The actual point is not security, but trust and certainty. Being Open Source does not change whether some messaging app is secure or not. It changes our knowledge about the code. It also makes me have a little bit more trust in some company for revealing their stuff.
Even if WhatsApp open-sources the clients, there is still the problem of US jurisdiction. NSA can force them to silently including a backdoor or send everything to NSA-servers.
Trust is a difficult thing.
No - the code could be "open source" but unreadable. But if it's not open-source there's definitely nothing we can do.
> Heartbleed and Shellshock, the two most significant vulnerabilities found in heavily used open source software, were found by vulnerability testing and not code inspection. So while being open source is a nice-to-have attribute for a piece of software, that's as far as it goes
a) afl-fuzz and the like require access to the source code.
b) Those were the vulnerabilities that made it into production. They tell you nothing about what proportion of potential vulnerabilities were stopped by it being open source.
This is very much not true. Understanding what any executable does is possible without the source code. In fact, if you are looking at the binary, you know exactly what you are dealing with, and don't have the doubt about what the build chain actually does with the source.
potential vulnerabilities were stopped by it being open source.
This presumably comes from "many eyes make all bugs shallow". But operationally this is not true, because there isn't really, except for rare circumstances, any useful review.
I think this doesn't fundamentally change my point though. ali-fuzz was used to find shellshock, but that vulnerability had been in bash for decades. If it had ben found and closed within months of being introduced I'd be cheering the advantages of open source with the best of them, but that's decades during which a bad actor could theoretically have found and exploited that vulnerability with impunity using code analysis. That's exactly what I mean by the balance of advantages versus disadvantages of open source being tipped the wrong way right now.
I'm not enemy of open source, far from it, I'm just arguing for an open and honest assessment of the situation. If open source is really going to be a genuine security advantage, there's an awful lot of work to be done to make it so. It's not going to happen spontaneously.
I don't think you've shown anything about relative vulnerability rates. I agree that there are massive problems with even major open-source projects, the general state of software security is terrible, and we have a lot of work to do on that front (starting with moving to memory-safe languages post-haste). But none of those things contradicts that open-source software is much more secure than closed-source software.
In reality, software security is a function of the amount of expert attention that has been paid to a given piece of software. Popular open source software attracts a certain, stochastic, significant amount of attention, but money buys a more reliable amount of attention. There is insecure open source and secure open source, insecure closed source and secure closed source. Open source is a red herring.
There's a reason why, for instance, Firefox had Bleichenbacher's E=3 vulnerability, while IE didn't.
How is it less safe than not having the source, though? Absent the source, how can you trust that the once trustworthy, if secret, code hasn't been nobbled via hackers, a court order etc.
The model of security through obscurity is what's broken, and that's what we've got here. You have to trust Facebook today, and forever and trust anyone else with the technical or legal power to silently violate its security; something that's much harder if the code is available for analysis.
In this case, if you're ideologically attached to open source, you're in luck: the cryptographic components WhatsApp uses are open source, and there's another good messenger that uses them: Signal, by Open Whisper Systems.
You are not in fact stuck with Facebook's "say-so" about what WhatsApp is doing. Obviously, if you have the executable binary, you can straightforwardly validate its functionality with a disassembler/decompiler. There are thousands of people that do this professionally.
There might be some other reason why it's important that WhatsApp's code be published, but it can't possibly be this one.
Personally if I was the NSA or GCHQ I think it would be a wicked smart plan to release this and have it be actually secure, have it audited, gain trust, let people use it for a while then after a while release an update that shoved all the messages in memory to a server somewhere once people let their guard down. Implausible yes, but that's the issue with trust. And I'm not sure releasing the clean source would really help this. The only thing would be to hold up on updating the app until a trusted party had audited the updated binary. More paranoia: Also would have to audit the specific binary for every country with wierd laws (e.g. UK's RIPA) appstore to make sure we didn't get a nice local flavour of poison.
I was wrong about heartbleed, it was found through a source code analysis technique called fuzzing - decades after the vulnerability was introduced. That's decades during which source code analysis could have been used by bad actors to find the same vulnerability and exploit it.
Opening the code doesn't by itself eliminate the vulnerabilities. What it does do is fire the starting pistol on a race between black hats and white hats to find and either exploit or close the vulnerabilities. It's very much a two edged sword. So what we need is confidence that the white hats are winning that race.
The race is more dependent on motivation than whether the code is open or closed. Often, blackhats are financially motivated (whether they themselves monetize the vulnerabilities directly - or they are hired-by/paid-for a 3rd party) - they factor in their return on investment (ROI). Open source merely makes their job easier but given enough motivation, they can and will find vulnerabilities in binaries, remote services, etc almost as easily.
One problem is that many people believe in "many eyes makes all bugs shallow". Numerous examples prove that assumption false. Is it because there is more financial interest in closed systems? ...or is it because in open systems people automatically assume that because it's open that someone else must have vetted it? (e.g. "if I'm interested in it, and thousands/millions are too, then it's highly likely some expert better than me already looked at")
The code being publicly available does not guarantee security but makes insecurity easier to find which on balance indirectly increases security.
Some in the open source community flout the "many eyes makes all bugs shallow" argument, but in the free software community we do not assert this. Part of security is transparency, and this means being able to read the source code, freedom 1. Free software is a prerequisite for secure software that a user can trust.
If you are opening up for incivility, I doubt there is an end what people will start calling each other. Do you really want to go down that road?
More here:
Bash was released in 1989 and initially development started some time before that.
OpenSSL project was founded in 1998.
Windows XP was initial developed in the late 1990s, released 2001.
Macromedia Flash 1.0 was released 1996 and initially developed a couple years before.
So should we only count software vulnerabilities that was created after 2010? 2016? What proof would satisfy you?
Or are you confused by your own argument that software written in the mid-to-late 1990s tend to be insecure software, and thus we should disregard that some software has been more exploited historically than others?
Obviously, a WhatsApp backdoor would not in fact take that form.
What you definitely don't need is permission to redistribute, modify, etc. the software. Those are important for user freedom, but for the goal of verifying that a particular app on a walled-garden app store does what it claims to do, those don't help you. You just need access to source code.
What you do need, whether or not you have source, is an understanding of what the software does. Sure, you can probably do this by disassembling the software. But if you can disassemble the software and understand it, there is nothing more that having the actual source would tell you. If the company is expecting that people will disassemble it to verify it, they might as well release source.
What you also need, given either source or a binary, is assurance that everyone else is running the same binary as you have. Given source, that probably requires reproducible builds and a documented and reasonable build chain. Given a binary, that requires some distribution mechanism that ensures that everyone in fact gets the same binary.
But if the code is not open source, we _cannot_ verify it's security?
Ability is already good. Not enough but necessary.
Heartbleed and Shellshock, the two most significant vulnerabilities found in heavily used open source software, were found by vulnerability testing and not code inspection. So while being open source is a nice-to-have attribute for a piece of software, that's as far as it goes. Painting open source as being a magical wand that wishes away all our security troubles is completely out of order.
Edit: I'll go further. It's become dismayingly apparent that very little systematic code review of open source software in order to secure it is actually taking place. It now seems quite possible that the most thorough investigations of software vulnerability, via code analysis or any other techniques, are carried out by those wishing to exploit them. They are well funded and highly motivated. Looked at in that light, the balance may well tip towards open source actually increasing the likelihood of software vulnerabilities being exploited maliciously.
The open source community has a long way to go if it's going to clearly demonstrate that it's model is advantageous, and complacent pronouncements of it's assumed superiority like this aren't going to achieve that.