The answer is inherently the same thing we do with what we already have. We've been generating electricity from nuclear power for sixty years. Nuclear waste is a thing that already exists. The question of what to do with two hundred thousand tons of nuclear waste is not fundamentally different than the question of what to do with one hundred thousand tons of nuclear waste. It needs to be answered independently of whether we build new reactors, and then the answer is the same for the new reactors as the existing ones.
Moreover, we already know the answers. The big one that nobody seems to talk about for some reason (?) is that the stuff is made of commercially valuable commodities. The short-lived isotopes are used in medical imaging. The longer-lived isotopes can be used to build RTGs and generate power.
You can also build fission reactors that run on it. Ironically the problem is that people keep complaining that we shouldn't build new reactors because of the unspent fuel which dampens investment into the new reactors that can do something about the existing material.
I don't know about the Navy, but we do know what to do with the toxic waste. I didn't realize people still thought it was a problem.
Nuclear fuel reprocessing plus breeder reactors can almost completely burn up all the nuclear fuel, leaving only short lived elements behind, and no long term storage issues.
The only reason we don't do it today is economic plus arms control.
Which would appear to be a disqualifying issue since the entire reason people are advocating for nuclear and not renewables is economic.
Moreover, that is a temporary issue. You have a lot of money from oil and coal lobbying against anything that could replace them, but you don't have to reprocess the spent fuel this year, or next year, or ten years from now. You can do it thirty years from now when the coal lobby is dead and gone because nobody burns coal anymore by then. And storing it for that long is much easier than needing somewhere to put it for thousands of years.
Or if you're saying "reactors are going to be just as safe even if all those expensive regulations are removed", then you have to justify that (and justify that removing regulations will reduce the cost enough). I am extremely skeptical.
Safety is always about trade offs. One solution makes things 30% safer and costs $2500, another makes things 0.000000002% safer and costs $2,500,000, another makes things 10% safer and costs $50,000 but is strictly an alternative to a newer technology that makes things just as safe but costs $500.
The problem with existing nuclear regulations is that they're stale and brittle. You're not allowed to do something which is a safety improvement because every change has to go through a slow, expensive bureaucratic process. By definition, preventing safety improvements does not improve safety.
But it also increases costs, because technology gets better over time in multiple dimensions, including efficiency. You can't use the technology which is both safer and less expensive because existing rules require you to do things in the strictly worse ways that existing reactors do them.
The process of improving the rules is itself the source of significant expense. Opponents will fight sound proposals on spurious grounds just to extend the duration of the process and increase costs. Or propose wastefully inefficient "safety improvements" that are politically difficult to argue against, because pointing out that you can get ten times the safety improvement at 10% of the cost with other technologies will only cause them to turn around and argue for all of those things too, so then your costs increase by 110% of the unreasonable amount instead of 100%.
The existing process is inherently broken. It isn't optimizing for safety or cost, both of which would be improved by a more efficient regulatory environment. Like the regulatory processes -- by no means perfect but a thousand times better than this -- that are used for other things with equally dangerous potential like dams and large chemical plants.
Regulations get added because new accident scenarios come to light, often due to near misses in existing plants. So one would expect a regulatory ratchet effect over time, even with perfect rational regulation.
It's interesting to compare fission to another area of technology that has achieved high reliability in the face of accidents: commercial air travel. There, safety has been achieved on a pile of corpses. Aircraft are reliable because we've crashed so many of them over the decades and learned what not to do. And we can do that because society accepts the occasional smoking pile of aircraft and passenger fragments. And even there, when regulation eases off, safety suffers. Look at the recent experience at Boeing.
I don't think society would tolerate the string of meltdowns that would be needed for the same kind of natural reliability growth in nuclear.
I have.
The existing regulations prohibit safer alternatives. The safer alternatives are also less complicated and correspondingly less expensive. Using those alternatives would not only not reduce safety, it would improve safety, but they can only be used if those regulations are removed.
Here is an example. Older reactors require active cooling. If they lose electrical power for circulating pumps, they melt down. This is precisely what happened in Fukushima.
Alternative reactors use passive cooling. If you have no electricity, it doesn't matter, having electricity is not required by design. Which means you don't need a bunch of expensive multiply-redundant systems and contingencies to keep the power on.
But the new designs aren't allowed by old regulations, so things are more expensive and less safe than they could be.
> Regulations get added because new accident scenarios come to light, often due to near misses in existing plants. So one would expect a regulatory ratchet effect over time, even with perfect rational regulation.
That is what often happens, but it isn't what ought to happen.
There are two ways to address a near miss.
One is to make the minimal change to the existing design to address the issue, which is the only real option for already-existing installations. So e.g. reactors that require active cooling should have better generator redundancy. The other is to fundamentally change the design so that that category of problem inherently cannot happen.
The second one is what you want for new builds, but it's also what a low quality regulatory response expressly prohibits, or at best makes unnecessarily more costly. Because you end up with a rule that says "must have double redundant backup power generation" even for a design that doesn't require any power generation.
All you need instead of that is the ability for regulators to make timely and reasonable decisions. If there is a rule requiring backup power for pumps then it shouldn't apply to designs that don't need pumps, and if that isn't clear then the process for determining that and correcting the regulatory error should take two weeks rather than ten years.
> It's interesting to compare fission to another area of technology that has achieved high reliability in the face of accidents: commercial air travel. There, safety has been achieved on a pile of corpses.
That isn't really necessary. When you need a system to be reliable you build it with high tolerances and significant redundancy of safety-critical components. Then failures come in the form of "the expected maximum value for this variable was 100, the material spec supports values up to 400, but we measured a value of 150 in practice." Then the response is to replace the material with one that supports values up to 600. But there was never any danger, only a smaller safety margin than anticipated -- which is what the safety margin is for.
This is dramatically more difficult for aircraft than almost anything else because an aircraft requires active systems to prevent it from crashing violently into the ground. The normal failsafe of "emergency shutdown in event of serious issues" doesn't exist because you can't just shut down a plane while it's flying through the air at five hundred miles an hour and thirty thousand feet. So the requirement there isn't just "don't blow up" it's that you can't actually stop operating no matter what happens or everybody dies. Which is a much harder target to hit. And yet they still kill fewer people per mile than cars by two orders of magnitude -- while traveling ten times faster and with a hundred times more passengers per vehicle.
We know how to engineer things to be safe without making them uneconomical.
For Japan, reprocessing has been a kind of plausibly deniable nuclear proliferation. They have the material to become a nuclear armed nation in a big way, and quickly, should they ever decide to do that.
Most countries don't reprocess spent nuclear fuel immediately on removing it from the reactor. They store it until it is economical to reprocess it--because reprocessing turns most of the spent fuel into new fuel. So of course it doesn't make sense to reprocess it until doing so is cheaper than just buying new fuel on the market.
The point of reprocessing is not to get rid of all the waste immediately, but to reduce the required storage time from something totally unrealistic like 10,000 years to something totally realistic like 30 to 50 years--in other words, enough time for the market price of new fuel to exceed the cost of reprocessing the spent fuel you have stored. In other words, reprocessing is simply part of a sane long-term plan for the nuclear fuel cycle. But of course the people who are against nuclear power are not against it for sane reasons, so you wouldn't expect them to understand a sane long-term plan.
Reprocessing is a net economic loser (and that's why there's no reprocessing in the US, not because of prohibitions that were removed long ago). It's cheaper to just make new fuel from uranium. This is because uranium turned out to be more abundant than feared, nuclear power growth stalled, fabricating fuel elements with mixed oxides is more expensive because of TRU toxicity, and because the cost of enrichment went WAY down when the world switched from gaseous diffusion to centrifuges.
Reprocessing does not significantly reduce the cost of disposal, especially if fast reactors are not being used. Thermal reactors can tolerate maybe one go around of the fuel, but you then end up with more transuranics like curium that have higher thermal output, which limits how tightly they can be packed in an underground repository. And fast reactors are expensive, so using them doesn't make this an easier sell.
Countries have not foreclosed the possibility of reprocessing in the future, but (aside from it being a kind of deniable weapon material proliferation) it's difficult to see why they would ever want to.
Yes, because, as you state, the current cost of new fuel is lower than the cost of reprocessing. But that won't always be true. If we start building significantly more nuclear capacity, it probably won't be true for more than 30 to 50 years.
> "If we start building significantly more nuclear capacity,"
Why do you think that's going to happen, when nuclear is so grossly uncompetitive? And if cheap uranium is running out, then nuclear is in even worse trouble. Reprocessing might make it not quite as bad for nuclear, but the net effect would still be to place another economic hurdle in the way of fission.
No, I'm simply distinguishing it from the obviously false claim that every single bit of spent fuel gets reprocessed immediately on removal from the reactor. There is plenty of reprocessing actually happening now; it just isn't happening to every single bit of spent fuel that exists now.
> Why do you think that's going to happen, when nuclear is so grossly uncompetitive?
Nuclear is only "grossly uncompetitive" because it is penalized while other energy sources are subsidized. No other energy source is held to a standard of essentially zero risk. Every other energy source has killed many more people per unit of energy generated than nuclear has, yet people still insist on tying up nuclear plants in lawsuits while doing nothing at all about the harms done by other energy sources.
On a fair and level playing field, nuclear does have a signficant economic difference as compared to coal, oil, or natural gas: fuel costs are a much smaller fraction of operating costs, and amortization of the initial capital investment of building the plant is a much larger fraction of operating costs. Nuclear shares this property with solar and wind power, but it has a key advantage over those two: it can supply reliable base load power at all times.
> if cheap uranium is running out, then nuclear is in even worse trouble
Not much, because, as noted above, fuel costs are a much smaller fraction of operating costs than for oil, coal, or natural gas plants. That means profitability is much less sensitive to fuel costs.
Hiding it in a mountain and hoping for the best is hardly a solution.
The US Navy also has effectively as much money as it ever needs to “decommission” reactors. How many private reactors have their decommissioning costs adequately covered? Everything I’ve read says most estimates from time of construction were woefully inadequate and thus any money that may have been squirrelled away to pay for decommissioning will fall way short of what’s required.