Strava didn't release it. It's not strava's job to stop you from uploading sensitive information. Strava does not have a security clearance. Military personell released it to strava. Surely the military already has rules about not uploading GPS tracks of their bases to random websites?
If one guy runs around a base using Strava, that's not an issue. If a few hundred do, then it lights up on the map. But realizing that is a potential issue ahead of time and then proactively addressing it is the challenge.
right, but what i'm saying is that i don't believe this. I'm sure every military has rules about uploading GPS tracking of soldier's movements to civilian websites, and those rules are being disobeyed or not being enforced.
and if the military doesn't care, i'm not sure why strava (or HN) should.
Many professional endurance based athletes also do not track using GPS for similar reasons. Openly sharing training programs is an advantage to opposition and their coaches. Especially with Strava, where people are searchable by name like facebook.
That might need a citation. They might not be using Strava and posting them publically (although a lot of pro cyclists do) but instead use something like Training Peaks for communication with coaches etc.
Does each internet service need to proactively hire someone with clearance and coordinate hiding of sensitive information with the US military?
Not sure if this can be solved from the civilian side. There is just too much information being transmitted out of a combat zone, and I think it has to be controlled from the source. Certain sites need to be just blocked in combat zones. Rather, we need to only have a list of allowed sites.
I know how much it sucks in a combat zone, and I know how much that internet connection makes someone feel like they are still part of the civilization. However, some data just should not be transmitted out of it, and it needs to be heavily controlled.
Basically people go home or whatever and plug in their Garmin and then it'll just upload the last 6 months of data, and there is the same issue.
To track their personal fitness while deployed?
My imagination of how an army is run requires careful maintenance of fitness of soldiers, so use of PT instructors, regular monitoring of fitness metrics. It also has dieticians to monitor food production/intake. Opsec would probably deny any personal electronic devices.
If a deployed soldier needs to track their personal fitness then that suggests a deficiency - fitness of sisters must be of prime importance during deployment? There seems no reason that soldiers wouldn't have a fitness record they could access that included all food intake, mandated exercise, regular weight monitoring, blood pressure, and whatever.
Of course, the use of personal fitness devices suggests my conception is wildly off how a deployed corpus of soldiers is actually run.
When deployed operationally fitness is usually your own business. PTIs often have a different job operationally (something like close protection of the commanding officer), although they may provide some mentorship and help improvise fitness equipment.
Generally soldiers are treated like professionals and left to manage their own fitness when deployed, using the skills and self discipline they've been taught. A fitness monitor is a good way to do that.
> Opsec would probably deny any personal electronic devices.
It doesn't. I've been told to not connect to Afghan mobile networks, and obviously not to talk about what you are doing, but apart from that you can just use your common sense.
> Of course, the use of personal fitness devices suggests my conception is wildly off how a deployed corpus of soldiers is actually run.
It's probably far more chilled out than you imagine. In my experience tech people think the Army is all 'sir-yes-sir'. I've literally never said that in my entire life in the military.
Check the FB group Fill Your Boots for what Army catering is really like... Nutrition seems to be very, very far down the list of priorities.
Soldiers generally lose a lot of fitness while deployed, manning an observation point or a weapons emplacement just doesn’t involve much movement, only a small minority are out on foot patrolling every day.
The problem isn't just the soldiers and it's not just Strava, it's the culture around data itself. Tech companies that produce quantified-self devices or services need to realize the ENORMOUS responsibility they're taking on by collecting and using this data. Users need to realize just what it is they are sharing and how their data gets from point A to point D. Burying it in the fine print is not enough. Maybe people should get into the habit of looking at the data profiles each company has on them or at least being aware of the totality of what's collected so they can make better decisions. It is kind of ironic that the point of collecting this data is to help people make better decisions while this particular case is actually a collection of really bad decisions. Fire is both a useful tool and a dangerous chemical reaction, this is no different.
Perhaps there needs to ALWAYS be an option to route the data to a private server of the user's choosing instead. If that were standard practice, it probably could have prevented this problem.
I guess people could also be using their smartphone app, which I am less familiar with. If I'm misunderstanding what the source of the data is I apologize.
In this case, the sensitive data being uploaded is entirely the fault of the user. I'm actually shocked that soldiers would track a run around a military base. It takes about 10 seconds of thought to realize how bad of an idea that is.
The locations of these bases are not secrets, and the locals already know the layout thoroughly. What I am concerned about is that Strava released this data in such an easily accessible format, and also, whether they even had an internal conversation about managing sensitive material.
Probably not, because that's not their job. A service like Strava should not have confidential or sensitive material uploaded to it (obviously), but it's not on Strava to make sure the data it has is not confidential or sensitive.
I just created an overlay of Google Maps and Strava Heatmap of the forward operating base I was at in Afghanistan. The heatmap clearly shows the layout of the base.
That base has been in operation for at least 6-8 years, and it is well-developed. The up-to-date satellite imagery of the area is not available on Google Maps for a good reason, and Strava just released it.
I imagine that this heatmap has been thoroughly scraped already.
* I was deployed to Afghanistan from 2011-2012.
edit: initially mis-typed '2011-2102' =D
edit2: A well-established military base, even in a combat zone, has access to wifi and cellphone network. We are constantly training physically, and we like to keep track of ourselves. We were early adopters of fitness trackers, and I used a couple of them myself also.