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Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by hans_castorp on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:21AM (#22402930)
I don't think so.

Signal might be open source but the servers are still run in the USA and thus are subject to the US "legal system" (which in turn is subject to the mood of its president).

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by cpbotha on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:29AM (#22402962)
Signal servers only know who talked to whom, but otherwise are physically not able to see even a smattering of the contents of the communication.

Correction: The signal servers don't even have that bit of metadata. See [1], they only store the last time that a user connected to the server.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software)#Servers

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by est31 on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:52AM (#22403040)
> The signal servers don't even have that bit of metadata. See [1], they only store the last time that a user connected to the server.

Note that it's what they claim at least. It's not verifiable client side, and to be honest, it's hard to come up with a scalable protocol where this is the case, but you should still not repeat their claim as a matter of fact while in reality we only have their word that the code actually matches what's deployed. And even if they don't store anything, AWS could still provide interested entities access to the infrastructure to capture what Signal doesn't want to capture. Yes, features like sealed sender are awesome and are an important step, but the service still gets ip addresses, which do provide hints about the sender. Again, likely Signal doesn't store ip addresses but people with access to their infrastructure could.

Furthermore, Signal's encryption doesn't help against people storing all of Signal's traffic and waiting until attacks on crypto algorithms become practical (quantum computers, theoretical progress on attacks). Some secrets become irrelevant with time, others increase in value. The best defense is never having the message leave your country's network in the first place.

And there's the DOS problem. What happens if the american president decides that the EU should be cut off from all US network connections? The EU parliament members can't even organize a good response to this because they use an american service...

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by tadzik_ on Monday February 24, 2020 @06:08AM (#22403103)
Signal app is also canonically distributed by Google Play/Apple Store, which are US entities under US law. When push comes to shove, an app update may get distributed to select individuals that will happily gather and send all their conversation histories and more.

As an EU citizen, I'm half puzzled and half horrified at how happy the EU institutions are to rely on foreign products: especially coming from a country that has a history of being trigger-happy and cutting people off in the name of a "trade war".

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by rawfan on Monday February 24, 2020 @07:25AM (#22403453)
I compiled Signal for iOS and monitored the sent data through a proxy. Both behave identical. There could be a hidden switch in the distributed binaries that triggers other behavior, but I really doubt it. For Android, there are reproducible builds so you can actually check the code is the same. For iOS reproducible builds are harder but should still be possible.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by squiggleblaz on Monday February 24, 2020 @09:09AM (#22404040)
Can I verify that the build installed on my Android phone[] is identical to the one that I compiled? For instance, if I mount the device in Linux I can only see /mnt/sdcard, not /, so I can't copy the binaries off.

[] i.e. the build installed on my phone, not the build available no Google's server to download.

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by pergadad on Monday February 24, 2020 @07:15AM (#22403415)
What's the alternative? Private closed-source apps like Threema?

This also is not for official communication , it's just for any case where staff would currently use WhatsApp or similar spyware.

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by dependenttypes on Monday February 24, 2020 @07:22AM (#22403440)
I do not think that anyone suggest to use proprietary alternatives. Instead it seems that the posters in this thread would be more happy if the EU was more independent from the US by for example hosting their own signal servers and forking the client.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by jeltz on Monday February 24, 2020 @09:16AM (#22404093)
Matrix, which is already used by the French government.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by imtringued on Monday February 24, 2020 @07:22AM (#22403441)
Under your threat model no internet connected smartphone is safe. Google can just push any arbitrary software to run on your phone and this includes spyware created by governments.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by m4rtink on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:37AM (#22402990)
Can one really trust they don't store more if they physicaly have the information at one point in time ? Or possibly their upstream connectivity provider could do that metadata scrapping.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by josh2600 on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:43AM (#22403009)
I will link to this each and every time this comes up:

https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/

Signal turned over everything they had on this user (which was two time stamps: user creation and last access), and fought the gag order to be able to publish the subpoena and the response. Signal would have to be pretty stupid to lie to a federal court.

Think what you want, but Signal doesn’t have any metadata to turn over.

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by DrScientist on Monday February 24, 2020 @06:57AM (#22403320)
If I worked for the intelligence agencies I would be capturing all the info going in and out of the signal servers at the infrastructure level.

Even if I couldn't break the encryption I'd have timing and connectivity data.

So, if I were a user, I would always operate on the assumption that info would leak.

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by Forbo on Monday February 24, 2020 @09:33AM (#22404214)
In this threat model, the only defense you would have would be an overlay network resistant to correlation attacks where all nodes are involved in routing traffic (like I2P), or a mixnet like Katzenpost.

Getting people to use Tor for everything is hard enough, good luck getting people to use stuff even more obscure.

Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by hans_castorp on Monday February 24, 2020 @06:22AM (#22403157)
And how often where the silenced by US law and weren't even allowed to mention such a thing? We will never know.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by mcv on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:49AM (#22403030)
Even so, by EU rules, I'd expect them to be required to store the data in the EU.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app by godelski on Monday February 24, 2020 @01:10PM (#22406575)
Do you have an alternative where this isn't true? Honestly the complaints I see about Signal here (servers and being distributed through iOS/Google store) seem extremely low priority and at the point where no true Scotsman exists. Is Signal just not supposed to have servers?