I really dislike titles like this. Why do they presume to know what I think? An example from yesterday was that consciousness goes deeper than I thought. On reading the article, it did no such thing. Again, why would they presume to know what I think?
I'm not sure why it rubs me wrong. It certainly biases my perception of the article before I've even read it. I even know that it is prejudicing my reading but I can't seem to get over it.
To me, they seem like click-bait. No, the answer may not surprise me and no, the author actually had no idea what I was thinking. It really does bias me against the article. It's just a small thing but I can see my own biases when I see headlines that include similar statements.
No big deal, just a pet peeve.
Same with "X considered harmful", just give me a break.
However if you are gullible enough to click on "7 awesome things Miley Cirus did, number 4 will shock you!", you are ripe to click on all the click bait they will show you.
The problem arises when good quality content uses clickbait. It's the same as naming your bank "The Nigerian Prince Bank of America".
'We looked at X and you won't believe what we found!'
Why yes, yes I will believe what you found, provided you give clear evidence, explain your methodology, and provide credible citations where needed.
I was worried it was only me who felt like this, as I'd not seen anyone else mention it. It really does bias my reading of the article afterwards. I should probably figure out a way to work past that bias, but I guess I should be grateful that I recognize it in myself.
Again, nothing major - it just irks me a bit. I'm not going to rage-quit or anything.
It's clickbait in another form. Playing psychological games with readers.
It's disrespecting its readers for making an assumption that readers are too shallow to show interest in substance. So, agree, insulting readers' intelligence.
It's not a rational thought, but the saddest part is that the real world fits that bias way too well.
That would be fine btw... the real problem is when a valuable material is hidden behind clickbaity titles. Now _THAT_ is what irks me personally -- and is sadly happening lately.
> So if tulipmania wasn’t actually a calamity, why was it made out to be one? We have tetchy Christian moralists to blame for that. With great wealth comes great social anxiety, or as historian Simon Schama writes in The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age, “The prodigious quality of their success went to their heads, but it also made them a bit queasy.” All the outlandish stories of economic ruin, of an innocent sailor thrown in prison for eating a tulip bulb, of chimney sweeps wading into the market in hopes of striking it rich—those come from propaganda pamphlets published by Dutch Calvinists worried that the tulip-propelled consumerism boom would lead to societal decay. Their insistence that such great wealth was ungodly has even stayed with us to this day.
> “Some of the stuff hasn’t lasted, like the idea that God punishes people who are overreaching by causing them to have the plague. That’s one of the things people said in the 1630s,” Goldgar says. “But the idea that you get punished if you overreach? You still hear that. It’s all, ‘pride goes before the fall.’”
There's some of that in cryptocurrency criticism.
Be careful, seems to me the Tulipmaniamania bubble might be about to burst.
Edit: Sorry, you're all right. There wasn't any titlemania after all.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panic_of_1819 a U.S. recession with bank failures; culmination of U.S.'s first boom-to-bust economic cycle
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panic_of_1837 a U.S. recession with bank failures, followed by a 5-year depression
and so on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_economic_crises#19th_c...
See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Moderation (though that's a shorter period).
* I know a little about this, but not that much. Take what I say with a big grain of salt.
But, more importantly, between the Great Depression and the last crisis of 2008, the Western World never saw any panic as big as those of the 19th century: the Fed had learned much better how to be the World banker, and the US had learned that, after winning a war, rebuilding international trade was much important than collecting war debts.
> Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households.
> Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues.
Paper by the authors available from https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/news/conference... .
> Canadian banks historically had balance sheets like other banks, and participated in complex global interbank networks since the early 19th century. Yet Canadian banks, throughout their history, avoided systemic banking crises – with the exception of two short-lived suspensions of convertibility in 1837 and 1839 in response to crises originating in the United States. Moreover, prudential regulation was absent for much of Canada’s history, as was a central bank (until 1935). According to the structural theory of crises, the exposure of Canadian banks to liquidity risk should have been higher than in many other countries, given that the Bank of Canada did not come into existence until 1935. According to the externalities theory and the myopia theory, the absence of activist prudential regulation in Canada during most of its history should have been associated with a higher frequency of banking crises, but it was not.
Note that you write "central banks and regulations intended to smooth the economy" but at that last quote points out, "prudential regulation was absent for much of Canada’s history", so something is incomplete in your understanding.
That being said, I admit to not having read the paper. The authors' ultimate conclusion may stand, but that their exemplar is a British Dominion adds some confounding details.
They do point out the connections to British rule. They give some other reasons as well.
A test for the importance of being fixed to the pound Sterling, etc., is to look to other regions under British rule, like Jamaica, Mauritius, Kenya, Gambia, and Cyprus, and evaluate their banking crises.
I know nothing about that history, just wanted to pointed out that it is, in principle, a testable prediction.
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/business-cy...
Because I thought they were connected, and was following that same topic of "panic and crash".
> Are business cycles in the modern sense (unemployment that lasts for longer than six months) known to happen in the presence of free banking and absent a central bank? Actual question. It matters because we know how this happens when a central bank controls the currency supply and allows NGDP to drop. It's not obvious to me that this happens with free banking.
Hope that clears everything up. I don't like arguing semantics for virtually no reason, but in this case it appears you legitimately misunderstood that the terms business cycle, market panics, and crashes are not specific to banks.
> That’s not to say that everything about the story is wrong; merchants really did engage in a frantic tulip trade, and they paid incredibly high prices for some bulbs. And when a number of buyers announced they couldn’t pay the high price previously agreed upon, the market did fall apart and cause a small crisis—but only because it undermined social expectations.
But it implies that it's not all that notable because it didn't collapse the entire economy:
> But the trade didn’t affect all levels of society, and it didn’t cause the collapse of industry in Amsterdam and elsewhere.
Personally, I don't think I'd ever made the assumption that it had. Likewise, if Bitcoin were to implode, it would be similar — some people would suffer, but it wouldn't be all that widespread of an effect.
Tulipmania still makes a great historical anecdote on speculation, and I for one, will keep using it as one.