What is an equality-enhancing mortgage?
My wife works at a community bank which has been cited as an important institution for social justice on the west coast. Equality enhancing mortgages could well be mortgages accessible to under-served populations who have the financial means to pay them back, but who face cultural barriers or ethnic discrimination.
Community banks have been railroaded out of the home mortgage business. There are now a lot of timing-dependent requirements and really stiff penalties in the banking regulations. It was sold to the public as a curb on the big banks, but what really it means, is that only banks large enough to write their own software or wealthy enough to license custom software can stay in the home mortgage business. Basically, we the public were sold flowery rhetoric by politicians on the wave of sentiment following the banking crisis, while big banks lobbied to write into law an even bigger advantage.
This is a characteristic of nearly all federal regulations since approximately the Nixon administration, across all industries with incumbents large enough to fund lobbying at that level.
The industry does something outrageous, or whips up a media storm about some non-issue, so that calls to regulate come. Then the industry itself pulls a thousand page bill out of a drawer whose title sounds like it's going to do something good but whose details are all written by the industry's lawyers.
The average voter doesn't have the time or domain expertise to understand a thousand pages of dry legal text, so the bill passes and nobody figures out what's actually in it until a decade later when the evidence of what it allowed the industry to do starts to surface. Then we get a renewed call for laws to fix the "unexpected" disaster and the cycle repeats.
Hopefully at some point people are going to figure out that the answer is to remove federal regulations and pass local laws that purposely favor small local businesses with local ownership and ties to the community.
Do you have any evidence of that - the discrimination part? Is there evidence that lending institutions choose to lend based on criteria other than ability to repay? Also, do/did smaller lenders fare as well or better than the big lenders during the financial crisis? Or were their loans more risky? I think that would be the strongest evidence either way.
Your second paragraph is really interesting, and creating an expensive barrier to entry is always a tactic big business implements to stifle competition. I just wonder what the way out of that is?
The various Chinatown community banks wouldn't even exist (and have greatly succeeded for awhile) if some form of cultural barrier didn't exist. The barrier isn't all the fault of one side or another. However, it's simply historical fact that big banks left a lot of money on the table -- in a way which could be characterized with gross demographics -- which smaller banks made their bread and butter for a few decades.
Is there evidence that lending institutions choose to lend based on criteria other than ability to repay?
Of course community banks choose to lend based on criteria other than ability to repay. Basically, community banks must use their advantage in local intelligence to distinguish between prospects who look a bit marginal but who are really strong, versus prospects who might look a bit marginal to normal but who constitute a risk. Basically, the big banks swoop up almost all of the "normal" customers and leave the smaller banks scrambling for the best of the odd ones left over.
Your second paragraph is really interesting, and creating an expensive barrier to entry is always a tactic big business implements to stifle competition. I just wonder what the way out of that is?
An informed electorate.
Now it is almost tough for self-employed, small business owners, to get mortgage through normal channels. When one doesn't get mortgage through normal channels, one goes to a FI(financial institution) that keeps these mortgages on their books. Such FIs charge extra interest rates, demand more downpayment like 30%, etc.
I think the best that can be hoped for is rigorous justification of lending criteria in non pure correlative ways. As opposed to discrimination laundering bullshit like sentencing based on the size of their yard. Judge them via their neighborhood foreclosure rates as opposed to ethnic make up. There are antidiscrimination in real estate laws on the books but I don't know enough to comment upon the current implementation and its pros and cons.
if you're worried about feedback loops, maybe don't lend based on any criteria other than the best possible estimate of ability to pay the loan back.
if you loan somebody money for a house that they can't pay back, they're going to 1) end up with even worse credit and 2) lose the house, which they made other emotional and financial investments in.
For a crude example, pick health history. The leading cause of bankruptcy in the US is medical bills due to a health crisis. This of course spills over into mortgage foreclosure. But someone might have excellent credit, and a high cancer risk. They get cancer, byebye loan. Are you accounting for that?
Someone has excellent credit, but works in a dying industry and has no skills to move to an equal-paying job in another industry. Their job goes away in five years, byebye mortgage. I can go on with these. But my point is, I don't know if you realize just what a difficult point you're making with your simple answer.
I think the problem with using money lending as a tool for social justice and equality was laid bare during the crisis. The downsides - lack of mobility for workers, pushing the risk from wealthy people (investors) to poorer people and the fact to function the system needs loans to be paid back at some percentage approaching 100 - all conspire to make this a really poor tool for change.
I think that something like the Australian approach - with enforced retirement savings set at 9% of income (where you earn $50K, and your employer pays $4.5K into super) - is a saner approach to wealth creation for the poorer groups than lumbering them with mortgages.
That’s not what happened. It wasn’t poor people who caused most of the defaults - it was investors working with mortgage brokers, real estate agents, and appraisers who were all part of the take. Poor people weren’t doing most of the no doc/negative interest or other types of “non conforming mortgages”. The investors walked away, did strategic defaults, and were free and clear within 3 years - ask me how I know....
There's a big difference between a community bank using community ties as a source of superior intelligence, and a big company acting as a mortgage mill trying to maximize throughput "countrywide" until the bubble bursts. Before the community banks existed, Asian community groups would arrange private lending within the community.
I think that something like the Australian approach - with enforced retirement savings set at 9% of income (where you earn $50K, and your employer pays $4.5K into super) - is a saner approach to wealth creation for the poorer groups than lumbering them with mortgages.
It sounds good on the surface. I'd let people opt-in on that, though.
That is itself the tightest of feedback loops, because the best estimator is either current wealth, or past performance of loans. It is massively exclusionary so I don't think your point is very well made.
The assumption of 3) was what drove 2008.
If you study immigrant minorities across history, around the world and going back 1000's of years, certain patterns emerge. Immigrant minority groups who can pool their resources and become participants in the economic life of the host country find a way to prosper, somehow. Before the 20th century, this pattern of prosperity could result in confiscation. With the widespread ideas of Human Rights, this has become less of a problem. (Though it can still be a problem.) Likewise, minority groups who remain in isolation tend to remain poor. Often, this is by the machinations of the elites of those groups, who use this isolation to remain in a position of relative power.
OP's point is government has better tools for enacting social policy than lending regulations. Improving low-income borrowers' finances, instead of pushing banks to stretch to them, seems saner. Unfortunately, we have a broad segment of the population that enjoys "sticking it" to the banks, thereby perpetuating the cycle.
The only reason that happens it that you're using exactly 100%.
If it's 98% then the top 2% in that group get approved, which gives you new data on that group that tells you your old numbers are inaccurate and a lower percentage of the group defected than predicted, so in the next generation you approve the top 10% in that group and so on.
This is the exact opposite of a feedback loop. As time passes it amplifies the signal, not the noise.
All it takes is a cursory glance at almost any mass migration in the US to show why that amplifying effect doesn't exist: when the [x]% finally get the money to move in, everyone else usually moves because of prejudice, driving the value of the neighborhood down and the [x]% into bankruptcy or financial destitution. I can even name a few towns in California where this has happened in my lifetime.
That's the kind of feedback loop we're talking about. No one bases their prejudices on actuarial tables.
Jim Crow laws were enforced until 1965. They existed in the lifetimes of part of the current generation of would-be homeowners, and that is one thing you can't lay at the feet of the banks.
> All it takes is a cursory glance at almost any mass migration in the US to show why that amplifying effect doesn't exist: when the [x]% finally get the money to move in, everyone else usually moves because of prejudice, driving the value of the neighborhood down and the [x]% into bankruptcy or financial destitution. I can even name a few towns in California where this has happened in my lifetime.
The events you're describing should have the opposite effect. The first family to move in is obviously screwed, but screwed in a long-term sense where they lose the value they paid for their home which only happens in some decades when they want to sell it. Until then their mortgage payment is the same one they budgeted for to begin with. And all the racist white people who are leaving are in the same boat, but right away -- they want to leave but no one will buy their house for what it was worth last year.
Meanwhile there is suddenly a whole neighborhood where housing prices have plummeted and a bunch of white people who would otherwise come in and bid the prices back up are opting out. Doesn't that just make it easier for other black people to buy those homes for a discounted price?
oh man, here we go again! I wonder if Y Combinator will fund my Collateralized Equality Enhanced Swap
...but didn't push banks to lever the loans 10x, securitize, sell and repeat over and over again. Fault for those days lied in a lot of places, and sub-prime mortgages aren't inherently a bad thing.
Correct.
> ...but didn't push banks to lever the loans 10x, securitize, sell and repeat over and over again.
Yeah, but I'm not going to pretend like I wouldn't. Worst case scenario is that my failed bets get paid out by the future productivity of the entire working population, and the distressed assets get transferred to the balance sheets of special purpose vehicles also funded by taxpayers.
And I get to keep all the performance fees.
The only way to avoid immoral behavior is to fix the incentives so that it doesn't pay off. In this situation, that means either make it uneconomical to sell (perhaps by penalties like jail time), or to not allow the sellers to socialize the risks (perhaps by not bailing them out when they failed). The former means that low-income borrowers can't buy homes; the latter means that the financial system would've imploded. Personally I think Obama would've been better off taking the latter course and letting the banks fail, but the point is TANSTAAFL and whichever course you to take will require some sacrifices, whether in equality, stability, or trust.
There's enormous competition for people with capabilities of repaying a loan but no thin credit files/scores. Those are credit scores between 575 and 650. There are government programs that target these people administered via Freddie, Fannie and FHA for automatic underwriting. Those are done? No matter, USDA(!) would guarantee loans in rural areas! Banks themselves do manual underwriting for people who barely qualify or on a cusp of qualifying at prime + rates. Those were not the subprime loan customers.
Subprime loans were originated with the same rationality as the loans covering Buy Here, Pay Here car loans: they were originated with a total knowledge that the buyer will fail to make payments and will be foreclosed on - no matter! Buyer would make payments for first 6-7 months, default, get foreclosed on and the house would be sold to someone else for higher amount than the defaulted loan. Housing was an appreciating asset when these loans worked fine on depreciating assets ( cars ).
Structural inequality or not, people who have shitty jobs and shitty financial position typically make shitty financial decisions over the long term. 30 year mortgage is a very long term financial play.
If you are lending money with the unspoken understanding that the note is likely doomed to be a loss unless the real estate market continues to go up, then you are not really in the loan business anymore. You are putting letting your capital ride on the real estate roulette wheel, while enjoying the fat fees in the short term. The fact their were enough greater fools around to move your capital from new bad loans to newer bad loans may let you bank a few more fees, but it still means the originator is choosing to screw up while hoping to be rescued by real estate market forces completely beyond his control.
They didn't.
The banks levered up so much that 7% of delinquencies was enough to crash the global economy.
The delinquencies ended up being less of a problem than the uncertainty around them. 7% delinquencies didn't kill anyone. Investors' fears that 7 would become 20 did.
https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/profitwise-n... quotes average default rates in the 30+% range on subprime mortgages.
The Collateralized Debt Objects reduced this risk down by being bundled with better credit worthy debt servicing.
The way that securitization works is that you take many thin streams of cash from individual loans, and bundle them into a giant river of money. That river will dry up at some point, and what point depends on how much defaulting there is. You then take horizontal chunks out of that river and sell them off. The first few slices are low risk - they will pay off even if lots of people default. The last one is very high risk indeed and are only worth pennies on the dollar, if that.
The principle is that it is safe not because it is bundled with better debt, but because those bonds still pay even if lots of people default. They may pay late, but they should pay.
However the models quantifying the risk assumed that there was a lot less correlation in defaults than there actually was. So when the housing market moved against the loans at the same time as people lost jobs in the financial crisis, investments that were supposed to be safe suddenly weren't.
I could believe 7% as the losses in bonds that originated as AAA bonds. But not as the losses in AAA bonds.
An RMBS is a portfolio of mortgages financed by multiple bonds, with an order of subordination between them. When a loss occurs on a mortgage, it is allocated to the most junior bond first, until it is fully written down, then the next junior bond, etc. So if you own the most senior bond (often rated AAA), you are really exposed to high default rates and high correlation. Ie if the portfolio of mortgages is diversified (low correlation) some mortages will default but not all at the same time, and there will always be enough mortgages that do not default to avoid a loss on the most senior bonds.
The big fuck up in the financial crisis is that the correlation was misestimated. There had never been a large, US wide, real estate crisis since 1929 and therefore everyone assumed a US wide portfolio was well diversified. That turned out to be wrong in 2006-2007, and delinquencies (ie balances of loans not paying interest or principal) shot up. This led to losses (not 100% of a defaulted loan, the house still had some residual value) that ultimately hit the AAA bonds.
A CDO is the same structure but using bonds in the portfolio instead of residential mortgages. But when people refer to large losses on CDOs in the financial crisis they usually refer to CDO of ABS, which basically uses junior RMBS bonds in the portfolio, so effectively you leverage the mortgages twice, first through an RMBS, and then another time through a CDO.
In those you are even more exposed to correlation. The portfolio is made up of junior RMBS bonds from multiple RMBS transactions originated by multiple subprime lenders across the country, so these structures were playing on not all of these RMBS going bad simultaneously, which is exactly what happened.
So the TL DR is that these portfolio of subprime mortgages and RMBS bonds were of a similar credit quality, but correlation is what got really badly mispriced, they were assumed to be diversified but what we got is a large US wide real estate crisis that hit everybody,
How? Doesn't buying a house (at market price) have an approximately zero effect on your net worth?
As of the closing date, sure. However, closing on a home allows a renter to become an owner for about the same monthly cost (plus produces some significant tax benefits typically only available to the wealthy). After 30 years of paying a mortgage, if holding all else constant, one probably owns the property. After 30 years of paying rent, holding all else constant, one still owns nothing.
Nothing except all the money saved on property taxes, maintenance and repairs, home insurance, etc. And, as another poster noted, this assumes mortgage payments similar to rental prices. The math on home ownership is not a slam dunk in favor of owning in every region and should be considered carefully.
Our calculated repayment on a 20 year mortgage with a 300k down payment on the estimated CV of this house: $1370 NZD pw
Yep!
Beijing is a good example of a place where rents are way lower than sale prices, so you can totally wind up paying $1000/month to rent something that is on the market for $1 million.
I have a fixed 15 year loan at 2.75%, which seems like a pretty good deal to me. Know where I can borrow a few hundred thou at 1%?
Yes, sometimes buying makes sense, but sometimes renting makes sense as well.
Assuming we pay the same for mortgage and rent, who wouldn't want to pay rather mortgage?
But remember, to pay the same, there was a huge downpayment. If you were to invest that rationally, long term returns could be worth it, even while paying rent.
OTOH, rational investing (in a balanced fund portfolio) is hard, and mortgage forces you to save.
YMMV, do your math.
And then I definitely want to own my house before brexit, as an immigrant I will not risk not being able to rent if things go tits up.
Leverage to the hilt, get a million-dollar home, keep it for three years, pocket a cool 500k.
Obviously this time it's different, and housing shall continue it's spectacular bull run forever.
Populations are migrating to cities en masse, which creates huge demand for city housing. And most cities haven't really been keeping up with the supply side since the 1930s or so.
How so? Subprime mortgages were largely not sold to government entities, but to private investors as CDOs. And government banking regulations about investing in low income communities never required making subprime loans.
This is coming from someone who was able to get a less than 4% FHA $340K mortgage three years after having two foreclosures a short sale, and three additional loans that were settled for less than full value.
Unless you live in an high priced area where rent is going up more than inflation a mortgage isn't really worth it. It ties you to a location and makes it harder to move to where the jobs are.
This sentiment gets expressed frequently in these discussions. There is a hell of a lot anchoring me to a particular place than whether or not I own the place I live. If I had to move, selling my residence would be a relatively minor consideration in the grand scheme.
It wouldn’t be easy, but if I had a choice between staying where I am where I couldn’t find any jobs and moving. I would move. But in my case, if I can’t find any company that’s looking for a software developer with an up to date skill in my entire metro area and I couldn’t find any type of remote job or contract, I’ve got bigger issues.
My responsibilities are only to my spouse, minor children, and some day maybe my parents. My parents already live in a different town than I do, but they would have to move to wherever I move to.
As far as abandoning a metro area, it took quite a bit for my wife and I to finally uproot. That we owned our house was relatively low on the friction list. Hell, my wife wants to delay buying again (we rent) because she finds the act of moving so stressful.
My mortgage is less than 25% of our net pay, but if it fell in value to a point where it was worth less than $50K what we owed on it and we had to move, we would be in trouble.
This leads to a segment of the population (usually lower income, but not always) without broad access to credit or leverage.
Edit: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/08/gop-congressman-chris-collin...
I’m sure things like this are isolated incidents given that members of Congress have a level of immunity from such laws.
Let’s keep discussing market solutions in a market that has been and always will be rigged and rerigged as needed coughpanamapaperscough
It could have worked out well if the Obama administration had just allowed the financial system to collapse instead of bailing it out. The collapse of the financial system would have meant that many poorly run companies would have disappeared and they would have been replaced by newer, smaller and more efficient companies. Europe recovered from WW2 relatively quickly; surely the US could also recover from a partial market collapse.
Before 2008, there were a lot of talented, ambitious people desperately waiting for an opportunity to compete on the marketplace but the government bailouts took away that opportunity and allowed corporations to keep running their inefficient oligopolies uninterrupted. Today, most of these talented, ambitious people have become losers; they're poor and paralyzed by self-doubt. The reality is that they might actually have succeeded if the government had simply allowed capitalism to take its natural course. The carpet was pulled from under them.
Well, part of that is because of countries like ours which weren't completely destroyed were able to assist financially, help rebuild essential infrastructure, and -- perhaps most importantly -- provide political stability to the region (which they desperately needed in 1945).
I'm not sure who would have played that role if we had let the entire global financial system melt down in 2008.
Rich people would have learned humility and everyone else would have learned that the system actually works.
Instead, rich people learned complacency and everyone else learned that the system is rigged.
What is an equality-enhancing mortgage? My guess is that it's akin to an equal opportunity / affirmative action campaign. The thing is, actuarial tables aren't oppressive - they're merely reflective of reality. If a particular group presents a higher risk profile than another, the only sane course of action is to be more restrictive when lending to members of that group.
The alternative is for banks to give out easy money again like in the leadup to 2008 and that didn't work out well. I'm sorry that some people can't get mortgages but the answer is not to aggregate out their financial problems onto those of us who do, in fact, pay our bills.