The content is not wrong in the same way a math question is, but many humanities classes are explicitly about taking arguments presented in essays, books, journals, by the government, by public interest groups, by private industry, and testing them against "objective reality and truth that exists around them." No humanities course just takes every argument at face value. Every argument is subject to intense scrutiny.
At least from my takeaway, just saying someone or an argument is "wrong" is not really what the humanities are about anyway. The humanities focus on the reasons people have and give for their claims. Often reasons are complex and are tied into complex human contexts. Reasons are not just evidence, they are the entire baggage of argument, logic, context, culture, and history. The humanities focus on understanding those reasons. Whether deciding whether those reasons and claims are wrong is important, but not the entire purpose of the humanities, and never was.
To be sure, there are people who come out of humanities programs with distorted views of the world. I have met many, and it worries me in some ways what more and more do to the humanities.
But there are also those that come out of STEM fields with wildly distorted views of the world as well. And I think that is because they lack a solid humanities education.
The reason we have a "left" and "right" in politics is it is impossible to prove one true and the other false. No matter how intense the scrutiny or clever the arguments.
Here is Orwell on the matter:
>"When the nautical screw was first invented, there was a controversy that lasted for years as to whether screw-steamers or paddle-steamers were better. The paddle-steamers, like all obsolete things, had their champions, who supported them by ingenious arguments. Finally, however, a distinguished admiral tied a screw-steamer and a paddle-steamer of equal horsepower stern to stern and set their engines running. That settled the question once and for all."[1]
Feynman:
>"It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If it doesn't agree with experiment, it's wrong."
People lived for a very long time without a proper appreciation of controlled, repeatable experiments, and progress was very slow.
1 - www.orwell.ru/library/essays/lion/english/e_saw
Who knows if it is even possible to model human interactions?
With physics, you can build a machine an test to your hearts content to determine what the underlying rules are. That's real tough to do when you're studying, say, an economy.
So, i don't mean this as a slight to physicists. It would never occur to me to use oil drops to measure the mass of an electron. It was a brilliant insight. But, with modern tools, I kinda think i could replicate that experiment in my apartment. Evolution? I mean, golly, that's a really subtle insight. I might be able to do something with petri dishes and poisons, but that seems like a pretty tough thing to detect. I'd like to compare Darwin to Newton, but Darwin is probably closer to Aristotle. We haven't begun to get to the really good stuff yet.
I'm skeptical of phycology, there are issues with replication all the time. But clearly they're on to something. The whole advertising industry is built on psychological insights.
I've dealt with crazy race conditions that make me want to pull my hair out. They're not consistently reproducible. Eventually i work out the logic and things fall into place. But i have access to the source :) I can't imagine how hard it is to get anything out of random interactions of black boxes. Social sciences just aren't for me.
Anyway, yeah, i believe it's possible to model human interactions. We do it all the time. As with all things, some models are just more useful than others.
I used to know someone who had nothing but contempt for developers and the IT team, because while he was busy playing the corporate ambition game, they just wanted to do a good job.
As far as he was concerned, this made them easy prey.
Guess which kind of person runs the world?
Engineering and science won't teach you this. You can finish your PhD with a completely unrealistic view about how politics works, and how political outcomes are generated.
Neither science nor engineering are immune to this. Popular beliefs and high-status areas of research are decided politically, not dispassionately.
It's tempting to say that things would be better if we had dispassionate objective AIs deciding policy, instead of individual and tribal ambition - but of course one of the challenges of AI is that instead of simply automating math, AI has the potential to automate and amplify influence and persuasion.
When you don't really understand influence and persuasion - but others do, in practice if not in theory - that's not necessarily a good place to be.
They also have tendency to take conflict like the above, completely ignore politics and motivations that drives the arguments (meaning involved money), pretend it was all technical question people magically could not figure out until someone did something simple.
> People lived for a very long time without a proper appreciation of controlled, repeatable experiments, and progress was very slow.
And now that we strive to only see what we can count and repeat, and worship our own creations as objective reality, progress seems to shift into the pathological. Even just the concept of "progress" as some kind of thing you can get more and more of, rather than a journey on an tree with infinite branches every moment, is in lockstep with that and betrays an incredible impoverishment of thought. Every single great scientist who also loved wisdom seems to have pointed out something along those lines which mediocre scientists seem to ignore.
Hannah Arendt in Vita Activa has a bunch of relevant parts, here is one:
> The rise of the natural sciences is credited with a demonstrable, ever-quickening increase in human knowledge and power; shortly before the modern age European mankind knew less than Archimedes in the third century B.C., while the first fifty years of our century have witnessed more important discoveries than all the centuries of recorded history together. Yet the same phenomenon is blamed with equal right for the hardly less demonstrable increase in human despair or the specifically modern nihilism which has spread to ever larger sections of the population, their most significant aspect perhaps being that they no longer spare the scientists themselves, whose well-founded optimism could still, in the nineteenth century, stand up against the equally justifiable pessimism of thinkers and poets. The modern astrophysical world view, which began with Galileo, and its challenge to the adequacy of the senses to reveal reality, have left us a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way they affect our measuring instruments, and — in the words of Eddington — "the former have as much resemblance to the latter as a telephone number has to a subscriber." Instead of objective qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature or the universe — in the words of Heisenberg — man encounters only himself.
> [The German physicist Werner Heisenberg has expressed this thought in a number of recent publications. For instance: "Wenn man versucht, von der Situation in der modernen Naturwissenschaft ausgehend, sich zu den in Bewegung geratenen Fundamenten vorzutasten, so hat man den Eindruck, ... dass zum erstenmal im Laufe der Geschichte der Mensch auf dieser Erde nur noch sich selbst gegenübersteht ... , daß wir gewissermassen immer nur uns selbst begegnen" (Das Naturbild der heutigen Pkysik [1955], pp. 17-18). Heisenberg's point is that the observed object has no existence independent of the observing subject: "Durch die Art der Beobachtung wird entschieden, welche Züge der Natur bestimmt werden und welche wir durch unsere Beobachtungen verwischen" (Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft [1949], p. 67).]
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My sloppy/literal translation of Heisenberg:
"When one attempts, beginning with the situation of modern science, to feel towards the fundaments that have been set in motion, one gets the impression [..] that for the first time in history man on this Earth is only facing himself [..] that we kind of only meet ourselves"
and
"the type of observation determines which traits of nature are defined and which traits we muddle with our observations"
But we live in the world of people, and demonstrating proficiency in only one insistent cultural mode because it is the most dedicated to rationalism is an impoverished worldview.
The question is, to what extent the current shape of humanities is aligned to those principles?!
The humanities teach how to look from multiple perspectives, our values, what we believe and why, our self and our relation to society. It teaches critical thinking and analysis of complex, nonquantifiable factors, such as: should we declare war on North Korea? What does it mean to be Chinese American? Should I trust this person, website, or TV station? The humanities are about life, and virtually all the themes are immediately applicable in daily life.
For what it's worth, I enjoyed Prof. Rota's piece and didn't particularly object to his "what"/"how" distinction. I agree with commenters above that it's a misrepresentation of historical research, which can be deeply empirical. Unfortunately a huge amount of history education, especially k-12, does boil down to a rote memorization of past events, so I can't really fault him for the generalization.
Surprisingly, even Macron articulated that maybe Western world needs "great story arcs", which is code word for SHARED IDEALS.
War is always an attribute of survival and the problem is that US population is pretty insulated from acute strife on the survival front. But the risks are there and can only be appreciated once you train in geopolitics.
Court cases are won or lost, but sometimes overturned on appeal. Even Supreme Court rulings can be overturned by later rulings.
Artists create art that can win or lose in the marketplace. Art can also gain or lose status based on how it appears to critics. Artists can be popular, notorious, or obscure.
Similarly for writers. Politicians win or lose elections. Nations win or lose wars.
Winning and losing in competitive situations seems more fundamental than falsification. (Take evolution for example.)
Arguably computing as a discipline is an important part of what makes contemporary lifestyles possible, and most of it, especially the practical parts, resembles the liberal arts more than it resembles mathematics. Especially areas like programming languages overall operate more through argumentation and analogy than through proofs. Sure, there are subsidiary proofs involved that can tell you something useful about the building blocks, but the type-related theorems you find in appendices of POPL papers are just low-level machinery, not the real goal, which is a usable programming language that people can do real work with. That requires constructing an overall language and ecosystem through a pretty liberal-arts style methodology: looking at what worked previously, reasoning what went well and badly about that, critically considering illustrative examples (often carefully constructed examples designed to illustrate a point, similar to the thought experiments in philosophy), and attempting to improve things on the basis of all that. If you look at a Rich Hickey talk, for example, that's pretty much entirely how he proceeds. And even in POPL papers, that's what you find in the meat of most influential papers (as opposed to the appendices): the real result of an influential paper is typically a qualitative argument about programming constructs, where the argument is convincing and well supported by examples, by not "proven" in any mathematical sense.
I think the virtue is not in the value of the arguments, but whether the argumenrs are falsifiable.
Programming has the virtue that it has to work for it to have value. Social sciences and humanities have to convince someone that it would work.
To pick a concrete example: Rich Hickey introduced transducers into Clojure a while ago, using an argument, illustrated by a number of examples, for why they're useful. Is this argument falsifiable? In principle some version of it might be, if you made "useful" more precise (useful to whom? in which contexts? how would you know?). But the kind of empirical work it would take to measure it in a non-toy setting is quite difficult, so afaik nobody's tested it, or even really formulated the question precisely enough to test it. In practice, you accept or reject the construct based on what you think of the argument, or you try to find a counterargument that makes them look like an inelegant/awkward construct, but in either case you probably aren't attempting to rigorously validate or falsify a scientific hypothesis relating to them. Basically all of PL design and evolution looks more like that than like Popperian science...
What I am saying is that there is nothing wrong with these arguments or with using them usefully. What is wrong is when nothing is falsifible or able to proven, either. So in other words, arguments are useful, but it does matter if it has to agree with scientific experiment.
Programming does, at the end of the day, agree with fundmantal truths for it to work. Its foundations are on the metal, and everything is reducible experimentability.
Perhaps everything except the human element: most aspects of modern product development involve programming language improvements that have to do with improving human interaction with a computer. But even here, we have a sort of market for ideas in that developers who adopt better ideas will be more successful.
Of course, it has to work. But a sculpture has to "work" too in the sense that it shouldn't collapse. Structural integrity is only part of the goal. Similarly for programs.
You mean PL design, don't you? Performance work is very empirical. If my new type of inline cache is better then I need to prove that and it's falsifiable (using benchmarks, which I admit aren't ideal).
http://cis.upenn.edu/~cis501/papers/producing-wrong-data.pdf
> Of the 133 papers published in the surveyed conference pro- ceedings, 88 had at least one section dedicated to experimental methodology and evaluation
And anyway the claim was 'very rarely', when it's actually a majority of cases.
I disagree. Historians are constantly making predictions of events happening today, based on their knowledge of history. Some are accurate, some are not. They can then take this output, and use it to refine the views of history.
This doesn't even cover how history is written by very unreliable narrators, and historians have to do more than learn the "what" to uncover the "how".
Your argument is also somewhat limited to History, when Philosophy, Psycology, and other liberal arts degrees do not have the same limitations.
Two Dogmas would be a good place to end up.
It's also weird to suggest that no historical claims are falsifiable. That seems to put real history on a par with nutty conspiracy theories.
In my humble opinion the scarceness of falsifiability in history is the reason why it is so easy to create nutty conspiracy theories about history vs, say, mathematics or physics.
History is roughly as falsifiable as astronomy or biology.
At least for mathematics I have hardly seen any "nutty mathematical theories" (I am a PhD student in mathematics, but not a physicist, so I cannot say anything about physics here). The reason that I see is that for a math text to be considered as solid, it has to contain good, understandable proofs - which are hard to write by "crackpots". To be more precise: On sceptic's blogs I have of course seen links to papers containing "mathematical crackpottery", but I have hardly ever seen those "in the open countryside".
Ask your favorite well-known professor how many proofs of P=NP, the Riemann hypothesis, or whatever they get per week. Sure, they're all Time-Cube level crazy, but most off the wall theories are, too.
My PhD advisor actually works in an area that is related to complexity questions that are related to P=NP. So if he would get spammed a lot with this kind of papers, I am pretty sure that I would know. Similar statements hold for other researchers who work on the same floor.
You might object that even though they might work on questions that are related to complexity theory, they are perhaps simply not the people that an "ordinary crackpot" thinks of as target reader for their texts - in other words one has to know a little bit about mathematics to know that the questions these people work on are actually related to P=NP. I will not disagree with this objection.
You may also object that the respective persons are well-known and well-regarded in their respective community, but the general public is not so much aware of them. I also will not disagree with this objection.
Nevertheless I strongly believe that if your claim were true in general, I would probably know.
> But then why do you judge the conspiracy theories to be nutty, if they are on just as firm an epistemological footing as actual history?
But to elaborate on your argument: Because of the dubious epistemological footing indeed "actual history" has not the highest reputation to me. The reason I disregard lots of "nutty conspiracy theories" rather lies in the fact that many "conspiracists" have a tendency to find conspiracies in other topics, too, where falsification is much better possible. Thus I tend to judge by looking at the track record of the respective person.
This is exactly one example for my "where falsification is much better possible" - in this case because of physics.
But by picking over the details of a particular example you're missing the point. Surely you don't want to say that you can reject crazy historical claims solely because the proponents of those claims make outragerous claims in other areas too. If you think the moon landings are an exception, for some reason, then let's look at other examples. E.g. Holocaust denial.
Falsifiable means subject to test. It doesn't mean provabe on the sense of math. Only math is provable like math.
Could you provide some examples?
How does this perspective that people are stupid gain ground? It seems to be a self serving, self important and extremely judgemental perspective held by some insular techies.
The world is as much about politics, people and culture as it is about science. A failure to understand how the world works not just scientifically but politically, culturally and economically, the history of societies and accompanying philosophies gives individuals no context or understanding of their world. A one dimensional perspective both ways impoverishes rather than enlightens.
In its current humanities-style argumentative form, you somewhat contradict yourself: either your argument holds power, then why do you dismiss this family of arguments as inferior? Or your argument doesn't hold power, then why would you expect us (or even yourself) to be convinced?
In the end, I think education is also the veichel and a platform for students to have the intellect to question and to challenge established facts.
Mathematics isn't really a science.
Where the author is correct is that in those fields the output isn’t falsifiable. Your math skills allow you to construct proofs that can be verified. Your study of history allows you to write accounts explaining and putting in context historical events in a way that is pursuasive to other people. But they are not falsifiable.
I agree with holding the former in higher esteem. Being able to communicate with people is important, but it’s an impoverished basis for an education. It’s terrifying that many students manage to graduate without much exposure to the world of objective reality and truth that exists around them (and which makes their lifestyles possible).