The big news here is that ACA looks really pathetic. They're saying "We had all the fundamental information we needed to judge the merits of this transaction. We could investigate every bond in the reference portfolio, and even every underlying mortgage. Our quants could build a model that would tell you exactly what would happen for any given default rate, interest rate, home price fluctuation, war, natural disaster, or act of god. But we didn't know that some know-name merger arb who liked to dabble in real estate derivatives was on the other side of the trade. If we'd known that, we would have been terrified." I mean, come on.
It would be like a professional baseball team whose entire model for winning was that they'd only play games against Little League teams, but they'd sue the other team if they turned out to be good.
A synthetic CDO can not even exist unless some party believes the securities it is comprised of will go bad.
Your analogy to people selling consumption goods is ridiculous. A synthetic CDO is a bet and only has value for speculative and hedging purposes.
It's like me making a bet with my friend that the yankees will win. What a jerk! He took my bet, all the while thinking the yankees would lose!
Not true at all, you don't necessarily have to think it will go bad, you just have to be afraid enough that it might to pay an insurance premium.
The Goldman case isn't about whether or not they should have disclosed that the short had speculative motives. It's that they actively lied about who put the reference portfolio together and why.
Edit: I can't believe Goldman really said - here's a basket of triple A's, when in fact they were junk. Expressing an opinion on whether they were likely to go up/down is a different matter. Of course a salesdesk is going to promote the investment in positive terms.
The lie was that the package of underlying mortgage bonds was selected solely and independently by a 3rd party who had an interest in putting together a quality instrument, when in fact Paulson played the major role in the selection.
Caveat Emptor is a fine thing and one should always be cautions when buying investment instruments,but outright fraud and deception through material omission strike at the credibility of the market itself.
You're acting as if Goldman, by virtue of being lucratively evil, had predicted the whole subprime mess. But they lost money initially, made it back on hedges, then lost other money elsewhere. If they were as well-informed as they should have been to commit this crime, they would have made far more money in 2007-9.
You're right that the buyer should have taken a closer look at the underlying mortgages themselves, but that's the other part of the story, that the ratings agencies that everyone trusted to do that work for them were either on the take, stupid, or both.
It's like a real estate agent knowingly selling you a house with a mold problem. Or maybe more like a developer selling houses that had been constructed with substandard materials.