If you’re required to handle this kind of sensitive information — for any purpose, but I would say this is even more true for anything tied to anything of a sexual nature or anything tied to health — you should take every precaution that that information is secure, encrypted when possible, and that your systems are regularly audited for vulnerabilities.
If the onus of properly protecting sensitive data — whether you’re legally required to hold it or not — is too much or too expensive, you shouldn’t be in that type of business. Period.
And to counter that, the victims are porn actors/actresses, so the perpetrators probably won't face consequences for it.
I'd like to /s this comment, but I'm not sure I can.
The law of having to hold the identification of the models is pretty much the only law you need to uphold. These sites are created from shills of shells.
You have one company, from there you then have two or three other companies which create white label brands utilising one of the shell companies.
So the brand “bangshelia” would be registered with a shell company “adult dating world”. This brand would then be bought by a shill and branded as “purple dating” but registered by a company called “dating purple”.
You would then affiliate with “adult dating tonight” where they would provide the data for your brand.
To get anywhere near close to chasing the company, you need to launch a lawsuit against the active site, (the company registered to) and then the company behind that and from that the company providing the database. Which all costs money.
As my CEO did, you pack up shop on one of those brands and rebrand yourself. Claim your not associated to the previous company by registering another director.
There are no resources available to attempt to make anything secure. The website of the company I used to work for kept all passwords in plain text in a database that was accessible online publicly for other affiliates to borrow to create their own “brand”.
It’s shill of shells. The CEO makes one company, another “investor” buys a brand of the original company and registers it in their name and then sells that on.
> If you’re required to handle this kind of sensitive information ... you should take every precaution that that information is secure, encrypted when possible, and that your systems are regularly audited for vulnerabilities.
None of that solves the problem, though.
You can protect an S3 bucket, but anyone who wants it simply checks it periodically.
Then one day someone is working with the data and changes the permissions to get access, and before they know it, it's downloaded in minutes. It just takes one attacker to get lucky and catch it before your audits do.
And S3 is not unusual, it's just an Internet service like any other, they all have this problem. Even if you have your own data center on a private network, it's only private until someone needs to transmit something and opens a route.
It's ultimately a human problem, there's no magic that can prevent it.
> If the onus ... you shouldn’t be in that type of business. Period.
Ending an unjustified opinion with "period" highlights the fact that you didn't justify the opinion. And it sounds fatuous.
That's pretty much a good rule of thumb for, well, everything.
(Sure, there are exceptions. But, there's a reason AWS not only doesn't enable public access to buckets by default, but actually by default has superceding policies in place which block setting normal policies to allow public access; it's almost always the wrong choice.)
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Child_Protection_and_Obscenity...
Considering that getting it wrong is a federal felony, the incentive set by the law is clear even if, arguably, unintended.
I don’t think you’re wrong, but I would argue that if getting it wrong is a felony, not properly protecting the data should be a felony as well. I realize it isn’t, but incidents like this showcase just how poorly the laws around this type of thing are written. If you can’t properly protect the data, you shouldn’t be in this type of business.
Of course, in this case, this is a site registered in Andorra. So who even know what those laws required in the first place.
It probably should be; I suspect that it's not because making involvement in porn risky for adult participants (and thereby discouraging it), while not the central focus of the law, isn't actually undesirable to lawmakers.
> Of course, in this case, this is a site registered in Andorra. So who even know what those laws required in the first place.
My understanding is that the US applies it's rules to anything of an adult nature sold into or among the US states, regardless of origin, though in practice applying it to foreign entities with little US exposure is difficult; but certainly it wouldn't be the only law that applies, to the extent it might apply.
What I will say is that just as computers are a force-multipler for getting important stuff done, they are also a force-multiplier for causing harm. As the old saying goes: “to er is human, to really foul up requires a computer”.
This leak did not endanger just one or two people, which would be bad enough, but 4000. Even if the remedy is limited to a fine sufficient for each affected person to change their names and address, it is still a more serious harm than almost anything normal intuition will help with because of how many were involved.
I wish that being in the sex industry was socially neutral for men and women and that nobody would be assaulted or insulted for it. I don’t know why that isn’t the case already, but I do recognise that it isn’t — and given that it isn’t, this leak is still extremely likely to result in someone getting hurt.
The law should allow for schemes that prove a performer is legal, identified, etc., but that don't keep individual private details. Even if the site was completely compromised, all the attackers would gain is a single bit of data on each performer. The data would be worthless for personal identification
Store all the identifying data they need to hold onto for compliance purposes plus the user ID in offline storage.
Just like banking regulations that seems stupid, they come from real abuses and a solution to it at the time. I doubt laws signed in 1988 had internet scale and access in mind, nor could they predict it.
This makes me physically sick.
Also, because of face recognition there really is zero anonymity at this point. It would be very misleading to represent to someone otherwise.
Also, there is a very big difference between citing facial recognition tech (which while rapidly becoming more common, is still something that requires a degree of skill to use and has a real cost to using) as a reason for “zero anonymity” and having public records with direct ties to nude photos and videos leaked. It’s even more misleading to represent that these have the same risk profile.
[1]: https://lawofsex.wordpress.com/2014/03/25/keeping-your-recor...
More like the state should not need it at all. Why support even more surveillance?
Age verification and privacy aren't mutually exclusive. The law can be amended in a way to remain effective without exposing people to such risks.
Back when the law was designed data breaches and being able to find everything online wasn't a thing so it wasn't a problem anyone thought of. Now it's time to fix the law to address the new risks.
And given that this is a site paying their webcammers, the other information is presumably back-up identification in case of account recovery or some such.
I see what you did there.
As always, the powerful (banks) can rig the system in their favor.
A credit card number is managed/owned/valid within the payment networks. Since they manage it, they get to dictate what means of protection are required in order for you to engage in business on those networks.
Government IDs are usually property of the body which issues them. That means each state can (and IIRC, does) have rules about what you can and cannot use that information for. Therefore you'd have to know the rules for each state or issuing body.
That's not to say that common sense _ought_ to dictate that these things should happen anyway, but who thinks to look up various state government rules on handling a Driver's License?
It's a matter of incentives.
Keep the data encrypted and only allow KYC providers access to the decryption keys.
ec109685 is right and this is precisely what VGS does. Most companies collect sensitive data (PII/PCI) to achieve a business objective, like verifying identity, age, creditworthiness or to authorize payment. Storing and securing this data is not their primary objective and possession of data comes with the burden of compliance and regulations. VGS acts as a proxy aliasing sensitive datasets as the data flows between systems. When it is time to use this data, VGS acts as a proxy replacing the aliases with real values as data has to be exchanged with third parties.
When dealing with short attributes, combining several other parts of the form to create a composite alias partitioned over the different parts of the payload gets the job done. This would expand the size of the short integer. Adjacent encodings in Chinese, Korean and Japanese characters further expand possibilities.
I'm not a cryptographer but that sounds like a good strategy when encrypting very short strings to resist cryptanalysis.
I don't get why they do it though. Faking a card photo is trivial so anyone trying to defraud them will just do so. These guys can manufacture physical replicas of cards to cash them out at ATMs, do the companies really think they won't be capable of altering a picture?
I'm assuming someone somewhere told them to do it and nobody took a minute to actually look into it deeper and realise how easy it is to exploit (and thus useless at preventing fraud).
And/or it ticks a checkbox in some compliance checklist.
There was a case years ago of a man who was on trial for child porn. It took the actress physically coming into the courtroom and showing her ID before the case was dropped.
It's just a really scary place to be in terms of society and the law, so I can understand making the decision to do the 'wrong' thing in this instance.
You do know that the legal recordkeeping requirements mandate specific indexing and cross-referencing requirements, and that the age records must legally include copies of portions of every covered piece of media sufficient to identify the performer against the photos in the age recors, and also must include cross-reference to every individual full work.
If your media is live streamed, it doesn't seem to me likely that you could meet the requirements with an offline system.
You store all the PII offline and assign each performer a unique identifier. Then tag each stream with the unique identifier.
Why would that not work?
It would work if the law is applied on such a way that the list of media retrieved by querying using the performer ID on the media server is acceptable as the listing of depictions that is required to be part of the age verification records. It's pretty clear in the combination of statute and regulation that either hardcopy or digital records can be used, but it's not at all obvious that a hybrid of that particular form satisfied the requirements. From an information management perspective, I can see it making sense; from what I've seen of administration of legal rules I can see where it might not be. Especially in an industry that politicians (and lead US federal prosecutors are all a brand of politicians) like to score points against, I would expect people to be extremely conservative about uncertain legal exposure; you don't want a setup where you have a decent but uncertain argument of it goes to court, you want one that would never give anyone a reason to think it was a viable pretext for legal action against you in the first place.
If so, there's a simple solution, albeit one that involves hiring a decent-sized staff of file clerks: whenever a model uploads a video, have a printer start spewing screenshots and have an file clerk grab a selection of photos that both identify the video and clearly show the model's face and put them in that model's file in the cabinet.
I guess today was my day to put my foot in my mouth for assuming that I can solve complicated systems with a "why don't you just" :/
Companies just choose to give them realtime access because they charge an admin fee for data access, and if it's realtime, they'll earn more.
source: i work in this field
But I don't think it is short, and it at least extends as long as you are selling the material to which it relates, since it is expressly illegal to sell depictions without the records.
They could be accused many years after the fact.
That way, if they need it as proof, they can just decrypt the data set. But if the data is stolen, it is of no use for the attacker.