Think of incoming CLID in the same way that you do email From: addresses. Often and easily faked. Funnily enough both my office PBX and SMTP daemon check incoming CLID/HELO and drop attempts to spoof their own identity. Its not a particularly sophisticated protection these days but is one of many, many rules. Actually, now I come to think of it, my firewalls also check for inbound IP spoofing on their own IPs.
As the OP stories highlight, your mental firewall must make you bail out when asked for your PIN, regardless of how legitimate things sound. The only thing that should ever request your PIN is a machine that you have stuffed your card in first. I'm pretty certain that CVV requests should also only ever come from vendors that you are buying from, not your bank.
Why not? That's how it was done for email. SPF doesn't prevent interoperability for sending domains that don't use it or recipients that don't verify it. What it does is inhibit forged messages from a domain that does use it to a recipient that does verify it.
Then the more senders who have an SPF record, the stronger a spam signal it is for a domain to not have one, and the stronger the incentive gets for senders to use it. It's already in the recipient's interest to verify it when it's used.
They could even use DNS for this exactly like email. Create a lookup zone equivalent to in-addr.arpa but for phone numbers.
It is not as simple as getting everyone who runs public facing smtpd on the Internet to upgrade their software and practices. Telco and PSTN phone stuff is the very opposite of being up to date and continually evolving best practices for security.
You may not even have to upgrade the old equipment. For an out of band protocol, the upstream may be able to implement it for you.
Turning those companies into smoking holes in the ground doesn't require anyone to upgrade their equipment. All it takes is willingness on the part of lawmakers and regulators to track them down and make them regret their business practices.
Creative use of firewall rules can be really powerful. For a very simple example: block VoIP from AWS's address ranges (serious gain).
A classic response for anon calls in telephony is to make the caller record a short identifying message and then play that to the potential recipient. The potential recipient then decides whether or not to accept the call - your staff (family, whatever) become the firewall. Remember that calls are billed to the caller by the terminating provider so this is OK (caller pays).
Those are two simple examples of using IP and humans to firewall telephony. Just because telephony is a bit crap on the identification side does not mean that you can't deploy lots of other weaponry to keep yourself safe. If you look deeply into SIP and IAX2, you get loads more options as well.
You can, technically, write anything in it and there’s no way to guarantee it’s authentic.
For example here are some headers from some spam I received:
From: "Jeremy Adamson" <[email protected]>
Reply-To: "Jeremy Adamson" <[email protected]>
From: is what I see in my client and Reply-To: is where a reply would go to.This one is much better, note how I'm BCCd and To: is complete bollocks:
Reply-To: [email protected]
From: Dr Faruk Ahmed <[email protected]>
Subject: MANAGER AUDIT AND ACCOUNT DEPT
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
BCC: <[email protected]>
Return-Path: [email protected]
Given that Reply-To and Return-Path are in different domains, where would a reply go to?Basically a large registry. When I call someone I tell t-mobile who I'm calling, and they register it. Then on the receiving end Verizon checks with T-mobile or a central registry, and says yep James's number is calling this number. Then it marks it as a verified call.
There are lots of good things that telephony could be required to do but they are not and they wont.
This leads down a privacy/metadata rabbit hole, but there are probably ways to make this a lot better. In any case, the phone OS can do some out-of-band signaling and just avoid dealing with the carriers altogether.
Although if you're doing all that then why not just make a call using voip...
However, just like email the CLID can be trivially faked and just like email, the lookup in your contacts is then wrong and potentially dangerous. In the case of telephony, if you subscribe to the BT service (I presume it still exists) that will return a name given a CLID (just like DNS for a price!) then you may end up with completely the wrong thing on your display.
Just to re-iterate the point: a PBX/phone/whatever cannot ... CANNOT ... verify CLID (Calling Line IDentification) it can only show what is presented to it.
Remember this, please: CLID is nominally under the control of the caller and could also be changed in transit. It should absolutely NOT be considered authoritative in any way.
I do think that the analogy works really well. PBXs can have quite a few weapons of their own to attempt to authenticate callers. For example you can pass "anonymous" calls to a dialplan that gets the caller to identify themselves and then play that to the recipient who then gets to allow/disallow the call - basically make the (human) recipient part of the firewall. Also, PBXs that deal with VoIP can use IP rules just like a firewall to make decisions on what to do.
Traditionally, "telephony" and "systems" have been considered separate. Personally I'm a sysadmin AND telephony bod with around 25/15 (respectively) years experience. My PBXs (generally Asterisk with FreePBX) have quite a few sources of intelligence about what is inbound, beyond CLID. I also look after quite a few email systems, often fronted by an Exim MTA with an attendant rspamd or spamassassin (int al).
Changing the subject or adding a footer will almost always break the DKIM signature, and DMARC won't like it anyway, because the From address and the envelope sender don't have the same domain (alignment). This makes it pretty hard to use DMARC for a public domain.
It's not so bad to use it for a corporate domain, and it helps a bunch if your domain is being used to source phishing; except that people still think you sent it when it comes from [email protected] which is clearly some ancient web mailer script that was compromised 20 years ago, but still remains online. (I'm totally not bitter!)
I cannot properly enable DMARC. I have working SPF and DKIM on everything I send, but as soon as I enforce it, people stop getting my email. The sticking points are mailing lists, and anyone with a forwarder. I've been on this merry go round a few times. If it's this bad on this personal domain, I'm a long way from considering it in a business.
Not sure about the US, but in most of the rest of the world regulators come up with new rules and regulations requiring some form of network upgrade all the time – SLAs, connectivity and routing requirements, legal interception, data residency, etc.
And telcos have no other way but to spend billions to protect some monopoly or enable more surveillance power for the governments. It's a matter of priorities, really.
Find another in/out of band way of providing caller-ID services.
I get way too many calls from area codes and prefixes I recognize. This would help me get some of that back.
However, the current system is largely useless when you get spoofed calls from numbers you recognize.
And probably just have to live with the fact that there will be situations where people are harder to reach quickly than they are today.
Any actual local number is always legit since spammers have no way of knowing where I actually live.
Here is a PR piece (by a telecom technology vendor) that explains that the Canadian telecom regulator will require non-spoofable caller id by March 2019 [1]. The technology is called STIR and SHAKEN. (That's all I know; I'm no expert).
The US FCC doesn't seem to be moving as quickly, if at all.
[1] https://transnexus.com/blog/2018/canadian-regulators-mandate...
I did this to a student loan company. The caller ID was that of my parent's house, and the woman on the other end was incredulous that anyone would demand that she prove who she was.
And it turned out to be legitimate, incredibly, though I certainly did not think so at the time.
If Peerless Networks was starting at millions of dollars in fines fake IRS scams originated on it because there's no way for someone else to find who actually originated the fraudulent calls, you would be able to bet a farm that a concept of a fake caller ID coming from Peerless Networks would go away.
It's OK to ask for their extension. A lot of times you can't call the fraud department directly, but if you have their extension you can ask to be transferred to it. But yeah, always call the number printed on the card, not what they tell you.
With text to speech software becoming so amazing, see Google's Duplex, I'm not that concerned with caller ID and am massively concerned for aging boomers who will have to contend with nearly perfect speaking bots.
It all took precious time, they really should anticipate this more.
SPF, implemented by most major email providers, helps to prevent FROM: spoofing.
Hell, I'm pretty sure our VoIP product drops external calls where the Caller ID matches one of its' own numbers.
These are problems we are solving. These are problems we should be solving in telephony too.
Having said that, always assume someone calling you is a fraud. If your "bank" calls you, tell them you'll call back and don't call a number they provide over the phone or in caller ID. If you can't find a reliable number to the bank, drive over there. The bottom line is that you can't trust anyone who calls you.