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Re:On Goldman by retube on Sunday April 25, 2010 @09:42AM (#1292698)
The crux of the complaint is weather GS lied or not. But what are they supposed to have lied about? If they were selling this fund/instrument/collection of bonds to third parties, by definition there must be a short on the other side - someone has sold the instruments into the fund. So what?
Re:On Goldman by blackswan on Sunday April 25, 2010 @09:50AM (#1292706)
I'm no expert on the matter but I believe the problem is that GS misrepresented one side of the trade. So having a short and a long side to the trade isn't an issue - the problem is that GS misrepresented Paulson's hedge fund as an independent recommender of the long side when that same fund was in fact shorting the securities (and GS clearly knew about this). If a truly independent party had recommended the long side of the trade then there wouldn't be a case.
Re:On Goldman by bushido on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:53AM (#1292901)
The real issue as people have been summing up is: "The Abacus Fund bought risky mortgage loans and literally bet that they (and the homeowners who held them) would default to the detriment of investors and consumers."

The abacus fund was the name of the Fund that John Paulson setup.

Let me get the facts out of the way:

1) It is not possible to have a long and short position in the same instrument on the same account simultaneously. ... unless of course it was calls vs puts. but while they are both options they are separate instruments as you can go long/short/offset on calls or puts for a complete trade without using the other. i.e. sell call and buy them back to offset.

2) Of course they could have used another instrument to do this. that is going Long on the futures while buying puts. and that would be illegal. oh wait! thats called hedging. thats not illegal.

3) Of course again if the fund was hedging there is no fraud possible since the money would be with the fund, hence with the investors.

4) If the opposite position was in another account, another fund, or whatever that is also not illegal. Though NOW since these were not hedges they had to be naked shorts. But wait thats not possible, aren't there hundreds of articles that say Goldman, Paulson, Lehman, MS etc etc etc lost tons of money by buying into CDOs...

5) But that would mean, that these were in fact hedged trades!

6) Of course there is also the fact that banks, investment advisors, etc are obligated to tell all their clients what their other clients are doing, now in cases like this that would include internal propitiatory trading desks. OH WAIT! thats illegal too...

Whats the effing case again?

That they sold mortgages that the investors wanted to buy (unless they were forced to do so under pressure/on gun point... without a choice.... that would definitely be illegal)?

That they hedged?

That the investors who had the money and sensibility to invest in these risky exotic securities, did not know that they should have hedged against their trades?

That its common knowledge that every transaction needs to have a sound exit strategy, and factor in the worst case scenario (hence the hedge), in this case it would be that the investors and consumers could default?

Since, if this case has any base, can we expect Full disclosure of Speculation, Investment activities of citizens to get included with emails to the Patriot Act? Oh wait... where did I get that idea from!

Since banks can now be taken to court for not disclosing this information, can we add this requirement to lawyers too?

Ok back to the topic.. what I think of this case is:

For every vague law GS has been blamed to break there is at least one not at all vague law that clears them, the fact of the matter is that this case is not at all about lawful merits, but rather political gain by creating an emotional and moralizing case that will be won even without wining the real case. By using word like literally betting against homeowners etc.

enough said.

Re:On Goldman by jballanc on Sunday April 25, 2010 @12:14PM (#1292936)
This is an excellent summary of what happened. This is also an excellent example of the Randian philosophy that is so rampant on Wall Street. To wit: "I'm smart, you're dumb, so I win, you loose." Matt Taibbi had a nice summary of this recently: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/24/will-goldman-...

Of course, the problem with this attitude is that it actively works against the establishment of a Pareto efficient system, and I think we're seeing the results of that with the most recent economic downturn. I don't know enough about the laws to say whether your assertion that no laws were broken is true or not. All I can say is that I hope some laws were broken. If not, then this does not speak well of the US's ability to regulate itself in such a way that benefits the nation, rather than benefitting a select few.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @12:46PM (#1292999)
The 'effing case' is that Goldman told the long side investors that ACA independently assembled the reference portfolio when Paulson actually played a significant role in putting it together.

How does that not constitute fraud?

Re:On Goldman by bushido on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:24PM (#1293067)
You're correct. Paulson did suggest 123 bonds that he thought should be included in the CDO. And since Paulson was considered smart by ACA he did have an "expert" influence on the final offering.

BUT. ACA as an independent portfolio selection agent only selected 55 of those. And only those 55 were used.

But since the first 123 were selected by Paulson we should ignore this fact.

Since we have already dismissed that ACA independently selected the portfolio, we shopuld also dismiss the fact that ACA's parent company invested $900 million in the CDO, because they believed in the validity of their choices.

But then again how is that in any way saying that they approved of the contents of the CDO.

Since we have established this,let me try and convince some law firms to start a class action against all colleges, universities, b-schools etc for giving students multiple choice questions, to try and influence their judgement that the answer can be something other than the right one.

Not exactly the same case as Paulson, ACA and Goldman, but its soooo close!

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:35PM (#1293088)
So he gets to pick the first 55 and sign off on the last 37, and you don't think that constitutes significant influence?
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @02:16PM (#1293159)
The 'effing case' is that Goldman told the long side investors that ACA independently assembled the reference portfolio when Paulson actually played a significant role in putting it together.

Paulson had a list of securities they wanted to short. ACA selected what was (in their opinion) the best set of long positions from this set. Goldman then sold a synthetic CDO based on the long positions. The exact positions were disclosed, in explicit detail, to every buyer.

This is how nearly every synthetic CDO is constructed.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @02:35PM (#1293205)
If you read the complaint, it specifically says 55 of Paulson's original list made it into the final portfolio right off the bat, and the final 37 were negotiated between Paulson and ACA and subject to Paulson's final approval. Yes, ACA also had to sign off, but they were hardly 'independent' - Goldman was paying them to build this thing at Paulson's request.

So it's clear that ACA sucks. I've never argued that wasn't the case. But ACA's suckage in no way bears on the fact that Goldman plainly lied about the selection process to longside investors (who clearly suck, as well).

In summary: everyone involved sucks, except maybe Paulson. Goldman's the only party that criminally sucks, though, at least that we know of right now.

Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @02:40PM (#1293221)
Obviously it was subject to Paulson's final approval. If ACA did not construct a short position which met Paulson's needs, Paulson would not participate and there would be no CDO (unless another short side was found).
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @03:22PM (#1293330)
So what are you arguing, exactly? If Paulson had to approve it, and it wouldn't have existed otherwise, how could Goldman possibly represent it as being independently selected by ACA and not be guilty of fraud?
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @04:22PM (#1293453)
ACA independently selected the best set of long positions that Paulson was willing to short. That's how almost every synthetic CDO is constructed, and was almost certainly disclosed in the legalese of the contract.
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @04:46PM (#1293505)
But ACA didn't know Paulson was the short. They thought he was going long, because that's what Goldman told them (and part of what the SEC is suing Goldman for). It was Goldman's responsibility to find the shorts, not ACA's.
Re:On Goldman by fleitz on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:08PM (#1293043)
ACA did put it together independently. Paulson sent a list of suggestions which ACA was not required and did not include in the way Paulson wanted.
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:19PM (#1293058)
Not true. ACA was being paid by Goldman to put this thing together, who in turn was being paid by Paulson. As long as Paulson wasn't satisfied with the portfolio, Abacus wasn't going anywhere. The fact that they didn't accept his first list without changes does not imply that he didn't directly influence and sign off on the final package.
Re:On Goldman by fleitz on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:06PM (#1293037)
Paulson didn't bet against homeowners, anyone who owns their home wouldn't be involved in a subprime CDO. He bet against people that owned less than any of their home. (eg. 0 down cash back subprime mortgage)
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:22AM (#1292838)
In these kinds of instruments, though, the short isn't always clear. Paulson himself was never short on the instrument directly - it's not like a stock where you can borrow shares. To be short, he had to go and buy a CDS on it (and one of the quirks of this setup is that there can effectively be a lot more short money than long on the instrument - lots of people can buy the insurance, but the underlying instrument is only held once).

The direct shorts that everyone knew about were the people selling the underlying mortgages up the chain, and the reasons they were short were well understood by everyone involved (cash now vs. over 30 years, etc.).

Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:32AM (#1292864)
In this case, the existence of the short side is completely clear. The only thing unknown is their identity.

ABACUS was a synthetic CDO. The short side wanted to buy CDS on a set of underlying bonds. The long side wanted to issue the CDS.

The only relation it has to bonds is that ACA structured the transaction to behave similarly to a set of bonds. The synthetic CDO could not have existed if someone was not explicitly trying to short the underlying bonds.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:53AM (#1292902)
The existence of the short is always clear. Who that short is, and why they're short, is not. In this case, ACA worked with Paulson to pick the reference portfolio of RMBS under the belief that we was long the equity tranche.
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @12:12PM (#1292933)
In the case of a synthetic CDO, there are only two reasons for a short side to be short: they want to hedge or speculate.

As for ACA working with Paulson, yet somehow not knowing they were short, I'm having a hard time believing it. If it is true, how come the SEC isn't charging Paulson with fraud?

Regarding the mechanics of it, it also seems extremely unlikely. The purpose of their meeting is to negotiate with Paulson - to build the best CDO possible (to increase the changes of finding buyers) while still allowing Paulson to get the short they desire. I find it extremely unlikely that somehow, they didn't figure out that Paulson was short during this process.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @12:35PM (#1292971)
What percent of all trades in anything don't fall under the umbrellas of hedging or speculating?

I assume Paulson's not being charged because it wasn't Paulson who told ACA he was long, it was Goldman. As for why ACA couldn't figure out he was short on their own, I don't know. Maybe they'd already had a lot of experience with people doing this kind of thing and walking out the other end okay? Maybe they thought Paulson was smarter than they were, and if he were long on these things, than there must be something to it? Maybe they're just happy to keep cashing the 'trusted independent 3rd party' checks Goldman keeps sending their way?

Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:04PM (#1293033)
What percent of all trades in anything don't fall under the umbrellas of hedging or speculating?

In synthetic CDO's, precisely zero. Consumption goods are purchased for other reasons, however.

I assume Paulson's not being charged because it wasn't Paulson who told ACA he was long, it was Goldman. As for why ACA couldn't figure out he was short on their own, I don't know.

Paulson and ACA were in direct collaboration on the creation of the CDO. They talked to each other directly on many occasions. If Paulson deliberately pretended to be the long side, when they were really the short side, that sounds like clear cut fraud on their part. So why isn't the SEC going after Paulson?

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:27PM (#1293072)
Do you have any evidence that in collaborating on the portfolio, Paulson ever said or represented that he was on the long side? Or that ACA that ever asked? Maybe the SEC doesn't, either, but they do have Goldman's emails on the matter.
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @03:10PM (#1293294)
If the SEC believed Paulson lied, then Paulson would be on the dock with Goldman.

In any case, I obviously don't have the ability to prove Paulson never said they were the long side. On the other hand, it's the job of the SEC to prove that a) ACA asked who the longside was and b) Goldman/Paulson lied about it. I see virtually no evidence of this.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @03:35PM (#1293357)
If you see no evidence that Goldman lied, you're not paying attention. Haven't you read the complaint yet? There are emails between ACA and Goldman where Goldman specifically says Paulson's going to go long in the finished product.
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @05:22PM (#1293555)
I haven't seen any emails which clearly show Goldman lying. All I saw were emails which could be vaguely interpreted that way. Could you post a link?
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @06:29PM (#1293651)
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Monday April 26, 2010 @08:32AM (#1294692)
I still don't see anything showing a lie by Goldman. They quote emails showing ACA didn't know who the short side was, but they don't quote any email showing Goldman claimed Paulson was the long side.
Re:On Goldman by fleitz on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:03PM (#1293031)
I tend to agree that it's irrelevant who the short side was. If I buy a stock, I have no idea who is holding it short.

In a subprime CDO it's far more important to know who is holding the mortgages. I'm assuming they are subprime CDOs as that was Paulson's bread and butter.

What special position does Paulson have that he can effectively convince people to stop paying their mortgages?

ACA made a bet that people would pay their mortgages, Paulson made a bet that they wouldn't. If the CDO market didn't collapse there would be no case brought.

If knowing who was on the other side was so important, why did ACA decline to ask?

If the SEC wants to find the responsible parties for the collapse why don't they look towards the Dept. of Treasury and the Federal Reserve?

Re:On Goldman by silverlake on Sunday April 25, 2010 @12:41PM (#1292983)
ACA rejected over half of Paulson's suggestions. To bring the long & short to the deal, you have to construct a CDO that both agree to. In fact, I believe ACA was long on the deal, so there's no way their going to load it with junk. And the identity of the short is irrelevant. At the time, Paulson was just another hedge fund manager. He became famous well after with the book "The Greatest Trade Ever".
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:15PM (#1293049)
The identity of the short wasn't relevant because it was "the famous John Paulson", it was relevant because it was the person in the room negotiating the reference portfolio with them. They want to put together the best possible portfolio, yes, but don't forget they're getting paid to do this. They're going to put together the best portfolio that still brings in the check.

And the ACA that ended up long was the parent company, "ACA Capital Holdings, Inc", not the management company, "ACA Management LLC", that worked with Paulson to put together the portfolio. I won't claim to know what the exact relationship between the two companies was, but the former didn't actually enter it's long position until 3 months after the latter signed off on the portfolio.

Re:On Goldman by secretasiandan on Sunday April 25, 2010 @12:01PM (#1292912)
The issue is not whether the long side knew the short side existed, the issue is did GS mislead/lie about the composition of what the security contained?

Alternatively, did the people selling insurance know what kind of insurance they were selling? By saying that ACA was constructing the portfolio and omitting Paulson's role, GS implies some kind of standard for portfolio construction. Was that standard different than what Paulson helped construct? My assumption is absolutely. Paulson was not creating a diversified portfolio, Paulson was creating a concentrated portfolio. Does the average bank/institution ever want to have a concentrated portfolio? Probably not.

There's always somebody on the other side of the trade. Is that person misrepresenting what the goods are is the question.

Re:On Goldman by cwp on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:37PM (#1293091)
That's Goldman's very argument. It may be true in a sense - the investors in Abacus should have been aware that somebody, somewhere would benefit, at least a little, if Abacus failed.

Nevertheless, the following are facts:

    - Paulson was involved in creating Abacus
    - Paulson would gain nothing if Abacus succeeded
    - Paulson would make a billion dollars if Abacus failed
If you're contemplating investing in Abacus, that's important information. Goldman neglected to mention it.
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @02:18PM (#1293162)
Nonsense. The following are facts that are known to every investor in any synthetic CDO (including ABACUS) who bothered to look up the definition of synthetic CDO:

    -- Anonymous counterparty was involved in creating Synthetic CDO.
    -- Anonymous counterparty gains nothing if the CDO succeeds.
    -- Anonymous counterparty makes money if it fails.
Re:On Goldman by cwp on Monday April 26, 2010 @03:21AM (#1294331)
Nope. You first bullet does not follow from the definition of a synthetic CDO.

Yes, somebody is taking the other side of the bet. The fact that he got to pick the portfolio isn't obvious. Goldman brought in ACA precisely because having an independent third party pick the portfolio would make it more attractive to investors. Goldman's lie was omitting the detail that ACA didn't actually operate independently.

Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Monday April 26, 2010 @08:22AM (#1294676)
Anonymous counterparty will not take the short side of just ANY synthetic CDO. Most likely, he wants a specific short. If he does not get that short, he will walk, and there will be no CDO.

That's exactly what happened in this case. Paulson wanted to short a certain profile. They selected a set of securities meeting this profile, and ACA took the best possible longsides from that set of shorts.

Re:On Goldman by cwp on Monday April 26, 2010 @12:22PM (#1295202)
Ah, so the investor would have to look up the definition of a synthetic CDO and know how Wall Street actually operates. They have to know that Goldman isn't serious about ACA being an independent third party.

Well, perhaps most investors out there really are that sophisticated. But Bear Sterns decided the deal Paulson proposed didn't meet their ethical standards. It couldn't have been completely uncontroversial.

Re:On Goldman by olefoo on Sunday April 25, 2010 @09:57AM (#1292716)
The heart of the case is that they were selling a product as being composed of a high-quality mix of mortgages likely to produce positive returns while simultaneously working to engineer the actual content of the CDO to be almost exclusively bad debt unlikely to avoid default.

It's like a real estate agent knowingly selling you a house with a mold problem. Or maybe more like a developer selling houses that had been constructed with substandard materials.

Re:On Goldman by byrneseyeview on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:07AM (#1292812)
Have you read the sales documents? They list the reference portfolio--every single bond. So you're arguing that both sides knew that ratings agencies were going to incorrectly rate all this stuff BBB. The only missing datum is, allegedly, who constructed the portfolio. However, Paolo Pellegrini, the SEC's main source, says that he had a meeting specifically to disclose exactly that information.

The big news here is that ACA looks really pathetic. They're saying "We had all the fundamental information we needed to judge the merits of this transaction. We could investigate every bond in the reference portfolio, and even every underlying mortgage. Our quants could build a model that would tell you exactly what would happen for any given default rate, interest rate, home price fluctuation, war, natural disaster, or act of god. But we didn't know that some know-name merger arb who liked to dabble in real estate derivatives was on the other side of the trade. If we'd known that, we would have been terrified." I mean, come on.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:53PM (#1293123)
I just don't understand why the fact that ACA and the longs are pathetic and should have known they were getting screwed materially influences the question of whether or not Goldman committed fraud. If they did (and it seems pretty clear that's the case), they should get off because they're an alpha dog?
Re:On Goldman by byrneseyeview on Sunday April 25, 2010 @04:06PM (#1293420)
It's only fraud if it is fraudulent not to tell ACA that some no-name hedge fund is on the other side of their trade. The ACA guys got paid big bucks to research their investments, not to make guesses based on how scary their counterparties were.

It would be like a professional baseball team whose entire model for winning was that they'd only play games against Little League teams, but they'd sue the other team if they turned out to be good.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @04:22PM (#1293450)
So your claim is that it's not fraudulent that Goldman lied to ACA saying Paulson was going to end up long on Abacus, or that Goldman lied to the real longs that ACA was solely responsible for selecting the reference portfolio?
Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:22AM (#1292837)
A synthetic CDO is NOT a mortgage backed security, it is backed by credit default swaps. It is not a mix of mortgages at all, high quality or otherwise.

A synthetic CDO can not even exist unless some party believes the securities it is comprised of will go bad.

Your analogy to people selling consumption goods is ridiculous. A synthetic CDO is a bet and only has value for speculative and hedging purposes.

It's like me making a bet with my friend that the yankees will win. What a jerk! He took my bet, all the while thinking the yankees would lose!

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:33PM (#1293085)
A synthetic CDO can not even exist unless some party believes the securities it is comprised of will go bad.

Not true at all, you don't necessarily have to think it will go bad, you just have to be afraid enough that it might to pay an insurance premium.

Re:On Goldman by yummyfajitas on Sunday April 25, 2010 @02:37PM (#1293213)
In general, brokers are not required to disclose whether the other side of a trade is a hedger or a speculator. In fact, they are usually legally forbidden from doing this.
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @03:19PM (#1293321)
Why would the broker themselves even have to know? The point isn't that the shorter and their motives should be disclosed, it's that the long side has plenty of explanations for why the short side is short other than simply taking the other side of a risky bet.

The Goldman case isn't about whether or not they should have disclosed that the short had speculative motives. It's that they actively lied about who put the reference portfolio together and why.

Re:On Goldman by retube on Sunday April 25, 2010 @10:15AM (#1292738)
at the risk of soliciting downticks, caveat emptor surely? It's not like the underlying instruments were not known.

Edit: I can't believe Goldman really said - here's a basket of triple A's, when in fact they were junk. Expressing an opinion on whether they were likely to go up/down is a different matter. Of course a salesdesk is going to promote the investment in positive terms.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:07AM (#1292814)
Your incredulity aside, they absolutely did say that, or at least they convinced the ratings agencies to say that. That wasn't the lie, though - according to the (horribly broken) models, they were AAA (or whatever rating is in question).

The lie was that the package of underlying mortgage bonds was selected solely and independently by a 3rd party who had an interest in putting together a quality instrument, when in fact Paulson played the major role in the selection.

Re:On Goldman by fleitz on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:28PM (#1293073)
He played a role only to the degree ACA allowed him to and failed in it's fiduciary duty.
Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @01:38PM (#1293097)
Okay, fine, ACA sucks. But Goldman still knowingly lied about who was involved in selecting the reference portfolio.
Re:On Goldman by olefoo on Sunday April 25, 2010 @10:32AM (#1292763)
That's why we have courts, in this case it seems pretty clear that Goldman Sachs did materially misrepresent the nature of the instrument they were selling to their customers and colluded with Paulson to engineer something that Paulson could bet against.

Caveat Emptor is a fine thing and one should always be cautions when buying investment instruments,but outright fraud and deception through material omission strike at the credibility of the market itself.

Re:On Goldman by byrneseyeview on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:09AM (#1292816)
Was any of the fundamental data in their presentation incorrect? They listed all the bonds in the reference portfolio. Were some of the bonds themselves deceptive? If so, why would Goldman just step into the middle of the transaction, instead of shorting them?

You're acting as if Goldman, by virtue of being lucratively evil, had predicted the whole subprime mess. But they lost money initially, made it back on hedges, then lost other money elsewhere. If they were as well-informed as they should have been to commit this crime, they would have made far more money in 2007-9.

Re:On Goldman by jfager on Sunday April 25, 2010 @11:34AM (#1292870)
Goldman stepped into the middle of the transaction because that's what they were paid (I think it was 15m?) to do.

You're right that the buyer should have taken a closer look at the underlying mortgages themselves, but that's the other part of the story, that the ratings agencies that everyone trusted to do that work for them were either on the take, stupid, or both.