Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
by m4rtink on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:37AM
(#22402990)
Can one really trust they don't store more if they physicaly have the information at one point in time ? Or possibly their upstream connectivity provider could do that metadata scrapping.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
by josh2600 on Monday February 24, 2020 @05:43AM
(#22403009)
I will link to this each and every time this comes up:
https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/
Signal turned over everything they had on this user (which was two time stamps: user creation and last access), and fought the gag order to be able to publish the subpoena and the response. Signal would have to be pretty stupid to lie to a federal court.
Think what you want, but Signal doesn’t have any metadata to turn over.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
by DrScientist on Monday February 24, 2020 @06:57AM
(#22403320)
If I worked for the intelligence agencies I would be capturing all the info going in and out of the signal servers at the infrastructure level.
Even if I couldn't break the encryption I'd have timing and connectivity data.
So, if I were a user, I would always operate on the assumption that info would leak.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
by Forbo on Monday February 24, 2020 @09:33AM
(#22404214)
In this threat model, the only defense you would have would be an overlay network resistant to correlation attacks where all nodes are involved in routing traffic (like I2P), or a mixnet like Katzenpost.
Getting people to use Tor for everything is hard enough, good luck getting people to use stuff even more obscure.
Re:EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
by hans_castorp on Monday February 24, 2020 @06:22AM
(#22403157)
And how often where the silenced by US law and weren't even allowed to mention such a thing? We will never know.