Not to mention that this is for the iPhone 5c. As other comments have mentioned, newer iPhones have the hardware-based Secure Enclave which add to the difficulty of breaking into the phone. https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
So while the Secure Enclave enforces the delay between brute force attempts, Apple could still release an update that removes that delay.
The FBI can also unsolder the components in the phone, make a full image of the content, find the encrypted section and then brute-force. This is what is done for SSD. They do not power up the drive, unsolder, put the memory modules in a special reader and copy the data before the controller of the SSD automatically wipe out data because of automatic optimization after a delete/trim.
Leaving a physical trace of my passwords is not only bad practice from security point of view, but quite useless since I know them. Also, my online accounts are useless if I can't use them because I'm dead, so I don't really care if no one can access them anymore. What happens to important things such as banking is already dealt with.
But I think the right solution here would be for Facebook to have a way of handling deceased people, not giving your password to everyone in case of sudden death.
See, for example, the people who know they're going to die and who leave their iPads to their relatives in their wills. Apple doesn't take grants of probate as sufficient legal documents (everyone else does (eg banks)) and insist on a court order.
That's not true actually. For example, the industry standard for storing passwords on a server (bcrypt) is specifically designed to slow down password match attempts.
> no way to stop a dedicated attacker from brute-forcing it
Wipe after x incorrect? Can't stop the attacker, but you can make it futile, surely.You can't swap the SE or CPU around, nor can you run the attempts on a different device.
Against a sufficiently capable adversary, tamper-resistance is never infalible, but good crypto can be.
> Against a sufficiently capable adversary, tamper-
> resistance is never infalible, but good crypto can be.
Nonsense, it all comes back to "sufficiently capable", every time.To a sufficiently capable adversary, _all_ crypto is just "mere security by obscurity".
"Oh, mwa-haha, they obscured their password amongst these millions of possible combinations, thinking it gave them security - how quaint. Thankfully I'm sufficiently capable.", she'll say.
Sure, if they wanted to they could implement a backdoor. But assuming they correctly created and shipped the secure enclave it shouldn't be possible to circumvent it even for Apple.
In theory it should be possible to make it fixed (which Apple doesn't seem to have done).
Apple reasons that there is no way to guarantee no one will take the same update and apply it to other iOS devices. Or government taking this a step further by making Apple to build that into future update for the whole user base.
A lot of it about PR.
Schroedinger's Backdoor? ;)
The way I understand it (and, correct me if I'm wrong) is that the code flows from disk through the aes engine where it is decrypted and then placed in a presumably interesting/hard to reverse place in ram at which point it is executed. I imagine even more interesting things are done to higher value data in ram, but that's not code - because as you said, code has to be decrypted (at the latest) by the time it reaches the registers.
The right password can be obtained by either knowing it, or by guessing it.
As an additional security measure, the software shipped with the phone prevents brute force attacks by wiping the device after a given number of failed attempts.
Apple has been asked to modify the software so that it won't wipe the phone, thus allowing the authorities to try many passwords.
If anybody could circumvent this additional security measure, actual security would be lower. The authorities are not asking Apple to ship this change to all users: they only want to install it on the device in their possession.
However, Apple is concerned that once they provide the authorities such a modified software, it could be leaked and thus be used by third parties to breach the security of any Apple device.
It should be noted that currently all data encrypted for example on your laptop's hard drive is already subject to this kind of brute force attacks. It's a well known fact that authorities or malicious users can already attempt brute force attacks on encrypted data if they can access the data on a passive device such as a hard-drive.
It's important to understand that Apple (at least not in this case) is not being asked to implement a backdoor in the encryption software. It's also important to understand that even if Apple was forced to install a backdoor, it would affect only the ability to access future data and not help the investigation of the San Bernardino case.
This very request by the Authorities suggests that Apple does not currently install any backdoor on stock phones.
However there is a logical possibility that the Authorities are either not aware of any such backdoor or in the worst case they are publicly requesting this feature just to hide the real reason of a possible future success at decrypting the phone: they can claim that Apple didn't have any backdoor, and they were just lucky at bruteforcing the device; in fact Apple wasn't even cooperating with them at relaxing the brute force prevention limit, so they could claim they did it in house.
(I'm personally not inclined to believe in such improbably well coordinated smoke and mirrors strategies, but they are a logical possibility nevertheless).
http://forums.appleinsider.com/discussion/comment/2832533/#C...
“Each Secure Enclave is provisioned during fabrication with its own UID (Unique ID) that is not accessible to other parts of the system and is not known to Apple. When the device starts up, an ephemeral key is created, entangled with its UID, and used to encrypt the Secure Enclave’s portion of the device’s memory space. Additionally, data that is saved to the file system by the Secure Enclave is encrypted with a key entangled with the UID and an anti-replay counter.”
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
The device in question is an iPhone 5C, which uses the older A6 design.
Everything is encrypted with a derivative of this UID, and extracting the UID is not a thing you can do without destroying the device.
"even Apple cannot decrypt without using the right password."
Could you please explain?
The iPhone prevents this by locking up (and potentially erasing the phone) after 10 failed attempts, but this a restriction created in iOS. If they provision a new backdoored version of iOS to the phone, that restriction wouldn't apply any more, and they could brute-force away.
If you have things that you need to be private, don't put it on a smartphone.
Apple has implicitly for a long time, and lately much more vocally, cared about privacy. They don't have the same data-driven business model that Google and FB do.
They say that. But with closed source software we can't verify that it's true. I'm not saying they don't care about privacy, only that we don't really know if they do or not.
Plus, with open source you can verify intent, which you can't with apple.
Which provide a device getting your finger prints, all your phone numbers, internet search, bank details, some paiements, network communication, voice communications, text communications, localisation using GPS and wifi + hotspot + phone towers and soon ihealth device collection body metrics.
And they are profit oriented, not people oriented.
Sure but they were there for years before anyone noticed. Same with PHP's Mersenne Twister code. Same with multiple other long-standing bugs. It's disingenuous to toss out "Oh, if only it was open source!" because reality tells us that people just plain -don't- read and verify open source code even when it's critical stuff like OpenSSL.
I agree that failing to fix a problem like this in a timely fashion is bad, but sins of omission are generally judged differently than sins of commission, for better or worse. Apple failing to apply proper prioritization to security holes isn't the same as Apple collecting data to be sold to the highest bidder.
So, again, Apple should not be treated as equivalent to Google and Facebook. Feel free to judge them harshly, but don't paint them with the same brush.
If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially?
And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to build it?
"Impossible" should mean "impossible", not "not yet done, but possible".