Wrong bug. Intel meltdown is bad, but not anywhere near as bad as Spectre which affects everything! No AMD immunity here.
Spectre needs a more perfect storm of factors to lead to exploitation. No hardware is immune to it, but not all software is vulnerable, either. You need code execution and you need a vulnerable target and you need to somehow trigger the vulnerable targets path and that vulnerable target needs data you want.
Meltdown just needs code execution and you have full read access to all memory.
Far worse for an unpached system, yes.
But in terms of fixing the problem, Spectre is much worse, with a larger impact.
It's so bad that I suspect some people will deliberately run without Spectre protection.
Worth noting that many of the claims around Spectre are wholly un-demonstrated. The PoC only involves reading memory from within the same process (aka, the PoC read memory through a side channel that it had full ability to read anyway). Trying to exploit this in a different process is entirely undemonstrated, and there's not even any real discussion in the paper of how it would work. In theory it's doable, but the issues around how you do this once process switching and IPC enters the picture seems substantial yet the paper does not make any attempt to tackle any of that.
This is untrue.
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privi...
Variant 2 is Spectre.
"This section describes the theory behind our PoC for variant 2 that, when running with root privileges inside a KVM guest created using virt-manager on the Intel Haswell Xeon CPU, with a specific version of Debian's distro kernel running on the host, can read host kernel memory at a rate of around 1500 bytes/second."
>This is untrue.
Anything that is not demonstrated in a reproducible way (that is, some downloadable PoC code) is wholly un-demonstrated. To date, afaik, that goes for Spectre in whole.
However, the description of spectre from spectreattack.com is this:
"Spectre breaks the isolation between different applications. It allows an attacker to trick error-free programs, which follow best practices, into leaking their secrets."
That, however, is not demonstrated by any of these PoC, not that I can find.
I mentioned Meltdown because multiple entities (gcc, llvm, Google Cloud, Azure, Linux, Windows, etc) have already converged on concrete solutions such as new compiler flags and patches which gives us a glimpse into the costs and severity. The Spectre bug may be "bigger" but it doesn't have complete consensus mitigation yet and in the meantime, we really can't tell people to "just keep your laptop unplugged from internet and don't run any apps to avoid the Spectre bug." The Spectre hole seems like it will be an open problem for many years and the new gcc/llvm is an incomplete fix.
The numbers seem to be for patches on several Intel CPUs for all three of the disclosed vulnerabilities. [reworded]
Not meaning to be that rude, yet this itself summarises (and the issue perhaps will shed more light on) how stupid an idea is to let everybody run untrusted code from other peoples, let alone third party stuff like "privacy-intrusion-as-a-service" startups et aliae.
My company doesn't need to mitigate the risk of me using these tricks. I'm not going to, but even if I was I have many other ways to get at sensitive data if I tried. If I get caught I'm fired and put in prison which is enough mitigation.
Would be interesting how it balances out in total.
It truly is difficult to predict all the ripple effects from this. I can't think of a single computer bug in the last 30 years that's similar in reach to this Intel Meltdown.
[EDITED following text to replace "Intel bug" with "Spectre bug" based on ars and jcranmer clarification. The Intel Meltdown can be fixed with operating system update patches for kpti instead of a complete recompile.]
Journalists like to overuse the bombastic metaphor "shaken the very foundations" but this Spectre bug actually seems very fitting of it. Off the top of my head:
- browsers like Chrome & Firefox have to compile with new defensive compilation flags because it runs untrusted Javascript
- cloud providers have to recompile and patch their code to protect themselves from hostile customer vms
- operating systems like Linux/Windows/MacOS have to recompile and patch code to protect users from malware
Imagine the economics of all these mitigations. Also imagine that each of the cloud vendors AWS/Google/Azure/Rackspace had very detailed Excel spreadsheets extrapolating cpu usage for the next few years to plan for millions of $$$ of capital expenditures. Because of the severe performance implications of the bugfix (5% to 50% slowdown?), the cpu utilization assumptions in those spreadsheets are now wrong. They will have to spend more than they thought they did to meet goals of workload throughput.
There are dozens of other scenarios that we can't immediately think of.