I would respectfully suggest that you read the book I quoted. I also thought there were "no incidents". The book is from 1983, so it specifically describes the 70s and early 80s. There were plenty of incidents and accidents, it's just that few of them resulted in major releases of radioactive material. My take on this after reading about some details is that we were just lucky.
Some might say it is outdated — but I followed up on some of the stories described there and checked more recent developments. Specifically, the San Onofre plant which gets a mention in the book. You can read about it on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Onofre_Nuclear_Generating_... — now tell me that we know what we're doing and that we "know how to safely operate nuclear power plants" after reading things like:
> On investigation, the replacement steam generators from 2011 in both units were found to show premature wear on over 3,000 tubes, in 15,000 places.[47] Plant officials pledged not to restart until the causes of the tube leak and tube degradation were understood.
Other honorable mentions:
> "The firm Bechtel was ... embarrassed in 1977, when it installed a 420-ton nuclear-reactor vessel backwards" at San Onofre
> In 2008, the San Onofre plant received multiple citations over issues such as failed emergency generators, improperly wired batteries and falsified fire safety data.
Again, I am not against nuclear power. I'm just pointing out that we have way too much hubris and the rosy picture of "no incidents" is not entirely true.
Also, which newer designs do you mean?
I mean, look at it from the other angle. At San Onofre, a vessel was installed backwards. It then proceeded to deliver power for 25 years & was decommissioned. Additionally, we're reading about all this mismanagement as a result of regulatory oversight. Not as a result of a post-catastrophe investigative report.
Per mile danger is the most favorable towards airlines, but you could use per-journey and then airline travel is 3-4x more dangerous than cars.
The best you can do is either say "airline travel is plenty safe enough" or make direct comparisons like "traveling from NYC to LA via airline is safer than driving the same distance".
This wouldn't be a fair comparison either, unless you normalized for number of people on the journey. (As done in passenger-miles.)
This particular case at least sounds like the system working as expected. The system was inspected, the tubes were in bad shape, so the plant shut down.
You don't. I bet you don't understand how a coal or hydro plant works either. People operating them do.
Furthermore, I feel this this could be an ideal application for AI. AI is outstanding at recognizing patterns that are often impossible for other systems to discover, so what would be better then to "train" a group of AI on nuclear plant safety and let them monitor all the systems in real time, looking for any group of subtle changes that, in the past, have lead to severe problems?
I'm sure I'm hardly the first person to consider this, so I was wondering if anyone has any info about using AI in this way?
Which avenues produce the most? Even PVs + batteries require mining and by-product disposal with environmentally devastating materials, and the fatalities cause by burning coal is almost immeasurable.
I got the Kindle edition and have read up through most of Chapter 2 now. While I see the author's general point, at least regarding nuclear power, and can understand where he was coming from when he wrote it, I already see two obvious flaws looking at it today:
(1) In Chapter 2 he predicts that there will be more TMIs as more reactor years of operation accumulate. But that didn't happen. If the expectation is that we should have, say, one TMI for every 35 reactor years of operation (35 is his estimate of how many reactor years of operation there were of reactors similar to TMI-2 at the time of the incident there), we should have had 50 or more TMIs by now. So evidently there was some major factor that he overlooked in his analysis. (The obvious candidate for such a factor is that, as someone else mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the nuclear industry learned from TMI and incidents like it, and the level of understanding of how nuclear plants work and how to avoid problems became much better than he indicates in the book.)
(2) He focuses on systems in which what he calls "normal accidents" can take place--incidents that are outside the intended operation of the system, but which are unavoidable (and hence "normal") due to the tightly coupled interactions of the parts of the system and the system's complexity being too high to be fully understood. But he completely ignores systems in which the intended, normal operation of the system causes harm, which is simply ignored because it is too diffuse to attract attention. For example, in the introduction to the book he says that we could have chosen coal plants instead of nuclear plants; he seems completely oblivious to the fact that coal plants, by emitting particulates into the atmosphere, have killed orders of magnitude more people through respiratory disease than have been harmed by nuclear incidents. But coal plants emitting particulates isn't an "incident"--it's the normal operation of the plants--and people dying of respiratory disease isn't a single newsworthy incident, so it flies under his radar and he never considers it.
You mention the San Onofre plant, but that was not a US Navy reactor, it was a commercial generating plant. I was specifically talking about US Navy reactors on ships and submarines.
I have not read the book you referenced, but I have added it to my reading list. It seems like it is focused on commercial nuclear plants.
> tell me that we know what we're doing and that we "know how to safely operate nuclear power plants" after reading things like
These are not errors that happened because nobody knows how to do these things correctly. They are errors that happened because technically ignorant managers and business people were making decisions they should not have been making. The US Navy's program solves that problem by not allowing technically ignorant people to be in decision making positions. And even technically non-ignorant people who make minor errors of judgment--far short of the kind illustrated in the incidents you mention--are fired and no longer allowed to operate the reactors, so they never reach the point where they can make a wrong decision that would have significant adverse consequences.
The reasons why civilian nuclear power in the US was never held to the same standards, again, are political, not technical. And it's also worth noting that no other energy source in the US gets held to such standards, even though all of them have caused far more harm than nuclear ever has.
> which newer designs do you mean?
Pebble bed reactors and small modular reactors, for example. But even a standard light water reactor can be passively safe against a TMI or Fukushima type scenario if the cooling system is designed to utilize natural circulation, which US Navy submarine reactors are (they do it in order to be quieter, since they don't require coolant pumps unless the sub is at high speed, but it also gives the passive safety benefit).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davis%E2%80%93Besse_Nuclear_Po...
Had that hole perforated, pressurized water/steam would have jetted straight up into the control rod drive mechanisms.
The USS Seawolf, Theodore Roosevolt, Swordfish, Proteus, Puffer, and Long Beach all had publicly known incidents involving the release of radioactive material... and given the navy's (legitimate) tendency to classify stuff I see little reason to believe this is the extent of the issues.
The only US Navy incidents I see there are:
- Loss of the USS Thresher--the reactor was shut down because of a subsafe problem (water leaking into the submarine because of a failed weld), not anything to do with the reactor. The leakage was severe enough that, as noted, the sub could not surface and sunk past crush depth.
- Loss of the USS Scorpion--the cause is unknown, as noted on the Wikipedia page, but a reactor problem is not among the causes considered possible. Most of the possible causes involve some kind of event causing a hull breach and flooding. [1]
- Various incidents involving radioactive reactor cooling water or related substances (such as the resin used to clean the reactor cooling loop). These do qualify as "incidents", but they have nothing to do with incorrect operation of the reactor or any inherent danger or factors not being understood in the reactor design.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Scorpion_%28SSN-589%29#The...
To the contrary, society's inability to deal with the radioactive waste created by running these reactors is one of the main concerns against nuclear power.
This is a political problem, not a technical problem. The only country using nuclear power that even has the political problem is the US. As noted elsewhere in this thread, every other country that uses nuclear power reprocesses the spent fuel and does not have a nuclear waste problem.
Last time I looked into it not one country had the ability to reprocess the fuel (and how would that work anyway?) and there was only one country in Europe that claimed it will have a storage facility fit for storing the waste forever, highly disputed (there are multiple for weakly radioactive waste but none for the highly radioactive stuff).
> This is a political problem, not a technical problem
Even if that were true (it isn't) that wouldn't not make it any better. Nuclear energy would still be way too dangerous, it doesn't matter whether the cause for its danger technical or political.
---
No one besides us two will read this, so I will add something I normally would not:
You claim a lot of falsehoods in this thread, like this now and the navy incidents. May I politely invite you to inform yourself a little bit better about this nuclear energy question? I really think that the political power amassed on HN could influence future politics on this question, and HN loves technical solution but sometimes misses the sensitivity for the danger on nuclear energy (probably reflecting that in the US there is no proper green energy movement and knowledge about this is in general limited). You adding completely wrong information to the discussion does not help improving the situation. So, as a real honest request: Please read up a bit more on this and don't spread pro-nuclear propaganda here.
Nobody has reprocessing capacity? You don't know how reprocessing would work? Are you serious?
http://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cy...
Note the "reprocessing capacity" table.
> May I politely invite you to inform yourself a little bit better about this nuclear energy question?
I think you are the one who needs to better inform yourself. I definitely think you need to do that before accusing anyone else of claiming falsehoods.
Nuclear energy has caused orders of magnitude less harm per unit of energy generated than any other power source. So you have things entirely backwards here.
Hiding it in a mountain and hoping for the best is hardly a solution.
The US Navy also has effectively as much money as it ever needs to “decommission” reactors. How many private reactors have their decommissioning costs adequately covered? Everything I’ve read says most estimates from time of construction were woefully inadequate and thus any money that may have been squirrelled away to pay for decommissioning will fall way short of what’s required.
The answer is inherently the same thing we do with what we already have. We've been generating electricity from nuclear power for sixty years. Nuclear waste is a thing that already exists. The question of what to do with two hundred thousand tons of nuclear waste is not fundamentally different than the question of what to do with one hundred thousand tons of nuclear waste. It needs to be answered independently of whether we build new reactors, and then the answer is the same for the new reactors as the existing ones.
Moreover, we already know the answers. The big one that nobody seems to talk about for some reason (?) is that the stuff is made of commercially valuable commodities. The short-lived isotopes are used in medical imaging. The longer-lived isotopes can be used to build RTGs and generate power.
You can also build fission reactors that run on it. Ironically the problem is that people keep complaining that we shouldn't build new reactors because of the unspent fuel which dampens investment into the new reactors that can do something about the existing material.
I don't know about the Navy, but we do know what to do with the toxic waste. I didn't realize people still thought it was a problem.
Nuclear fuel reprocessing plus breeder reactors can almost completely burn up all the nuclear fuel, leaving only short lived elements behind, and no long term storage issues.
The only reason we don't do it today is economic plus arms control.
Which would appear to be a disqualifying issue since the entire reason people are advocating for nuclear and not renewables is economic.
Moreover, that is a temporary issue. You have a lot of money from oil and coal lobbying against anything that could replace them, but you don't have to reprocess the spent fuel this year, or next year, or ten years from now. You can do it thirty years from now when the coal lobby is dead and gone because nobody burns coal anymore by then. And storing it for that long is much easier than needing somewhere to put it for thousands of years.
Or if you're saying "reactors are going to be just as safe even if all those expensive regulations are removed", then you have to justify that (and justify that removing regulations will reduce the cost enough). I am extremely skeptical.
Safety is always about trade offs. One solution makes things 30% safer and costs $2500, another makes things 0.000000002% safer and costs $2,500,000, another makes things 10% safer and costs $50,000 but is strictly an alternative to a newer technology that makes things just as safe but costs $500.
The problem with existing nuclear regulations is that they're stale and brittle. You're not allowed to do something which is a safety improvement because every change has to go through a slow, expensive bureaucratic process. By definition, preventing safety improvements does not improve safety.
But it also increases costs, because technology gets better over time in multiple dimensions, including efficiency. You can't use the technology which is both safer and less expensive because existing rules require you to do things in the strictly worse ways that existing reactors do them.
The process of improving the rules is itself the source of significant expense. Opponents will fight sound proposals on spurious grounds just to extend the duration of the process and increase costs. Or propose wastefully inefficient "safety improvements" that are politically difficult to argue against, because pointing out that you can get ten times the safety improvement at 10% of the cost with other technologies will only cause them to turn around and argue for all of those things too, so then your costs increase by 110% of the unreasonable amount instead of 100%.
The existing process is inherently broken. It isn't optimizing for safety or cost, both of which would be improved by a more efficient regulatory environment. Like the regulatory processes -- by no means perfect but a thousand times better than this -- that are used for other things with equally dangerous potential like dams and large chemical plants.
Regulations get added because new accident scenarios come to light, often due to near misses in existing plants. So one would expect a regulatory ratchet effect over time, even with perfect rational regulation.
It's interesting to compare fission to another area of technology that has achieved high reliability in the face of accidents: commercial air travel. There, safety has been achieved on a pile of corpses. Aircraft are reliable because we've crashed so many of them over the decades and learned what not to do. And we can do that because society accepts the occasional smoking pile of aircraft and passenger fragments. And even there, when regulation eases off, safety suffers. Look at the recent experience at Boeing.
I don't think society would tolerate the string of meltdowns that would be needed for the same kind of natural reliability growth in nuclear.
I have.
The existing regulations prohibit safer alternatives. The safer alternatives are also less complicated and correspondingly less expensive. Using those alternatives would not only not reduce safety, it would improve safety, but they can only be used if those regulations are removed.
Here is an example. Older reactors require active cooling. If they lose electrical power for circulating pumps, they melt down. This is precisely what happened in Fukushima.
Alternative reactors use passive cooling. If you have no electricity, it doesn't matter, having electricity is not required by design. Which means you don't need a bunch of expensive multiply-redundant systems and contingencies to keep the power on.
But the new designs aren't allowed by old regulations, so things are more expensive and less safe than they could be.
> Regulations get added because new accident scenarios come to light, often due to near misses in existing plants. So one would expect a regulatory ratchet effect over time, even with perfect rational regulation.
That is what often happens, but it isn't what ought to happen.
There are two ways to address a near miss.
One is to make the minimal change to the existing design to address the issue, which is the only real option for already-existing installations. So e.g. reactors that require active cooling should have better generator redundancy. The other is to fundamentally change the design so that that category of problem inherently cannot happen.
The second one is what you want for new builds, but it's also what a low quality regulatory response expressly prohibits, or at best makes unnecessarily more costly. Because you end up with a rule that says "must have double redundant backup power generation" even for a design that doesn't require any power generation.
All you need instead of that is the ability for regulators to make timely and reasonable decisions. If there is a rule requiring backup power for pumps then it shouldn't apply to designs that don't need pumps, and if that isn't clear then the process for determining that and correcting the regulatory error should take two weeks rather than ten years.
> It's interesting to compare fission to another area of technology that has achieved high reliability in the face of accidents: commercial air travel. There, safety has been achieved on a pile of corpses.
That isn't really necessary. When you need a system to be reliable you build it with high tolerances and significant redundancy of safety-critical components. Then failures come in the form of "the expected maximum value for this variable was 100, the material spec supports values up to 400, but we measured a value of 150 in practice." Then the response is to replace the material with one that supports values up to 600. But there was never any danger, only a smaller safety margin than anticipated -- which is what the safety margin is for.
This is dramatically more difficult for aircraft than almost anything else because an aircraft requires active systems to prevent it from crashing violently into the ground. The normal failsafe of "emergency shutdown in event of serious issues" doesn't exist because you can't just shut down a plane while it's flying through the air at five hundred miles an hour and thirty thousand feet. So the requirement there isn't just "don't blow up" it's that you can't actually stop operating no matter what happens or everybody dies. Which is a much harder target to hit. And yet they still kill fewer people per mile than cars by two orders of magnitude -- while traveling ten times faster and with a hundred times more passengers per vehicle.
We know how to engineer things to be safe without making them uneconomical.
For Japan, reprocessing has been a kind of plausibly deniable nuclear proliferation. They have the material to become a nuclear armed nation in a big way, and quickly, should they ever decide to do that.
Most countries don't reprocess spent nuclear fuel immediately on removing it from the reactor. They store it until it is economical to reprocess it--because reprocessing turns most of the spent fuel into new fuel. So of course it doesn't make sense to reprocess it until doing so is cheaper than just buying new fuel on the market.
The point of reprocessing is not to get rid of all the waste immediately, but to reduce the required storage time from something totally unrealistic like 10,000 years to something totally realistic like 30 to 50 years--in other words, enough time for the market price of new fuel to exceed the cost of reprocessing the spent fuel you have stored. In other words, reprocessing is simply part of a sane long-term plan for the nuclear fuel cycle. But of course the people who are against nuclear power are not against it for sane reasons, so you wouldn't expect them to understand a sane long-term plan.
Reprocessing is a net economic loser (and that's why there's no reprocessing in the US, not because of prohibitions that were removed long ago). It's cheaper to just make new fuel from uranium. This is because uranium turned out to be more abundant than feared, nuclear power growth stalled, fabricating fuel elements with mixed oxides is more expensive because of TRU toxicity, and because the cost of enrichment went WAY down when the world switched from gaseous diffusion to centrifuges.
Reprocessing does not significantly reduce the cost of disposal, especially if fast reactors are not being used. Thermal reactors can tolerate maybe one go around of the fuel, but you then end up with more transuranics like curium that have higher thermal output, which limits how tightly they can be packed in an underground repository. And fast reactors are expensive, so using them doesn't make this an easier sell.
Countries have not foreclosed the possibility of reprocessing in the future, but (aside from it being a kind of deniable weapon material proliferation) it's difficult to see why they would ever want to.
Yes, because, as you state, the current cost of new fuel is lower than the cost of reprocessing. But that won't always be true. If we start building significantly more nuclear capacity, it probably won't be true for more than 30 to 50 years.
> "If we start building significantly more nuclear capacity,"
Why do you think that's going to happen, when nuclear is so grossly uncompetitive? And if cheap uranium is running out, then nuclear is in even worse trouble. Reprocessing might make it not quite as bad for nuclear, but the net effect would still be to place another economic hurdle in the way of fission.
No, I'm simply distinguishing it from the obviously false claim that every single bit of spent fuel gets reprocessed immediately on removal from the reactor. There is plenty of reprocessing actually happening now; it just isn't happening to every single bit of spent fuel that exists now.
> Why do you think that's going to happen, when nuclear is so grossly uncompetitive?
Nuclear is only "grossly uncompetitive" because it is penalized while other energy sources are subsidized. No other energy source is held to a standard of essentially zero risk. Every other energy source has killed many more people per unit of energy generated than nuclear has, yet people still insist on tying up nuclear plants in lawsuits while doing nothing at all about the harms done by other energy sources.
On a fair and level playing field, nuclear does have a signficant economic difference as compared to coal, oil, or natural gas: fuel costs are a much smaller fraction of operating costs, and amortization of the initial capital investment of building the plant is a much larger fraction of operating costs. Nuclear shares this property with solar and wind power, but it has a key advantage over those two: it can supply reliable base load power at all times.
> if cheap uranium is running out, then nuclear is in even worse trouble
Not much, because, as noted above, fuel costs are a much smaller fraction of operating costs than for oil, coal, or natural gas plants. That means profitability is much less sensitive to fuel costs.
Sure sounds like a great plan.
This video [1] is a pretty interesting and reasonably short look at their safety systems/precautions.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CANDU_reactor [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yx_XoqXNtRM
>...Or we could have done it after Three Mile Island (which harmed no members of the general public but clearly showed inadequacies in the way civilian nuclear plants were operated). The fact that we didn't is a political problem, not a technical or operational problem.
All indications are that much was learned by industry and the NRC after TMI:
"...The NRC said the TMI accident also led to increased identification, analysis and publication of plant performance information, and recognising human performance as “a critical component of plant safety”. Key indicators of plant safety performance in the US have improved dramatically. Those indicators show:
• The average number of significant reactor events over the past 20 years has dropped to nearly zero.
• Today there are far fewer, much less frequent and lower risk events that could lead to a reactor-core damage.
• The average number of times safety systems have had to be activated is about one-tenth of what it was 22 years ago.
• Radiation exposure levels to plant workers have steadily decreased to about one-sixth of the 1985 exposure levels and are well below national limits.
• The average number of unplanned reactor shutdowns has decreased by nearly ten-fold. In 2007 there were about 52 shutdowns compared to about 530 shutdowns in 1985."
https://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2009/03/23/three-mile-is...
That's true, the industry did learn a lot from TMI--and it made no difference, because it was already too late as far as public opinion was concerned. The US government and the media spun TMI as showing that nuclear power just wasn't safe enough, and the public believed it. As a result, we have nuclear generating about 20% of US electricity, when it could be more like 75%. Imagine if the US had not had to buy any foreign oil at all after, say, 1990.
Care to explain your "carefree" nuclear or give an example of a plant that has solved this problem?
This isn't just some theory work in academic papers. It isn't even "new", lots of research dating back to the 1960s.
The design from the 1960s would require online reprocessing of the salt. This is an immediate showstopper for utilities. No utility wants to operate a highly radioactive reprocessing plant at each of their reactors, especially when that complex equipment could not be maintained with direct human contact.
The MSR design from the 1960s used FLiBe. The total world annual production of beryllium is maybe 220 tonnes; the estimated resource, 100,000 tonnes. The design could not be scaled to supply world energy demand.
I don't think they use swimming pools for that purpose.
Scaling any operation is going to introduce error. It's exponentially harder to control 1,000 outcomes in a civilian operation than 10 outcomes in a military operation. And when the failure scenario is nuclear debris beyond sovereign borders, it gets dicey.
So the real political problem seems to be, "I don't want to be any part of Chernobyl, USA"
According to Wikipedia, US Navy has 70 active nuclear submarines, and 11 nuclear aircraft carriers. So 81 not 10. There is also a number of decommissioned ones.
On reactors less than 200MWe. 1GWe is another game when vessel is huge and pressurized. MSR is the way to go.
Also, in the case of an accident, the ship usually goes down and the reactor is naturally cooled and shielded by water. Then the accident us probably classified, because we don't want Russia recovering an US sub, like the CIA did at great taxpayer expense.
I think that SMRs are a way forward, even if it's a temporary solution until other safer, non pressurized reactors are developed. They draw from navy reactors and can be produced in a factory under strict QA, transported on site by truck and installed by qualified staff using clearly documented and reproductible procedures.
Maybe you just solved the problem. The Navy should operate the civilian nuclear power plants.
Unfortunately, scaling the power output also scales the risks and consequences of an accident.
This is true, and Perrow's book contains an interesting discussion of this. The Navy had requirements which are different from civilian power generation: they needed small and relatively lightweight reactors whose power output can be quickly adjusted, and where fuel can be replaced quickly. None of these requirements make sense for a stationary civilian power plant.
Yes, and not having to meet those requirements makes the reactor easier to design, operate, and maintain.
Furthermore, even the operational problem is now nonexistent with newer reactor designs. Older designs, like the reactors at Three Mile Island, required the operators to correctly execute a fairly complex procedure in the event of a problem to prevent the reactor from being severely damaged or destroyed; the TMI operators failed to do that. Also, as Fukushima showed, older reactor designs require reliable backup power for decay heat removal. Newer designs have neither of those requirements; you can literally pull the shutdown switch and walk away and there will be no problem.
So while I don't disagree with what you say about complex systems in general, I don't think nuclear reactors, with today's designs, are even that complex. We know how to design and build them so that it is impossible to operate them unsafely. We just don't have the political will to do it.