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Re:Voice Phishing Scams Are Getting More Clever by walrus01 on Monday October 01, 2018 @05:58PM (#18117188)
The problem with SS7 is that you extend your SMTP analogy, there is no way to implement the equivalent of SPF, DKIM and DMARC for verification of incoming traffic without breaking SS7-to-SS7 links between the vast majority of installed phone switching gear out there on the PSTN. Which nobody wants to pay money to completely replace.
Re:Voice Phishing Scams Are Getting More Clever by zrm on Monday October 01, 2018 @08:44PM (#18117977)
> The problem with SS7 is that you extend your SMTP analogy, there is no way to implement the equivalent of SPF, DKIM and DMARC for verification of incoming traffic without breaking SS7-to-SS7 links between the vast majority of installed phone switching gear out there on the PSTN.

Why not? That's how it was done for email. SPF doesn't prevent interoperability for sending domains that don't use it or recipients that don't verify it. What it does is inhibit forged messages from a domain that does use it to a recipient that does verify it.

Then the more senders who have an SPF record, the stronger a spam signal it is for a domain to not have one, and the stronger the incentive gets for senders to use it. It's already in the recipient's interest to verify it when it's used.

They could even use DNS for this exactly like email. Create a lookup zone equivalent to in-addr.arpa but for phone numbers.

Re:Voice Phishing Scams Are Getting More Clever by walrus01 on Monday October 01, 2018 @08:49PM (#18117996)
Because it's a huge installed base of non-upgradeable equipment that is 15, 20, 25 years old. People doing oldschool SS7 telco stuff are just not going to upgrade. They'll sue their upstream carriers if they suddenly cut them off because their new re-implementation of SS7 is incompatible with their old gear. I'm a senior network engineer for a mid sized regional ISP, and encounter this shit on a fairly regular basis.

It is not as simple as getting everyone who runs public facing smtpd on the Internet to upgrade their software and practices. Telco and PSTN phone stuff is the very opposite of being up to date and continually evolving best practices for security.

Re:Voice Phishing Scams Are Getting More Clever by zrm on Monday October 01, 2018 @09:02PM (#18118046)
It isn't the upstream forcing the upgrade. It isn't forced at all. You can keep using your old equipment as long as you want. But there would come a point that enough people are using the new protocol that recipients start auto-blocking calls from anyone who doesn't use it.

You may not even have to upgrade the old equipment. For an out of band protocol, the upstream may be able to implement it for you.

Re:Voice Phishing Scams Are Getting More Clever by ubernostrum on Tuesday October 02, 2018 @01:06AM (#18118953)
When you get a scam call, you know that somewhere there is a company that got paid for that call, because telcos -- even and really especially scummy shady scam-enabling telcos -- don't offer access to their network for free out of the goodness of their hearts.

Turning those companies into smoking holes in the ground doesn't require anyone to upgrade their equipment. All it takes is willingness on the part of lawmakers and regulators to track them down and make them regret their business practices.

Re:Voice Phishing Scams Are Getting More Clever by paulie_a on Monday October 01, 2018 @11:29PM (#18118610)
Cut them off unless they upgrade, their upstream probably has that option in the agreement anyways. Ptsn should just die. The technicians and customer service are so incompetent that every day I had to call to get a line disabled at the switch because it got re-enabled. After a hundred days in a row I finally just shorted the damn line and problem solved.
Re:Voice Phishing Scams Are Getting More Clever by gerdesj on Monday October 01, 2018 @06:56PM (#18117498)
True, but you can use your firewall for SIP'n'RTP or IAX2.

Creative use of firewall rules can be really powerful. For a very simple example: block VoIP from AWS's address ranges (serious gain).

A classic response for anon calls in telephony is to make the caller record a short identifying message and then play that to the potential recipient. The potential recipient then decides whether or not to accept the call - your staff (family, whatever) become the firewall. Remember that calls are billed to the caller by the terminating provider so this is OK (caller pays).

Those are two simple examples of using IP and humans to firewall telephony. Just because telephony is a bit crap on the identification side does not mean that you can't deploy lots of other weaponry to keep yourself safe. If you look deeply into SIP and IAX2, you get loads more options as well.