Well, that seems to be the analogy the judge saw... and common law works by analogy.

Analogies and metaphors break though.. when stacked too high or precariously. Here we stack the segregation analogy and the metaphor of "corporation are people, with rights." So, discriminating against a class of corporations is a violation of civil rights. In this case, the civil rights of bankruptcy attorneys & collection agencies... who probably do unsavoury things with square's service.

The CA SC didn't address that..

our opinion does not preclude Square from disputing White’s factual allegations. ... Nor do we express any view on whether a defendant violates the Act by discriminating on the basis of occupation or on White’s adequacy as a representative for a class of bankruptcy attorneys excluded from Square’s services. The question of an individual plaintiff’s standing under the Unruh Civil Rights Act is distinct from the question of that plaintiff’s ability to serve as a representative for a class of allegedly aggrieved individuals.[0]

White only won standing to bring his case. He's still prohibited from using Square; and he needs to win his case against Square before that'll change.

0. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2019/s...

Precisely. This is a "win" in terms of providing standing to litigate issues that previously would have been precluded under arbitration clauses, or through lack of transaction per the Surrey v. TrueBeginnings precedent, which is what was overturned.

It get's around the arbitration clause by overturning Surrey, so plaintiffs who are not a party to the arbitration clause can be found that may (through class representation) act for those who are subject to the arbitration clause.

> discriminating against a class of corporations is a violation of civil rights

This seems obviously true if eg the class in question is the corporation owner's race or sex.

Corporations frequently do not have a single owner. How does the logic work in that case?

You might look up the recent Comcast v. National Association of African American-Owned Media for how alleged race discrimination against a corporation can happen in practice.

Suppose I make it a known policy to reject as client all companies with at least one Asian owner, Asian major shareholder or Asian board member. If my company is a major market player (or if this policy were widespread) then this creates an incentive for companies to avoid having Asians in those positions, and puts all Asians at a disadvatage. That seems like a civil rights issue to me.

You also need to have either no competition, (or incompetent) and some barrier to entry. Otherwise companies will just by from your competitor.

History has plenty of examples where it works, however in many other cases the policy just limits those trying it. Most people don't care enough about your prejudice when they can get a better deal and suddenly the out group becomes normal business partners.

That’s a fairly absurd example all around. As a practical matter, any public company of any size will probably have at least one Asian shareholder.

85 years ago such policies existed in Europe with Jews instead of Asians as the target, in the current climate you might instead substitute "Asian" with "Chinese". The race doesn't really matter, it's the concept that matters.

You are missing the point. Your logic means no business can refuse to deal with any public company, because any company of any size has a(n) $ETHNICITY shareholder.

> Your logic means no business can refuse to deal with any public company, because any company of any size has a(n) $ETHNICITY shareholder.

No, nothing offered upthread suggested that. First of all because it didn't refer to merely having a shareholder of a particular ethnicity, but more critically because it didn't suggest it was illegal to refuse to do business with a company that happened to have a major shareholder or board member of a particular race or ethnicity but that it was illegal for a business to refuse to do business because of the race/ethnicity of some party holding a specified role ownership/management role within the target firm.

I think you are bypassing the issue the GP was addressing: You said the scenario described by the GGP was absurd. The GP provided a concrete example of that scenario.

GP was disputing your characterization of the example as absurd, nothing more.

You can always start with "more than 50% of shares held by $ETHNICITY", and if you notice that you have an effect you can slowly lower the limit to allow fewer and fewer $ETHNICITY shareholders.

If we’re talking globally then plenty of examples of that exist right now.

I don’t know your gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or country of origin, but I can guarantee someone you’re going to have issues doing business because of discrimination. Saying X in not an issue in a country where X is protected/prohibited/regulated etc is a very week argument for getting rid of the associated laws.

You would need to show intent either way. If the intent is proven to discriminate based one of several owners I think the protection would still apply.

Under "disparate impact" [0], intent is not required.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disparate_impact

An interesting example of this I'll mention that I have personal experience with (I know someone processing these complaints).

In New York City, there is a law against advertising for jobs with gender-specific terms. So the terms "busboy", "waitress", etc... are not permitted - you must use both gendered terms or a gender neutral term.

Some enterprising people decided to file complaints each week against restaurants and bars for their gender-based job postings online. The restaurants and bars would get fined, and the complaintee would be given a portion of the fine.

Some folks are earning a steady income filing these complaints - never having any intention of even applying for any of those jobs.

This practice continues even today - courtesy of the New York City Human Rights Commission. Ironically, the City advertises the number of "actions" against bars and restaurants as a metric that it is doing good in the community.

This isn't about civil rights per se, it's about a definition of "standing" in a particular context (the Unruh Act).

While not an invalid point, it's worth noting that this case deals mostly with occupational discrimination and not racial discrimination which is arguably a red herring here. Debt collectors for example, from my reading, were among certain groups barred from accessing Square.

This is what I came away with as well. I really don't understand how Surrey v. TrueBeginnings became relevant jurisprudence outside of its own idiosyncrasies.