Sulla is generally seen as having set the precedent for Caesar's march on Rome and dictatorship. Cicero comments that Pompey once said "If Sulla could, why can't I?". Sulla's example proved that it could be done, and therefore inspired others to attempt it; and in this respect, he has been seen as another step in the Republic's fall.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulla#Legacy

Kafka also has a nice related aphorism: "Beyond a certain point there is no return. This point has to be reached."

"There was a point where we needed to stop, and we have clearly passed it.

So let's keep going and see what happens."

And disease, starvation, and the general problems of the march. This is one of the things I learned from Clausewitz's discussion of Napoleon's march on Moscow, the one that produces the famous Tufte diagram.

The Grande Armeé numbered 422,000 per Tufte/Minard, 1 million per Wikipedia, the same as several large music festivals; and they almost all had to walk the ~3,000 kilometers to Moscow; and most of the food had to be locally sourced. This necessarily resulted in the force being spread out over a huge area, and every morning when it was formed up there would be slightly fewer men.

Edit: and speaking of burning boats, when they got there, the Russians had burned the food stores of Moscow, starving both the Invaders and the citizens.

> and they almost all had to walk the ~3,000 kilometers to Moscow

Closer to 800 km than 3000. Napoleon's invasion of russia started at the neman river near lithuania. It didn't start in paris.

Now compare napoleon's "short walk" to moscow with the thousands of kilometers of logistics that alexander or genghis khan had to deal with ( and they succeeded while napoleon failed miserably ).

Another great napoleon logistic fail was his failure in egypt where he lost another army. It shows how propaganda frames the people's minds that we think that napoleon was a competent, let alone a great military leader. Objectively, Napoleon's major failures and the fact that he destroyed the french empire makes him one of the greatest military fools in human history.

http://nowscape.com/images/map_napoleon_moscow.gif

https://external-content.duckduckgo.com/iu/?u=https%3A%2F%2F...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berezina

From my school lessons, it wasn't deliberate.

Of course if Cortés burned all his ships then his entire force was wiped out, would news have reached home? And if it did reach home, would the news of crushing defeat and incompetent leadership have been hushed up?

So I'm not sure I consider this 'substantial advantage' proven.

Payoff table: Both swerve: both lose face Neither swerve: both die They swerve, you don't: you gain face, they lose it You swerve, they don't: you lose face, they gain it

So: you make it abundantly clear that you can't control your car, even if you wanted to. Tear out the steering wheel, or lash it down and jump onto the roof of the car. Now it changes your opponents options to:

Swerve: lose face Don't: die.

(It's a trolley-problem-like scenario, don't ask too many questions about the practicalities of tearing out the steering wheel)

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precommitment

[1] https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/game-theory/commitment/...

https://youtu.be/S0qjK3TWZE8?t=72

– EF Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered (1973)

https://youtu.be/S0qjK3TWZE8

Only if you are the only one knowing that the opponent cannot steer the car.

If you know that a bullet is coming and keep running into it, people will call you an idiot, not courageous. You also won’t lose face if you duck, if those judging your courage know that the bullet can’t steer itself.

The current article seems to believe that this behaviour is in some sense irrational, presumably on the theory that "rationally" you should never prefer to remove a potentially useful option (which after all you could just choose not to use).

But I think that isn't the best way to look at it. What Cortés really needed was for his men to _believe_ that there was no option to retreat. As the only way for him to achieve that was to actually burn the ships, that was the price he chose to pay. But if he'd had another way to achieve that goal I expect he would have taken it.

The same goes for the chicken game: removing your control of the car is the price you may have to pay for causing your opponent to believe that you have no control of your car.

Looking at things this way, the behaviour is no more irrational than it's irrational for me to prefer a situation in which I end up with less money to a situation in which I end up with more, if I've bought something of value with that money.

[0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shareholder_rights_plan#Common...

In industry you sometimes see a similar "against all odds" spirit that infuses an organization, usually from the top down but sometimes just the worker's commitment to a cause although usually not caused by the CEO burning a building.

Yes, dramatic and desperate 'damn close run thing' breakout with heavy losses, also including 41 Commando Royal Marines, and assisted by a lot of close air support.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devotio

> There is a legend that Ṭāriq ordered that the ships he arrived in be burnt, to prevent any cowardice. This is first mentioned over 400 years later by the geographer al-Idrisi, fasc. 5 p. 540 of Arabic text

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariq_ibn_Ziyad#cite_ref-7

> This strategic choice highlights the difference between logic and economists’ concept of “rationality,”

Maybe if economics were that simple. But if your increased soldiers' willpower to fight is superior to what you lost in terms of tools, then the plan should be economically viable, right?

(literally)

> When they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve - to their villages about four hundred - and to the private dwellings that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them; that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more ready for undergoing all dangers.

Spoiler: It did not work out so great for them.

Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities."

-- Sun Tzu, Art of War, Maneuvering

https://suntzusaid.com/book/7

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.

https://suntzusaid.com/book/8

At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.

He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going.

To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the business of the general.

https://suntzusaid.com/book/11

https://onepeterfive.com/burn-ships-hernan-cortes-new-world/

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/Ruta_de_...

It's the origin of the famous phrase "the sea is behind and the enemy is in front of you".

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicksburg_campaign

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precommitment

People come to battle for a reason, fight for a reason, obey for a reason, all which may be different. 90% of a victory is bringing the soldiers you need with the weapons you need commanded by the officers you need in the place you need them. We focus on the 10% of battles that were won by tactical geniuses, but even they, without the 90% of logistics that preceded it, would be nowhere.

Caesar was a bridge builder. Hannibal crossed the Alps in winter. Mehmed II carrying ships over land to siege Constantinople. Hitler's specialty, the Blitzkrieg, was ALL about logistics.

The secret to being a trader is to not risk it all, to be there tomorrow to claim tomorrow's profit. Or perhaps the secret to poker is to stay in till you have a winning hand then risk it all.

But We have made lottery winners our heroes - I fear this is entirely the wrong model.

NB Ceaser invaded Britain and definitely did not burn his ships - his mission was not conquest of Britain but political gains in Rome. Caesar may have risked it all - but when the odds on him where around 50:50, not at Cortes' level of risk. To me the difference is profound.

People here should be familiar with this dynamic.

Aside from being overdone, the reason it bothers me is because it distracts from so many other points. In this case, it distracts from the main point of the article which is that not having a fallback position leads to higher commitment. It's a lesson larger than just the warfare and politics examples given. It has very broad applicability in life.

That's what the article claims, but that doesn't necessarily make that statement accurate.

There's no proof Cortez et. al.'s troops actually felt higher commitment as a consequence of having their ships burned - we are expected to conclude that's what happened, but we have only Cortez's word to tell us this and an article demonstrating selection bias.

This is a natural human response. Relatable even without testimony from Cortez's troops.

So sometimes having the backup plan let's you make better choices.