I've been thinking about this actually for quite a while, on a small-time scale. Consider the following scenario:
1. You have a fair amount of money in a Roth IRA, and roughly the same amount of money in a taxable account.
2. The limit on contributions per year is like $6K, and even if you put money in a 401K and then convert whenever possible, that's limited to $19K/yr I think. How can you work around this?
3. Let's assume you're approved for options in your taxable account; and my understanding is that you can buy options in a Roth account - you just can't write them.
4. So, what if you create a synthetic long position by purchasing calls on a broad market fund in the Roth, and selling cash-secured puts on the same fund in the taxable account. And maybe buy some short term corporate debt fund in the Roth to make up for the missing dividends. Not sure if you could also earn some interest on the taxable side. If the stock market goes up in the long run, then you have most of your gains tax-free in the Roth, and minimize your taxable gains. If the stock market goes down for a while, you have most of your losses in the taxable account, and minimal losses in the Roth.
5. I think there are some practical problems, but Matt Levine could probably write about them much more engagingly than me, particularly after someone tries this and gets in trouble for it.
Worse, the aspect of options and "substantially similar" securities starts to get arcane fast. Meaning, you really want a tax lawyer involved on a complex transaction like that. Otherwise, you may find that you've apparently made a ton of money, and then a few years later the IRS knocks on your door and asks for all your profits in a nice check paid to US Treasury.
(I'm not saying you can or cannot do this, only that the tax law gets complicated fast.)
[0] - (page 56) - https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p550.pdf
[1] - https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-08-05.pdf
=======
EDIT - meant to add that "sale or other disposition" includes the expiration of an option. So you don't actually have to sell to incur the wash sale situation.
Making a sham trade at an arbitrary price with yourself is not what I was describing. My idea was the calls and the puts are as close to at the money as possible, and the counterparties are just random people with no pre-arrangement.
If you're going to simply do fraud, then the constraints don't seem interesting to me.
Say you have a $200B state pension fund - you invest a portion in the loser fund, earn a portion back as personal wealth on the winner side.
Doing this sort of thing destroys the reputation of hedge funds and is not a long-term positive expected value decision. (See Bluecrest: https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/fund-within-a-fund-c...)
While skepticism of Medallion is warranted, we're not doing ourselves favors by explaining away its success with activity that would have much more likely killed the firm vs sustained it.
Simons, for example, has a ~$21B fortune, and I doubt he gets more than 1/3rd of Medallion's $10B capacity. He's probably got more money in RIEF than in Medallion.
But I am not seeing how you can control the direction the money moves. For example if you knew fund A will gain $x and fund B will lose $x, shouldn't you simply not make the trade in fund B?
So there are (simplistically) two funds, Sucker and Winner. They take complementary positions, and, whichever one wins gets transferred to Winner.
So far so good. Winner is winning every bet, and Sucker is losing every bet.
Now you need people to put money into Sucker, because it has to come out the other end into Winner. How do you convince them to do that? By giving them a cut of Winner's profit?
But that's where things don't add up. How can the Sucker investors and the Winner investors both be making a profit from Winner's funds, if the net money going in and out of the combined funds is equal?
BTW I don't really buy this theory but that's how it would work.
It doesn't seem so brazen that 40 years of proprietary IP could have built something to scrape 0.00000x% of the value of something much bigger that's roughly but not exactly built on mathematical principles and is largely unexplored due to a relatively short life.
The "sovereign pump and dump" is interesting. Fund A is 20% of your assets and is "clean". Fund B raises the asset value of whatever A is invested in, and A monetizes. You could maybe even do this without the manager knowing. But it seems so crazy inefficient surely if you had a billion dollars this isn't the way you would do it.
If RenTec medallion fund is capped at 10B and their other funds are 100B, every 1% profit they transfer is 10% performance improvement in medallion. As long as the large fund is still profitable, it is basically a management fee.
Alternatively, the looser fund could be another external fund, operating in cahoots using a complementary strategy to launder monday.
But for Winner to be beating the market, Sucker has to be underperforming the market, since hedge funds, on average, match or underperform the market (see Buffet's famous ten-year bet: hedge funds massively underperformed index funds).
If the managers of Sucker have figured out a way to outperform the market for 20 years, even while secretly giving away some of its earnings, then that would already be an incredibly impressive success story, even without the cheating.
making a profit /= beating the market. People invest in hedge funds all the time that under-perform the market. In this case, the sucker fund just sucks a little more than usual. while the sucker fund under-performs the market, the firm also looks like hot shit because the winner fund is the most profitable fund on earth.
This is perfectly true. I guess it was aptly named the "Sucker" fund in our discussion.
People have accepted 2% fees on managed funds despite underperforming an index fund for decades.
In such a case, it may be (fscking) helpful for the courts of law to go after the people who _didn't clearly break_ the law in the first place. That way, the shady Machiavellians get caught first and the chumps can be mopped up afterwards. Deep as anythink.
The idea is that you have two theoretically unrelated funds that take complementary positions with uneven odds. One sacrifices performance for the other, effectively transmitting money. The trick, of course, is doing this in a manner so that you have plausible deniability with regulators and, more importantly, so that other market players don't grab the money in flight, because that's what an efficient market would do. Still, consistently creating and hiding complementary pairs of good/bad opportunities is a much easier problem than consistently beating the market.
OK, so you've got a way to transmit money from a "sucker fund" to a "winner's fund" with plausible deniability, what do you do with this ability? In reality you'd probably have many "sucker funds," rotate the one that gets sucked, and limit the extent to which it gets sucked, but still, nobody's going to just buy the sucker fund, not for long, anyway. That's how efficient markets work. Well, one major, well-known, boring inefficiency is the principal agent problem: trusting others to invest your money. They can't just steal it, because that's illegal. They can't just invest in a private fund that they just happen to oversee and which just happens to pay them an enormous salary, because that's illegal. However, if they were to invest in one side of a money wormhole, which is designed to look like a perfectly reasonable investment on its own, in exchange for a cut of the proceeds from the other side of the money wormhole, who's to say the theft even happened? Such an accusation would need to untangle the coordination behavior of the money wormhole to make its case, and those inner workings could be made very convoluted indeed, hidden deep inside complementary pseudorandom behavior.
So, in short, the conspiracy theory says it's a heist -- but one that's well hidden under the veil of statistics and plausible deniability. It provides investment managers looking to monetize the confidence placed in them a way to make that happen without getting caught.
It's probably a dumb theory, but it's enough to entertain someone who knows as little about finance as I do :)