But then actually use the myriad of compiler flags, static analysers and dependent typing tooling (Frama-C) available for it.
Some of them exist since 1979.
If someone can scan your repo for a problem this quickly, then youre not designing secure software, and that should be posted front and center at the top of the repo given that wasms entire purpose is machine independent code that is properly sandboxed from exploitation.
Page one of the spec
– Safe: code is validated and executes in a memory-safe3, sandboxed environment preventing data cor-ruption or security breaches.
You start with the ability to do arbitrary code execution, you don't have to find an exploit to do that. And since your WASM code is the only thing in the process, what is an exploit going to let you do that you couldn't already do anyway?
Maybe you're confusing it with privilege escalation, though? Or a sandbox escape? But FYI those aren't the same thing. At all.
Alternatively if the worst you've seen on HN is one person seemingly confusing arbitrary code execution with privilege escalation you must not be on HN very much.
This one clearly needs work in validating the Wasm sent to it.
What prevents me from writing a wasm file with an arbitrary value for "depth" greater than CALLSTACK_SIZE (1024) and overflowing the buffer? (If the answer is "nothing", that's probably arbitrary code execution.)