News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by bambax on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:10AM (#11116760)
I don't see how this "reassuring"; to me it's rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments).

If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially?

And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to build it?

"Impossible" should mean "impossible", not "not yet done, but possible".

Re:A Message to Our Customers by epaga on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:23AM (#11116814)
What it means is that the best the FBI can come up with is "Make a way for us to brute force attack the passphrase." And brute force attack is worthless for a strong enough passphrase. That's what is reassuring.

Not to mention that this is for the iPhone 5c. As other comments have mentioned, newer iPhones have the hardware-based Secure Enclave which add to the difficulty of breaking into the phone. https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf

Re:A Message to Our Customers by andreyvit on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:04AM (#11117877)
My reading of that PDF is that Secure Enclave software can be updated too, it simply does an independent verification of the Apple's digital signature.

So while the Secure Enclave enforces the delay between brute force attempts, Apple could still release an update that removes that delay.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by fnordfnordfnord on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:39AM (#11117719)
It could also be that the FBI has already obtained the info, or can obtain the info through illegal means and simply want to use the issue to force legislative and policy changes or public opinion changes in their favor, and or just want to legitimize their having the information.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by Loic on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:34AM (#11116869)
In the world of cryptography, it is always possible, because you can always be lucky and guess the right "unlock" code. In fact, social engineering is normally used to find the right "unlock" code[0].

The FBI can also unsolder the components in the phone, make a full image of the content, find the encrypted section and then brute-force. This is what is done for SSD. They do not power up the drive, unsolder, put the memory modules in a special reader and copy the data before the controller of the SSD automatically wipe out data because of automatic optimization after a delete/trim.

[0]: https://xkcd.com/538/

Re:A Message to Our Customers by jupp0r on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @06:32AM (#11117106)
It's kind of hard to social engineer dead people, though.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by Loic on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @06:46AM (#11117165)
This is why the "normally" in my sentence. But the point I really wanted to make is that you have no "impossible" with encryption.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by datashaman on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @06:55AM (#11117205)
dead people were once alive. go through their pockets or their apartment.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by Majestic121 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:46AM (#11117450)
You can go through each and every physical object I own or even was in contact with, but you won't find any of my passwords
Re:A Message to Our Customers by DanBC on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:50AM (#11117471)
What happens to all your stuff when you die?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by Majestic121 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:26AM (#11117645)
I guess my family will take care of my physical stuff. For the online part, some of it can probably be handled through support (facebook, etc...), and the rest will stay as is until it is deleted for lack of use. Or never deleted. Both are okay.

Leaving a physical trace of my passwords is not only bad practice from security point of view, but quite useless since I know them. Also, my online accounts are useless if I can't use them because I'm dead, so I don't really care if no one can access them anymore. What happens to important things such as banking is already dealt with.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by JoeAltmaier on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:30AM (#11117664)
I just got a Facebook birthday notification for my cousin, who died three years ago. So, that has some impact on me and others in our extended family. Maybe that's ok, maybe it'll get weirder at some point; but its definitely something to think about.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by pc86 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:45AM (#11118125)
You can have FB set the page as a memorial, and I believe that also gives you the option to disable all those types of notifications.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by Majestic121 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:56AM (#11118206)
That's a very real issue indeed. Sorry for your loss.

But I think the right solution here would be for Facebook to have a way of handling deceased people, not giving your password to everyone in case of sudden death.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by knd775 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @10:29AM (#11118448)
They do. If someone contacts Facebook and let's them know that a person has died (with some sort of verification), they will memorialize the account.

https://www.facebook.com/help/103897939701143

Re:A Message to Our Customers by asgfoi on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:27AM (#11118010)
If facebook doesn't want to delete his account, why don't you unfriend him?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by visakanv on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @10:33AM (#11118473)
You can have the account memorialized (and/or removed): https://www.facebook.com/help/150486848354038
Re:A Message to Our Customers by JoeAltmaier on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:40AM (#11118086)
Would you?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by nly on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @11:00AM (#11118696)
Re:A Message to Our Customers by shiven on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:20AM (#11117618)
Why care about "stuff" once you are dead?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by DanBC on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:41AM (#11118095)
Because you don't want to make a difficult situation even harder for your relatives?

See, for example, the people who know they're going to die and who leave their iPads to their relatives in their wills. Apple doesn't take grants of probate as sufficient legal documents (everyone else does (eg banks)) and insist on a court order.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26448158

Re:A Message to Our Customers by Jupe on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:51AM (#11117803)
Significant other? Kids? Relatives?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by poooogles on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:55AM (#11117503)
Well your opinion is kind of moot at that point.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by fnordfnordfnord on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:31AM (#11117670)
With a $5 dollar wrench? What's that going to get you?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by kristofferR on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:55AM (#11117828)
The media already did that :P
Re:A Message to Our Customers by jacquesm on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:25AM (#11117333)
From a forensics point of view that is a very risky path. You risk destroying the evidence and you're tampering with it.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by 0942v8653 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:58AM (#11117522)
It's not a backdoor, it's a frontdoor. In cryptography, there's no way to make repeated attempts more computationally expensive. The lockout just an extra feature Apple put on, that Apple could easily remove. If we're going to have 4- and 6- digit PINs, there is no way to stop a dedicated attacker frome brute-forcing it. None.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by charlieegan3 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:06AM (#11117560)
You can't make crypto behave slower on repeated attempts but you can still make each attempt more expensive. For example: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepper_(cryptography)
Re:A Message to Our Customers by 0942v8653 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:33AM (#11117682)
True. But Apple, with such a focus on UX, cannot reasonably afford more than ~200 millisec when checking a password; and still it scales linearly, so the solution for concerned users still involves creating a more complex password. Doubling the amount of time it takes to hash a password will have the same effect as adding 1 more bit of entropy to the password, which can easily be beaten by adding a single character to it.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by daeken on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:46AM (#11118135)
If you consider caching of keys, there's no reason that the first login attempt after a cold boot couldn't take 1-2s. Each subsequent login would be roughly instant.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by harryh on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:23AM (#11117630)
"there's no way to make repeated attempts more computationally expensive"

That's not true actually. For example, the industry standard for storing passwords on a server (bcrypt) is specifically designed to slow down password match attempts.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by rhaps0dy on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:36AM (#11117696)
It is true. You're confusing making _repeated_ attempts progressively more expensive with making all attempts more expensive to start with
Re:A Message to Our Customers by harryh on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:10AM (#11117912)
Ah yes. You are right, I was confusing those two things. Thanks for the clarification!
Re:A Message to Our Customers by nly on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @11:01AM (#11118708)
Bcrypt isn't an industry standard.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by OJFord on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:03AM (#11117549)

  > no way to stop a dedicated attacker from brute-forcing it
Wipe after x incorrect? Can't stop the attacker, but you can make it futile, surely.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by 0942v8653 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:07AM (#11117564)
Nope. If the attacker (Apple in this case) can replace the OS, they will just do so before the phone gets wiped—replacing the OS will remove that wipe feature.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by germanier on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:32AM (#11117677)
Not if the check and wiping is done in hardware as claimed by Apple for newer devices than the one in question here.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by 0942v8653 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:37AM (#11117704)
Meh. Then the attacker can simply replace the hardware. Remember, our attacker model is Apple; non-cryptographic security measures mean very little to a company with such complete knowledge of the hardware and software involved.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by xenadu02 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @12:57PM (#11119741)
Nope. On newer devices the key is derived from a random key fused into the SE during manufacturing, a key fused into the ARM CPU, and a key randomly generated on-device during setup (derived from accelerometer, gyro, and altitude data) and stored in the SE. The SE's JTAG interface is disabled in production firmware and it won't accept new firmware without the passcode.

You can't swap the SE or CPU around, nor can you run the attempts on a different device.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by lazaroclapp on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @03:45PM (#11121216)
Can't you? Seems like the kind of problem you can point an electron microscope at, and perhaps some very high precision laser cutting. In any case, I imagine if you are willing to spend resources on it, you could read the on-chip memory somehow and start cryptoanalysing that.

Against a sufficiently capable adversary, tamper-resistance is never infalible, but good crypto can be.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by OJFord on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:00PM (#11122603)

    > Against a sufficiently capable adversary, tamper-
    > resistance is never infalible, but good crypto can be.
Nonsense, it all comes back to "sufficiently capable", every time.

To a sufficiently capable adversary, _all_ crypto is just "mere security by obscurity".

"Oh, mwa-haha, they obscured their password amongst these millions of possible combinations, thinking it gave them security - how quaint. Thankfully I'm sufficiently capable.", she'll say.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by germanier on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:46AM (#11117766)
The point is that the key is stored there too (part of it burned during production in silicone) and can't be read or changed.

Sure, if they wanted to they could implement a backdoor. But assuming they correctly created and shipped the secure enclave it shouldn't be possible to circumvent it even for Apple.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by jcwayne on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:26AM (#11118002)
It's sounding like that's the problem. They left an opening for this sort of thing by allowing firmware updates to the secure enclave. That basically makes it a fight over whether the FBI can force Apple to use the required key to sign an update meeting the specifications the FBI directs.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by jboy55 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @12:48PM (#11119662)
Well, i read elsewhere in this thread, that updating the firmware for the secure enclave wipes the private key contained within. Which means you've effectively wiped the phone.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by lololomg on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @04:59PM (#11121786)
You need to unlock the phone before you can update the firmware on the secure enclave.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by andreyvit on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:13AM (#11117930)
Secure Enclave is not really ‘hardware’; despite being isolated from the main OS and CPU, it is still software-based and accepts software updates signed by Apple.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by fixermark on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @10:17AM (#11118351)
If those software updates force it to erase its private key store, though, then it's functionally isolated from that attack vector. An updated enclave that no longer contains the data of interest has no value.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by germanier on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:19AM (#11117964)
Ok, if that part is updatable you have indeed a backdoor.

In theory it should be possible to make it fixed (which Apple doesn't seem to have done).

Re:A Message to Our Customers by daeken on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:48AM (#11118151)
Making it fixed just means you can't fix future bugs. The secure approach is to ensure that updates are only possible if the device is either unlocked or wiped completely.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by lololomg on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:03PM (#11121823)
The Secure Enclave enforces time delays between attempts.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by elmigranto on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:22AM (#11116808)
Not possible without backing it into iOS with some update that FBI is claiming will be used on one particular phone in this particular case.

Apple reasons that there is no way to guarantee no one will take the same update and apply it to other iOS devices. Or government taking this a step further by making Apple to build that into future update for the whole user base.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by tobylane on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:24AM (#11116818)
It's not a backdoor to the phone only being unlocked by the passphrase, but a backdoor to the number of attempts limitation.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by vbezhenar on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @06:06AM (#11116989)
This limitation must be built into security hardware used by iPhone so software couldn't do anything about it. I was under impression that it's how iOS security model works. If it's not and in fact this check implemented in iOS itself, it's much weaker protection and it's really looks like an intended backdoor from Apple.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by schrodinger on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @06:25AM (#11117071)
It sounds like it is built into hardware with newer iPhones containing the secure enclave, but not for an older phone like the iPhone 5C.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by andreyvit on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:12AM (#11117921)
It's not really built into ‘hardware’, it's enforced by the Secure Enclave, which is software-based and accepts software updates signed by Apple. It's secure against kernel exploits and third-parties, but not against Apple.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by thesmok on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:01AM (#11117530)
I'm really interested to know more about this. Does TouchId secure enclave really enforce the password attempt limits?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by germanier on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:35AM (#11117690)
Re:A Message to Our Customers by nly on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @11:07AM (#11118756)
Its really a pretty impressive design. Android phones are lacking here.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by joonoro on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:39AM (#11116883)
They didn't make any mention of how feasible it would be, just that they wouldn't even try because it would threaten the security of their users.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by dba7dba on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @10:57AM (#11118675)
Let me correct it for you. "Perceived security of their users".

A lot of it about PR.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by ry_ry on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:28AM (#11117354)
> If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists

Schroedinger's Backdoor? ;)

Re:A Message to Our Customers by ikeboy on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:32AM (#11117380)
Only Apple has the ability to sign updates to software (barring jailbreak).
Re:A Message to Our Customers by taneq on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:52AM (#11116935)
It sounds like it'd be trivial to nop out the timer on repeated passcode attempts. Which makes sense... Leaving any short passcode trivially crackable.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by curryhowardiso on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @06:58AM (#11117218)
Yes but like where would you nop? You can't statically analyse the code because the image is encrypted at rest (and potentially partially in ram also?)
Re:A Message to Our Customers by thefreeman on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:02AM (#11117543)
The code which decrypts the system (and is responsible for wiping the drive on repeated failures) is definitely not encrypted. How would it be able to take the input in order to decrypt the drive.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by curryhowardiso on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:50AM (#11117793)
Yes but that code is all running in ram, precluding static analysis. You can still dynamically analyse it, but that is much harder.

The way I understand it (and, correct me if I'm wrong) is that the code flows from disk through the aes engine where it is decrypted and then placed in a presumably interesting/hard to reverse place in ram at which point it is executed. I imagine even more interesting things are done to higher value data in ram, but that's not code - because as you said, code has to be decrypted (at the latest) by the time it reaches the registers.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by andreyvit on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:15AM (#11117944)
Their security PDF says that the system has a chain of trust established, anchored at an immutable loader residing inside the chip, and each step verifies the digital signature of the next step against the hardcoded Apple CA certificate.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by curryhowardiso on Friday February 19, 2016 @08:17PM (#11138115)
So to clarify you're saying that you can't just nop instructions, or it's not as simple as that, right?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by mjibson on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:26AM (#11116829)
I agree. I was under the impression that Apple's security was such that even they didn't have the power to decrypt a device because the crypto made it impossible without the password/pin/key. I'm interested to understand the reasons that it was not done this way.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by ithkuil on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:56AM (#11116950)
The current implementation is done this way indeed: even Apple cannot decrypt without using the right password.

The right password can be obtained by either knowing it, or by guessing it.

As an additional security measure, the software shipped with the phone prevents brute force attacks by wiping the device after a given number of failed attempts.

Apple has been asked to modify the software so that it won't wipe the phone, thus allowing the authorities to try many passwords.

If anybody could circumvent this additional security measure, actual security would be lower. The authorities are not asking Apple to ship this change to all users: they only want to install it on the device in their possession.

However, Apple is concerned that once they provide the authorities such a modified software, it could be leaked and thus be used by third parties to breach the security of any Apple device.

It should be noted that currently all data encrypted for example on your laptop's hard drive is already subject to this kind of brute force attacks. It's a well known fact that authorities or malicious users can already attempt brute force attacks on encrypted data if they can access the data on a passive device such as a hard-drive.

It's important to understand that Apple (at least not in this case) is not being asked to implement a backdoor in the encryption software. It's also important to understand that even if Apple was forced to install a backdoor, it would affect only the ability to access future data and not help the investigation of the San Bernardino case.

This very request by the Authorities suggests that Apple does not currently install any backdoor on stock phones.

However there is a logical possibility that the Authorities are either not aware of any such backdoor or in the worst case they are publicly requesting this feature just to hide the real reason of a possible future success at decrypting the phone: they can claim that Apple didn't have any backdoor, and they were just lucky at bruteforcing the device; in fact Apple wasn't even cooperating with them at relaxing the brute force prevention limit, so they could claim they did it in house.

(I'm personally not inclined to believe in such improbably well coordinated smoke and mirrors strategies, but they are a logical possibility nevertheless).

Re:A Message to Our Customers by mmcconnell1618 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:05AM (#11117558)
Why doesn't the FBI simply clone the current device, make brute force attempts and then clone again if locked out? Yes, lots of work but also doesn't force Apple to participate.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by pflats on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:24AM (#11117635)
I thought @csoghoian's take was interesting. The FBI doesn't want one specific phone unlocked, they want precedent.

https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/699841360963108864

Re:A Message to Our Customers by ParadoxOryx on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:25AM (#11117641)
The iPhone uses AES encryption which would prevent cloning the flash storage [1]. There was an informative discussion of this over on AppleInsider - http://forums.appleinsider.com/discussion/191851

[1] http://www.darthnull.org/2014/10/06/ios-encryption

Re:A Message to Our Customers by jobead on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @01:24PM (#11120005)
from that discussion, super informative details on how secure enclave is actually implemented:

http://forums.appleinsider.com/discussion/comment/2832533/#C...

Re:A Message to Our Customers by ethbro on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:23AM (#11117632)
Would it be infeasible to construct part of the private key out of hardware-specific id's + time-of-creation hashes? I assume it's not only the PIN?
Re:A Message to Our Customers by acdha on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:50AM (#11117797)
That's what the A7 (iPhone 5S and later) design does:

“Each Secure Enclave is provisioned during fabrication with its own UID (Unique ID) that is not accessible to other parts of the system and is not known to Apple. When the device starts up, an ephemeral key is created, entangled with its UID, and used to encrypt the Secure Enclave’s portion of the device’s memory space. Additionally, data that is saved to the file system by the Secure Enclave is encrypted with a key entangled with the UID and an anti-replay counter.”

https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf

The device in question is an iPhone 5C, which uses the older A6 design.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by ethbro on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @03:42PM (#11121185)
Thanks for the link! I knew there had to be more technical information out there but couldn't find it on an initial search.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by acdha on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @07:44PM (#11122814)
Yeah, it wasn't exactly unknown before but it wasn't terribly common outside of certain security / compliance circles. I think I've seen more links today than in the previous year.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by conradev on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @03:00PM (#11120790)
Each device has a device-specific AES key (UID) burned into it such that you cannot clone devices (or move flash chips between them).

Everything is encrypted with a derivative of this UID, and extracting the UID is not a thing you can do without destroying the device.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by gizmodo59 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @08:57AM (#11117835)
I'm really curious as I have been hearing this many times.

"even Apple cannot decrypt without using the right password."

Could you please explain?

Re:A Message to Our Customers by ithkuil on Friday February 19, 2016 @06:02PM (#11137423)
You can read more about it in this well written article: https://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2016-02-19-what-is-...
Re:A Message to Our Customers by manarth on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:56AM (#11116952)
It sounds like it has been built that way - the data cannot be decrypted without the correct passphrase - but the user secured the phone with a 4-digit PIN, giving a mere 10,000 possible combinations - easily brute-forceable.

The iPhone prevents this by locking up (and potentially erasing the phone) after 10 failed attempts, but this a restriction created in iOS. If they provision a new backdoored version of iOS to the phone, that restriction wouldn't apply any more, and they could brute-force away.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by HappyTypist on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:36PM (#11122094)
To clarify, on A6 and earlier this is enforced in software. On A7 and later this is enforced in hardware.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by freshyill on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @05:30AM (#11116849)
I think they're being asked for a few things—private keys and the ability to automate and not limit passcode entry attempts.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by sametmax on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:01AM (#11117863)
But why would you even think apple, google or facebook would be a good bet to defend your privacy in the first place ? They got the most terrible track record of not caring about.

If you have things that you need to be private, don't put it on a smartphone.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by macintux on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @09:50AM (#11118168)
I wish people would stop lumping Apple with Google/Facebook with regards to privacy.

Apple has implicitly for a long time, and lately much more vocally, cared about privacy. They don't have the same data-driven business model that Google and FB do.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by CaptSpify on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @10:05AM (#11118264)
> Apple has implicitly for a long time, and lately much more vocally, cared about privacy.

They say that. But with closed source software we can't verify that it's true. I'm not saying they don't care about privacy, only that we don't really know if they do or not.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by zimpenfish on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @11:42AM (#11119074)
With open source software, it doesn't appear that people can verify things are safe either given the long-term security issues with things like OpenSSL et al.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by sametmax on Thursday February 18, 2016 @06:32AM (#11125067)
We found the bug in OpenSSL BECAUSE it was opensource. If it weren't, nobody would have seen it.

Plus, with open source you can verify intent, which you can't with apple.

Which provide a device getting your finger prints, all your phone numbers, internet search, bank details, some paiements, network communication, voice communications, text communications, localisation using GPS and wifi + hotspot + phone towers and soon ihealth device collection body metrics.

And they are profit oriented, not people oriented.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by zimpenfish on Thursday February 18, 2016 @04:43PM (#11129560)
> We found the bug in OpenSSL BECAUSE it was opensource.

Sure but they were there for years before anyone noticed. Same with PHP's Mersenne Twister code. Same with multiple other long-standing bugs. It's disingenuous to toss out "Oh, if only it was open source!" because reality tells us that people just plain -don't- read and verify open source code even when it's critical stuff like OpenSSL.

Re:A Message to Our Customers by CaptSpify on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @01:06PM (#11119840)
I never said they could. There is a better chance that they can, but that line of thinking ends up trying to prove a negative.
Re:A Message to Our Customers by curt15 on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @11:09AM (#11118773)
Actions speak louder than words. The most revealing test of the strength of a company's commitment to privacy is how it handles situations when privacy can conflict with profits. Privacy on the internet relies critically on browsers only trusting trustworthy certificate authorities. When CNNIC breached its trust as a certificate authority last year, Apple sat tight waiting for the furor to subside (https://threatpost.com/apple-leaves-cnnic-root-in-ios-osx-ce...).
Re:A Message to Our Customers by macintux on Wednesday February 17, 2016 @03:53PM (#11121282)
I would argue that handling security problems in general has not been Apple's strength historically.

I agree that failing to fix a problem like this in a timely fashion is bad, but sins of omission are generally judged differently than sins of commission, for better or worse. Apple failing to apply proper prioritization to security holes isn't the same as Apple collecting data to be sold to the highest bidder.

So, again, Apple should not be treated as equivalent to Google and Facebook. Feel free to judge them harshly, but don't paint them with the same brush.