I don't think you've shown anything about relative vulnerability rates. I agree that there are massive problems with even major open-source projects, the general state of software security is terrible, and we have a lot of work to do on that front (starting with moving to memory-safe languages post-haste). But none of those things contradicts that open-source software is much more secure than closed-source software.
In reality, software security is a function of the amount of expert attention that has been paid to a given piece of software. Popular open source software attracts a certain, stochastic, significant amount of attention, but money buys a more reliable amount of attention. There is insecure open source and secure open source, insecure closed source and secure closed source. Open source is a red herring.
There's a reason why, for instance, Firefox had Bleichenbacher's E=3 vulnerability, while IE didn't.
I think this doesn't fundamentally change my point though. ali-fuzz was used to find shellshock, but that vulnerability had been in bash for decades. If it had ben found and closed within months of being introduced I'd be cheering the advantages of open source with the best of them, but that's decades during which a bad actor could theoretically have found and exploited that vulnerability with impunity using code analysis. That's exactly what I mean by the balance of advantages versus disadvantages of open source being tipped the wrong way right now.
I'm not enemy of open source, far from it, I'm just arguing for an open and honest assessment of the situation. If open source is really going to be a genuine security advantage, there's an awful lot of work to be done to make it so. It's not going to happen spontaneously.