Cars have been dependent on software for a long time (literally decades). This isn't something new. Even combustion engine cars have had software inside of them that controls the operation of the engine, and this software is vigorously tested for safety issues (because most car manufacturers understand a fault with such software could result in someone's death). Tesla seems to be the only major car manufacturer that has a problem with this.
>So what is the right way to handle these updates?
The way that other vehicle manufacturers (car, airplane, etc) have been doing it for decades is a pretty good way.
>You mentioned a clear flaw with OTA updates, but there are also numerous advantages. For example, the recent Tesla brake software issue was fixed with an OTA update. That immediately made cars safer.
There is no evidence that said OTA update made Tesla cars any safer. There is evidence that similar OTA updates have made Tesla cars more unsafe.
The brake OTA that you mentioned has actually potentially done more harm than good. Tesla owners have been reporting that the same update made unexpected changes to the way their cars handle/accelerate in addition to the change in braking distance. These were forced, unpredictable changes that were introduced without warning. When you're driving a 2 ton vehicle at 70mph, being able to know exactly how your car will react in all situations, including how fast it accelerates, how well it handles, how fast it brakes, and how the autopilot will act is crucial to maintaining safety. Tesla messing with those parameters without warning is a detriment to safety, not an advantage.
The TACC offered by most (if not all) manufacturers can't differentiate between the surroundings and stopped vehicles. I wouldn't be surprised if their Lane Keeping Assist (LKA) systems have similar problems.
https://support.volvocars.com/en-CA/cars/Pages/owners-manual...
>WARNING When Pilot Assist follows another vehicle at speeds overapprox. 30 km/h (20 mph) and changes target vehicle – from a moving vehicle to a stationary one – Pilot Assist will ignore the stationary vehicle and instead accelerate to the stored speed.
>The driver must then intervene and apply the brakes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u__51kTl4j8
Despite this warning in the manual[1]:
>Super Cruise is not a crash avoidance system and will not steer or brake to avoid a crash. Super Cruise does not steer to prevent a crash with stopped or slow-moving vehicles. You must supervise the driving task and may need to steer and brake to prevent a crash, especially in stop-and-go traffic or when a vehicle suddenly enters your lane. Always pay attention when using Super Cruise. Failure to do so could result in a crash involving serious injury or death.
[1] - https://www.cadillac.com/content/dam/cadillac/na/us/english/...
That's a nitpick. Your broader point about Tesla pressuring the market down an unfortunate path is spot on.
http://www.oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Chrysler_and_Imperi...
Ideally, yeah, every manufacturer would have to take all the puffery out of their marketing, or better yet, talk about all the negatives of their product/service first, but I doubt I'll ever see that.
This article portrayed Super Cruise as something qualitatively different, based on the maps of existing roadways. I'm not sure if they've also considered integrating the multiple systems involved in driver assistance. I'm curious if Tesla has either for that matter.
Software should not be driving a car into any of them. I think that LIDAR would see the obstacle, but as I understand, the crashed Tesla car didn't have it.
I'd love to see LIDAR on consumer vehicles, but AFAIK it's prohibitively expensive. And to be fair, even Level 4 autonomous vehicles still crash into things and kill people.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/uber-self...
Last but not least, every semi-autonomous system all the way back to Chrysler's "AUTO-PILOT" has had similar criticisms. People in the past even said similar things about high speed highways compared to other roads WRT attention.
http://www.curbsideclassic.com/blog/history/automotive-histo...
https://books.google.com/books?id=YpGkDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA100&lpg=...
Literally every car I have driven equipped with Cruise Control and Collision Avoidance (TACC) hits the brakes and slows down to 20-ish km/h if it senses ANYTHING moving slower (including stationary) in front of the car at possible collision path.
https://skeptics.stackexchange.com/questions/39559/does-the-...
This really affects the nature of the situation. 20 years ago, cars contained microcontrollers with a tiny bit of code which was thoroughly reviewed and tested by skilled professionals. Today, all cars run so much code, even outside of the entertainment system, that the review and testing just can't be the same. (And there's way more programmers, so the range of skill and care is also much wider.)
We're in a new mountain-of-flaky-software world.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/business/20...
https://www.caranddriver.com/features/its-all-your-fault-the...
Compare this to classic engineering where you know the changes you've made, so you can rerun your unit tests, rerun your integration tests, check your change in the vehicle and be reasonably sure that what you changed is actually what you wanted.
The other approach to autonomous driving is to slowly and progressively engineer more and more autonomous systems where you can be reasonably sure to not have regressions. Or at least to contain your neural networks to very very specific tasks (object recognition, which they're good at), where you can always add more to your test data to be reasonably sure you don't have a regression.
I don't think we'll see too many cars being controlled by neural networks entirely, unless there's some huge advancement here. Most of the reason we see more neural networks now is that our computing power has reached the ability to train sufficiently complex NNs for useful tasks. Not because the math behind it advanced that much since the 60s.
That particular OTA update significantly shortened braking distances. [The update] cut the vehicle’s 60 mph stopping distance a whole 19 feet, to 133, about average for a luxury compact sedan. That's a safer condition, IMO, and I'm uncertain how to argue that it doesn't make the car safer.
[0] - https://www.wired.com/story/tesla-model3-braking-software-up...
> being able to know exactly how your car will react in all situations
If one depends on intimate knowledge of his own car for safety then he’s likely already driving outside the safety envelope of the code, which was written to provide enough safety margin for people driving bad cars from 40yr ago.
Additionally, the argument that we should continue to handle updates this way simply because we have done it this way for decades is the laziest possible reasoning. It is frankly surprising to see that argument on HN of all places.
As for the evidence that OTA updates can make things safer, this is from Consumer Reports:
>Consumer Reports now recommends the Tesla Model 3, after our testers found that a recent over-the-air (OTA) update improved the car’s braking distance by almost 20 feet. [1]
That update going out immediately OTA is going to save lives compared to if Tesla waited for the cars to be serviced like other manufacturers. I don't think you can legitimately argue against that fact.
[1] - https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/tesla-model-3-get...
There is again no evidence to support this fact. There is evidence that Tesla's OTA software updates have introduced safety issues with Tesla cars. That's a fact.
Better braking distance is of course a good thing but if anything, the fact that Teslas were on the road for so long with a sub-par braking distance is more evidence of a problem with Tesla than it is evidence of a benefit of OTA updates.
The other factor in that brake story is that it took mere days for Tesla to release an update to "fix" the brakes. This isn't a good thing. The fact that it was accomplished so quickly means that the OTA update was likely not tested very well. It also means that the issue was easy to fix, which calls into question why it wasn't fixed before. It also highlights the fact that Tesla, for some reason, failed to do the most basic testing on their own cars for braking distance. Comparing the braking distance of their cars should have been one of the very first things they did before even selling the cars, but apparently it took a third party to do that before Tesla was even aware of the issue. This doesn't inspire confidence in Tesla cars at all.
EDIT: The comment I was replying to was heavily edited after I responded. It originally said something along the lines of improving braking distance is good but there is no evidence that it would improve safety.
> if you are going to legitimately argue that shaving 20 feet off of braking distance will not make a car any safer.
Nobody is arguing that. We're arguing that there is no evidence the Tesla OTA update made the cars safer on net.
You're trying to set up some sort of "OTA updates are dangerous in general, but this one is clearly good, how do we balance it" conversation, but the problem is, this OTA update is not clearly good. OTA updates are dangerous in general, and also in this case in specific. You need to find a better example where there's actual difficult tradeoffs being made, and not just a manufacturer mishandling things.
If the car can’t see the obstacle, the braking distance simply does not matter.
As for your edit, you clearly misread the original comment, which is why I edited it for you. I said that there was no evidence that the OTA made the car safer. Please try to read with better comprehension instead of trying to misrepresent my comments.
You don't have enough information to come to that conclusion.
It's quite common to have to brake hard to avoid a cousin. It's pretty uncommon to see the specific scenario triggering this crash behavior.
Avoid doing them in the first place? It's not like bit rot is - or should be - a problem for cars. It's a problem specific to the Internet-connected software ecosystem, which a car shouldn't be a part of.
So basically: develop software, test the shit out of it, then release. If you happen to find some critical problem later on that is fixable with software, by all means fix it, again test the shit out of it, and only then update.
If OTA updates on cars are frequent, it means someone preferred to get to market quickly instead of building the product right. Which, again, is fine for bullshit social apps, but not fine for life-critical systems.
Part of me wonders if there should be a very quick, unskipable, animated, easy to understand explanation of the patch notes before you can drive when they make material changes to core driving functionality.
Tesla did make a mistake calling it Autopilot, but only because regular folk don't understand that aircraft autopilot is literally a heading, altitude, and speed, and will not make any correction for fault. Aircraft autopilot will fly you straight into a mountain if one happens to be in the way.
> Tesla did make a mistake calling it Autopilot, but only because regular folk don't understand that aircraft autopilot is literally a heading, altitude, and speed, and will not make any correction for fault. Aircraft autopilot will fly you straight into a mountain if one happens to be in the way.
Auto-TCAS and Auto-GCAS exist, and the public is aware of them: E.g. http://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2009/08/eas.... http://aviationweek.com/air-combat-safety/auto-gcas-saves-un....
This is beyond broken, it's a fundamental misunderstanding of how physical products are supposed to work. Software people have gotten used to dismiss the principle of least astonishment because they know better —and no user got killed because of a Gmail redesign—, but this is a car, it's hardware with its user on-board, a lot of kinetic energy and all of it relies on muscle memory.
Highways are not, nor should they ever be if at all possible, proving grounds.
The second thing is to require the owners to take some action as part of the installation procedure, so that it is hard for them to overlook the fact that it has happened.
The third thing is that changes with safety implications should not be bundled with 'convenience/usability' upgrades (including those that are more of a convenience for the manufacturer than for the user.) To be fair, I am not aware of Tesla doing that, but it is a common enough practice in the software business to justify being mentioned.
And it has to be done securely. Again, I am not aware of Tesla getting this wrong.
A problem with variable stopping distances is the sort of thing that should be blindingly obvious in the telemetry data from your testing procedures. Brake systems, and ABS controls in particular, are normally rigorously tested over the course of 12-18 months in different environments and conditions.[0] That Tesla completely missed something like that suggests either their testing procedures are drastically flawed (missing something that CR was able to easily and quickly verify in different cars), that their software development process isn't meshed up with their hardware testing and validation, or a combination of the two. Neither option is a good one.
The fact that Tesla was able to shave 19 feet of their braking distances is horrifying. After months of testing different variations and changes to refine your braking systems, shaving off an extra 19 feet should be impossible. There shouldn't be any room to gain extra inches without making tradeoffs in performance in other conditions that you've already ruled out making. If there's an extra 19 feet to be found for free after a few days of dev time, you did something drastically wrong. And that's completely ignoring physical testing before pushing your new update. Code tests aren't sufficient; you're changing physical real-world behavior, and there's always a tradeoff when you're dealing with braking and traction.
Tesla is being praised by consumers and the media because, hey, who doesn't like the idea that problems can be fixed a couple days after being identified? That's great. In this case, Tesla literally made people's cars better than they were just a few days before. But it trivializes a problem with very real consequences, and I hope that trivialization doesn't extend to Tesla's engineers. Instead of talking about a brake problem, people are talking about how great the fast OTA update for the problem is. Consumers find that comforting, as the OTA updates can makes what's otherwisea pain in the ass (recalls and dealer visits for software updates) effortless.
Hell, I'm a believer in release early, release often for software. Users benefit, as do developers. At the same time, the knowledge that you can quickly fix a bug and push out an update can be a bit insidious. It's a bit of a double-edged sword in that it gives you a sense of comfort that can bite you in the ass as it trivializes the consequences of a bug. And when bug reports for your product can literally come in the form of coroner's reports, that comfort isn't a good thing for developers.
0. https://www.forbes.com/sites/samabuelsamid/2018/05/30/rapid-...
I see a Tesla, and I try to get away from them as soon as possible.
Nope. I see tremendous numbers of distracted drivers who don't even realize there's a threat. I also see many utterly incompetent drivers who will not take any evasive action, including braking, because they simply don't understand basic vehicle dynamics or that one needs to react to unexpected circumstances.
Require updates to be sent to a government entity, which will test the code for X miles of real traffic, and then releases the updates to the cars. Of course, costs of this are to be paid by the company.
So, no filter, but government penalties and legal remedies should be available.
That's exactly the impression that I don't get from Tesla very much. Instead I see the follwing:
Get that thing to market as quickly as possible. If the software for safety critical systems is sub-par, well, can be fixed with OTA updates. That's fine for your dry cleaning app. For safety critical software that's borderline criminal
Hype features far beyond their ability (autopilot). Combine this with OTAs, which potentially change the handling of something that is not at all autopilot, but actually some glorified adaptive cruise control. For good measure: Throw your customers under the bus if ineviteble and potentially deadly problems do pop up
Treating safety issues merely as a PR problem and acting acordingly. Getting all huffy and insulted and accusing the press of fake news when such shit is pointed out
I could go on. But such behavior to me is not a company signaling that safety is of paramount concern.
"That does mean complete transparency during investigations, a complete audit trail of every software function invoked prior to a crash."
Let's just say that Tesla's very selective handling and publication of crash data does not signal any inclination for transparency.
Government has a valid role to play, though, by requiring full disclosure of the contents of updates and "improvements," by setting and enforcing minimum requirements for various levels of vehicle autonomy, and by mandating and enforcing uniform highway marking standards. Local DOTs are a big part of the problem.
Cars have been made safe for us also by direct intervention by the government. From important things like mandating seat belts and crash safety to smaller things like forcing the recall of tens of millions of faulty air bag inflators.
These are just a few of the many things Uncle Sam has done to make things safer for us.
First, any change in design (or in configuration, in the case of repairs) is backed by PEs or A&P mechanics who sign off on the changes. Their career rides on the validity of their analysis so that's a better guarantee than some commit message by a systems programmer.
Second, the FAA basically says "show us what you are changing" after which they will absolutely require physical tests (static or dynamic tests, test flights, etc., as appropriate to the scope of change).
And I'd say flying is so safe mainly from the blameless post-mortem policy that the American industry instantiated decades ago and which is constantly reinforced by the pros in the NTSB. It's a wonderful model for improvement.
As an example, the crash of N121JM on a rejected takeoff was due (only in part) to a defective throttle quadrant/gust lock design that went undetected during design and certification, in part because it was argued to be a continuation of a conformant and previously certificated design. (Which is relevant to the current discussion in that if you decide to make certification costly and time-consuming, there will be business and engineering pressure to continue using previously certificated parts, with only "insignificant changes".)
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20140531-...
PS: I 100% agree on the NTSB process' contribution to safety.
If an engineer signs off a change they sign that they have validated all the constraints and that for all they know the machine will work within the specs with no faults.
If a software engineer commits code we may run some tests over it, look a bit over it. That's fine. But if the software ends up killing anyone, the software engineer is not responsible.
And yes, to my knowledge, every change to an aircraft is tested before flight or atleast validated by an engineer that understands what was just changed.
See also: The FDA and drug approvals.
At the very least, you should be able to get some sort of magnitude/fuzzy understanding of how frequently the new code is disagreeing, and you can figure out where and go check out those conditions.
An ML solution stops "learning" after training and only reacts.
To illustrate the difference, have you driven on roads under construction lately? As humans, when you've driven the same road hundreds of times, you start to do the same thing as a machine learned implementation. You drive by rote.
When you get to that construction zone though, or the lines get messed up, your brain will generally realize something has changed, and you'll end up doing something "unpredictable", i.e. learning a new behavior. The Machine Learning Ali's output (a neural net) can't do that. It can generify a pattern to a point, but it's behavior in truly novel circumstances cannot be assured.
Besides which, the problem still stands that the system is coded to ignore straight ahead stationary objects. Terrible implementation. It should look for overly fast and uniform increase in angular field coverage combined with being near stationary in terms of relative motion as a trigger to brake. I.e. If a recognized shape gets bigger at the same rate on all "sides" whilst maintaining a weighted center at the same coordinate. It's one of the visual tricks pilots are taught to avoid mid-air collisions.
Admittedly though, the human brain will likely remain WAY better at those types of tricks than a computer will be for a good long time.
You can do this sort of stuff when replacing a web service too, by the way. For example running two versions of Django and checking if the new version produces any difference for a week before making it the version the client actually sees.
You can look at your code and say "For all invalid XML, this, for all input spaces, that." You can formally prove your code in other words.
You CANNOT do that with Neural Nets. Any formal proof would simply prove that your neural network simulation is still running okay. Not that it is generating the correct results.
You can supervise the learning process, and you can practically guarantee all the cases within your training data set, and everyone in the research space is comfy enough to say "yeah, for the most part this will probably generify" but the spectre of overfitting never goes away.
With machine learning, I developed a rule of thumb for applicability: "Can a human being who devotes their life to the task learn to do it perfectly?"
If the answer is yes, it MAY be possible to create an expert system capable of performing the task reliably.
So lets apply the rule of thumb:
"Can a human being, devoting their life to the task of driving in arbitrary environmental conditions, perfectly safely drive? Can he safely coexist with other non-dedicated motorists?"
The answer to the first I think we could MAYBE pull off by constraining the scope of arbitrary conditions (I.e. specifically build dedicated self-driving only infrastructure).
The second is a big fat NOPE. In fact, studies have found that too many perfectly obedient drivers typically WORSEN traffic in terms of probability to create traffic jams. Start thinking about how people drive outside the United States and the first-world in general, and the task becomes exponentially more difficult.
The only things smarter than the engineers trying to get your car to drive itself are all the idiots who will invent hazard conditions that your car isn't trained to handle. Your brain is your number one safety device. Technology won't change that. You cannot, and should not outsource your own safety.
I mean what would have happened here if another Tesla or two were directly behind Huang, following his car's lead?!
Possibly nothing, I'd assume the stopping distance would be observed and the following cars would be able to stop/avoid, but I wouldn't like to bet either way. Perhaps, in some conditions, the sudden impact on the lead car would cause the second car to lose track of the rear end of the first? Would it then accelerate into it?
An attentive human would realize something horrible had happened and perhaps reacted accordingly. A disengaged or otherwise distracted one may not have the reaction time necessary to stop the system from plowing right into the situation to make it worse.
Because there are no closed facilities that you can use to actually perform any meaningful test. You could test "in-situ", but you would need an absolutely _huge_ testing area in order to accurately test and check all the different roadway configurations the vehicle is likely to encounter. You'll probably want more than one pass, some with pedestrians, some without, some in high light and some in low, etc..
It's worth noting that American's drive more than 260 billion miles each _month_. It's just an enormous problem.
[ABS News Reporter] Dan Noyes also spoke and texted with Walter Huang's brother, Will, today. He confirmed Walter was on the way to work at Apple when he died. He also makes a startling claim — that before the crash, Walter complained "seven-to-10 times the car would swivel toward that same exact barrier during auto-pilot. Walter took it into dealership addressing the issue, but they couldn't duplicate it there."
It is very believable that the car would swivel toward the same exact barrier on auto-pilot.
BTW - I'm running a nonprofit/public dataset project aimed at increasing safety of autonomous vehicles. If anyone here wants to contribute (with suggestions / pull requests / following it on twitter / etc) - you'd be most welcome. Its: https://www.safe-av.org/
But you're right, if you're really going to do a full roll out, may as well test it on a subsegment first - I'd hate for it to be used as a debugging tool though.
As I understand it, this is essentially what they were doing with the autopilot 'shadow mode' stuff. Running the system in the background and comparing its outputs with the human driver's responses, and (presumably) logging an incident when the two diverged by any significant margin?
I recently got downvoted for that exact line of reasoning.
Looks like some people don't like to hear that :-)
- known preventable deaths from, say, not staying in the lane aggressively enough;
- possible surprises and subsequent deaths.
There is an ethical conundrum (that is quite different from the trolley problem) between a known fix and an unknown possibility. If both are clearly establish and you dismiss the former to have a simplistic take, yes, you would be down-voted because you are making the debate less informed.
Without falling to solutionism, in that case, the remaining issue seems rather isolated to a handful of areas that look like lanes and could be either painted properly, or that Telsa cars could train to avoid. The later fix would have to be sent rapidly and could have surprising consequences -- although it seems decreasingly likely.
That learning pattern (resolving unintended surprises as they happen decreasingly often) is common in software. This explains why this community prefers (to an extend) Telsa to other manufacturers. Others have preferred the surprise-free and PR-friendly option of not saving the dozens of thousand of lives dying on the road at the moment. There are ethical backgrounds to non-interventionism.
As the victim of car violence, I happen to think that their position is unethical. I’m actually at what is considered an extreme position, of being in favour of Telsa (and Waymo) taking more risk than necessary and temporarily increasing the number of accidents on the road because they have a far better track record of learning from those accidents (and the subsequent press coverage) and that would lower the overall number of deaths faster.
As it happens, they don’t need to: even with less than half of accidents from their counterparts, they still get spectacular learning rate.
> I think you got down-voted because you misrepresented what Telsa is actually doing, which is a difficult arbitrage between: > > - known preventable deaths from, say, not staying in the lane aggressively enough; > > - possible surprises and subsequent deaths.
I don't think I was misrepresenting anything (at least, I was trying not to). I just pointed out that behaviour-changing updates that may be harmless in, say, smartphone apps, are much more problematic in environments such as driving-assisted cars. I think this is objectively true. And I think we need to come up with mechanisms to solve these problems.
> That learning pattern (resolving unintended surprises as they happen decreasingly often) is common in software.
My argument is that changes in behaviour are (almost automatically) surprising, and thus inherently dangerous. Unless my car is truly autonomous and doesn't need my intervention, it must be predictable. Updates run the risk oof breaking htat predictability.
> Others have preferred the surprise-free and PR-friendly option of not saving the dozens of thousand of lives dying on the road at the moment.
My worry is that (potentially) people will still die, just different ones.
> being in favour of Telsa (and Waymo) taking more risk than necessary
If I'm taking you literally, that's an obviously unwise position to take ("more than necessary"). But I think I know what you meant to say: err on the side of faster learning, accepting the potential consequences. Perhaps like NASA in the 1960s.
But my argument was simply that there is a problem with frequent, gradual updates. Not that we shouldn't update (even though that's actually one option). We ought to search for solutions to this problem. I can think of several that aren't "don't update".
But claiming that the problem doesn't exist, or that those that worry about it are unreasonable, is unhelpful.
The saying has been beat to death, but it bears repeating: Tesla is a prime case where the SV mindset of "move fast and break things" has resulted in "move fast and kill people". There's a reason that other vehicle manufacturers don't send out vehicle software updates willy-nilly, and it's not because they're technologically inferior.