Second of all, you can mix them with other coins, which instantly crushes all hopes of traceability.
Example: Imagine you have wallets A (clean) and B (stolen) with 1 BTC each. You put them both into wallet C, and then you split it again equally into X and Y. Where is the stolen money now?
And then there are altcoin exchanges.
That's the distinction. Is it money or is it a fenced good?
If I'm receiving currency (be it real money or bitcoin), I'm not going to think about where it came from. It's fungible.
Welcome to anti-money laundering law. KYC regulations basically mean, for anyone handling large volumes of money, it's the vendor's business, and liability, to know where customers' money comes from.
Yes, this can happen. Especially for higher valued items
This was in a small town bank, and I'm sure that larger banks have more sophisticated policies. I'm curious to know if ATMs have any similar features.
Exchanges do know the identities of a small fraction of all addresses, that's true. But if someone wants to remain anonymous, and has a relatively small amount (in relation to exchange's liquidity), it becomes trivial to hide the money.
Something like MtGox amounts are much much more complicated to clean in their entirety, that I agree with.
The bitcoin tumbler is a service that does the mixing, and as long as it has more than one customer, it can do the mixing.
A tumbler only helps if a lot of people with legitimate BitCoins frequently mix them in, so that people with coins from a mixer have a plausible claim of innocence. If mixers are primarily used by criminals, you've only anonymized which crime you've committed, you haven't really laundered the money. If those coins touch your real-world identity, you may not be incriminated in a particular crime, but you've made yourself into a suspect in a relatively small pool of crimes.
Beyond that, you could buy legitimate bitcoin and only use it to 'legitimize' mixing pools.
In your example the stolen coins are in wallet X and Y and using the blockchain we can determine exactly how much in each wallet comes from the stolen coin.
A true mixing service takes the coins into a wallet and sends you coins that are from another wallet that has never had any contact with the coins you sent in. This is what breaks the chain you can trace.
Altcoin exchanges let you clean your coins by using an altcoin as the mixer. Essentially you send BTC to an exchange, buy an altcoin, transfer altcoin to another exchange, buty bitcoin. You now have much harder to trace bitcoin.
A mixer or exchange is the best bet, but then you're relying on a third party. A mixer may record it's transactions with people to say which coin was given out for which coin moved in.
At least this is my understanding of how the blockchain works. I may be wrong (likely!)
So if you move 20 coins from wallets A and B to wallet C, and then Wallet C moves those coins to wallets D and E, there's no concept of "whos" coins from A and B you moved into each wallet, it's just a count.
So in this case wallets A,B,C,D, and E are all suspect, and at some point they're going to try and buy something tangible or convert to real currency from one of those wallets.
That's why I asked - where is the stolen money, is it in X or in Y or in both?
The best we can do to reduce crime is to convince most of the exchanges not to take the stolen coins (or take them, but give them back to the real owners). But there are so many of them, and many of them are anonymous, I don't see how we can do that.
Here's an approach to deter crime here: explicitly expose the implicit information about stolen coins. Wallets containing stolen coins are to be considered tainted to a specific amount of BTC. Receiving from them means your wallets gets that taint, proportionally to the amount received. The only way to un-taint a wallet is to return the stolen money.
This assumes certain infrastructure, of course.
How did you reach this conclusion?
Why not 0.1 in X and 0.9 in Y?
Why not 1 in X and 0 in Y?
> This assumes certain infrastructure, of course.
Will not happen any time soon. Just like it doesn't happen with the dollars / euros / etc.
Even if you somehow magically force this kind of filtering at the node level, people who desire freedom will move to some other cryptocurrency. Bitcoin is actually quite simple compared to more modern and more anonymous offerings.
Here's a more detailed proposal to show it can be done as a distributed system.
http://www.loper-os.org/?p=988
It's not about forcing nodes to do anything. It's about publishing data about what they're doing. Then people can make informed decisions. Some people won't like it, but precisely what freedom would be be trying to preserve, if they're fighting this? Freedom to foist off dirty money to people who don't want to receive it?
But you see, that's not the question I asked. I asked where the stolen money actually is. And the only truthful answer you can give is "I don't know".
I agree that we could create a system to track "tainted money" and use the proportional tracking in case of merge-splits (50-50 in our example). But you will quickly run out of untainted money (besides the freshly-mined coins), because
1) everything that touches the hot wallet in any exchange will be considered tainted
2) Even if #1 were not true, every time an exchange does a withdrawal, they don't do it in 1 transaction per address, they do it in batches, where they withdraw from the hot wallet into dozens/hundreds of addresses. They do it to massively save on the transaction fees.
Okay, let's go down that route. Here's where it is: nowhere. Not because it disappeared, but because it was never actually located IN a wallet. And this is true of all bitcoins! They're not really IN wallets. They're abstract entities, if they count as entities at all. The wallets are the more primary entities in the BTC platform, as I understand it. Wallets are associated with amounts of BTC.
The BTC platform has no concept of 'stolen' coins. That's why you'll need another parallel platform to deal with this issue. As a wholly hypothetical platform, we're free to propose the invention of new conventions here.
So you are doing mixing. One of your users is a criminal, and that is apparent to you as you can trace where their coins came from. In your stash, you have 100BTC, 10 of which is the share from the criminal. He/she orders 1BTC to be transferred to a private wallet. You make a transfer to the private wallet from your stash, but you know exactly who gave the order. When the police comes to you, you will be forced to tell them who gave the order. Am I missing something? If I'm correct, then the attacker has to trust the mixer.
And then we have things like ZCash, which are designed to make tracing impossible.
You could, theoretically, convince some providers of goods/services not to accept any tainted coins. It is doable, but most business owners don't care about that, as long as the money is not pure stolen (in both Bitcoin and physical world).
Consider that some money in your bank account has previously gone through being stolen, traded for drugs, guns, slaves, being laundered. Pretty much nobody but the Central Banks has clean money.
By using a set of different wallets where the control is shared but unknown outside of the mixer, you can end up with coins that are not traceable through wallets.
A bit like you giving money to a third party, who calls up his friend, and then his friend gives the same amount of money to your friend. 'Your money' then ends up being used for something else (unrelated to you).
Even if you go further and say, split Y into Y1 and Y2 and only cash out Y1, there is still some information retained.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20...
Also mixing is not laundering. Mixing only allows you to stop the tracing. Converting these mixed coins on a large scale to something like dollars is very very hard. Most exchanges that interact with the traditional banking system do check where you got the money from. It's not like you can send $1M worth of tumbled coins to Bitstamp/Kraken/Coinbase and convert them to dollars without tons of paperwork. And it's not like you can buy a house/car/boat with these coins and expect the IRS not to show up.
This nicely explains why the Mexican cartels (in their simplicity) used US dollars and not Bitcoins ;).
But I still wonder about the paperwork, it completely escapes me.
I mean, there are mainly three "legit" ways to actually become in possession of a Bitcoin:
1) mining it
2) buying it (i.e. giving real money in exchange for it), let's say as an investment
3) accepting the Bitcoin as payment for any service, good, etc.
Why any of the above (that have more or less a proven/provable origin and thus that can justify the provenance of the Bitcoin and somehow do the appropriate paperworks) would want to use a mixer?
Or - differently put - once you Bitcoin has gone through the mixer isn't it not anymore suitable to any exchange requiring this paperwork? I.e. it becomes "unspendable" money (if not in very small quantities, small amount single operations, limited quantities of operation).
Or am I missing something?
I haven't made any darknet purchases yet, but if I do I'd like my legally purchased Bitcoins not to be linked back to Coinbase which has a lot of identifying information on who I am.
But I wasn't hypothizing the case of buying anything on a darknet or anything "debatable" (which would be a good reason to try to strip each and every information) I was trying to understand why - excluded the use of the Bitcoin for any less than perfectly clear, transparent and legitimate operation - one would want to use a mixer.
In your case the Bitcoin (which was "legit" before) becomes somehow "tainted" by going through the mixer.
And I doubt a significant portion of bitcoin is used for money laundering - it's mostly geeks, investors, and other early adopters holding it.
Another point was - the government generally doesn't seem to care about massive scale money laundering. I have no other explanation why nobody went to prison, and the fine was only $1.9B on $670B laundered.
Or use BTC mixers.
How does one stay anonymous without being perceived as a threat by authorities is the million bitcoin question
It shouldn't matter if you're perceived as a threat by authorities if you're anonymous. Bitcoin's biggest selling point is that it's supposed to render governments and law enforcement impotent to interfere with transactions, regardless of their legality.
Okay, now according to the rules here I have to say something helpful, see below:
The primary goal is to - unlink - your transaction.
First, the mixers are primarily hidden services on TOR, but even if they aren't, you would use a mixer over TOR. Ultimately, you get different bitcoins back over time. Mixers have reputation and you hope they don't undermine that reputation this particular time. Its a slow process and pretty bad experience. The mixer's "tainted" coins are liquid and fungible enough.
Second, well mixing on the same blockchain kind of sucks. But wait how would you even know if the person trying to obfuscate and unlink is even using the same blockchain? Again, its not 2012 anymore and there are thousands of blockchains they could have been paid out in, and you wouldn't know because you are an armchair sleuth clicking across bitcoin addresses in 2017 playing detective. Such high tech chain analysis.
Third, but okay, some service is probably still keeping records of these blockchain transfers, this just delays the detective work as people wise up to cross chain movement ... maybe in 2022? Rhetorical question. Turns out, some blockchains aren't like the others, and some cryptocurrencies don't use blockchains at all.
Enter Monero. Monero does use a blockchain. Monero's blockchain does not contain:
- sender's address (or any plain text addresses for that matter)
- recipient's address (or any plain text addresses for that matter)
- transaction amounts
so now you just need a "mixer" that lets you swap your unfungible coin to a fungible coin like Monero. Hm, well since its already 2017, as you've realized, what services do that?
www.shapeshift.io - Many to many asset exchange. No accounts needed. Doesn't store funds, just a pretty GUI on a mixer. Low transaction limits.
www.xmr.to - Monero to bitcoin, bitcoin to Monero transmitter. No accounts needed. Doesn't store funds, just a pretty GUI on a mixer. Decent transaction limits.
www.changelly.com - Many to many asset exchange. No accounts actually needed. Extremely high transaction limits, but the spread just gets worse.
no accounts needed on any of those, and if they pretend you do, just use TOR and a fake email address. You'll still get your opaque coins.
Unlike most cryptocurrencies that you've never heard of, Monero has USD markets on well known exchanges and is a very active market. The project hopes its fungibility improvements make it more valuable than bitcoin-style blockchains, while the technology advances to get the scalability improvements as well, eventually.
One of the rebuttals posted here was that all of the services will blacklist the bitcoin addresses that are tainted. This is not true, even the ones that are interested in doing so just don't update that fast.
There have been several times in the past where I paid bitcoin invoices, using a mixer/exchange like xmr.to. I just put the service provider's bitcoin address as the recipient, and I sent Monero to the mixer. Why would you want everyone knowing how much you ever had in any address? I didn't want that and I opted out. You wouldn't know if a hacker that accepted bitcoin was doing the same thing.
Sounds pretty easy to connect the dots to me...
So now the hacker has 10BTC in the mixer, he requests to be paid out to a list of 20 addresses. These addresses are sent between 0.1 and 0.9btc until the mixer has sent out 9 BTC (taking a 10% commission for the service).
None of those hacker controlled addresses have any connection with one another and they have zero connection to the original deposits made by the hacker.
There are also another 10 hackers doing exactly the same thing, so now we are looking at hundreds of transactions. So it becomes very difficult to connect the dots, also if you really could connect the dots easily I imagine that the FBI et al would really like to speak to you.
Money laundering is disguising the origin in general, which is of course the point of mixing. It's not some kind of theoretical bitcoin boner exercise, it's intended so you can maybe at a later date withdraw some bitcoins without the party providing the cash (and the feds) immediately making the connection to the crime.
Bitcoin mixing disguises the origin only as far as the blockchain is concerned, you still end up with X BTC that you have no explanation for how you earned them.
Still obfuscating the source of funds or making it harder to trace is what both Money Laundering and Privacy are about.
Sadly, politicians don't make it easy to be 'almost private' (to everyone but the government it's a secret).
Transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain are public, so it's relatively easy to keep tabs on movements of known criminal proceeds (as the article demonstrates :)
Until they've been obfuscated by a mixer... and not every mixer is going to be interested in blacklisting every set of coin from every known criminal activity. And many criminal activities are surely unknown, including many for which the sources of coins are not going to go to any extent to report. (The senders may be committing crimes that were unrelated to Bitcoin crime, and so entirely off the radar.)
I'd hazard a guess that the majority of crime committed in and around the ecosystem of Bitcoin is not even Bitcoin theft, so might never be reported.
How many times does a value have to move from one address to another address, and mix with untainted coin, before it's going to be considered too far removed from the original addresses to be palpably associated with the original crime?
https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-exchange-shapeshift-h...
The big exchanges are making a lot of money, so it would seem incredibly ill-advised for exchanges not to do this - the risks are simply far too high.
We know which addresses the WannaCry ransoms were paid to - whether a small or large amount is sent to an exchange, the source address would be blacklisted.
Thus, everyone knows that the coins that were in this particular wallet are hot. Even if the owner "cashes out" in a few years, the buyer is holding hot coins and can't do much with them.
or sell the bitcoin for another cryptocurrency
if this is true, then there shouldn't be any bad guy selling stolen credit card numbers online.
You can't buy anything directly with it because as soon as you receive the goods the police will force the person who provided the goods to you to give away your details.\
You can't take it out into your bank account because that will also identify you.
So - a bitcoin mixer would seem your best bet, but even then it just makes it "more difficult" to trace. Not sure I'd want to risk many years in prison on that.