I don't follow. If pirate A assigns themself all the coins, the other pirates may as well vote against the plan - doing so risks nothing, and might result in them getting more than 0 coins if others happen to also vote against.
Maybe it's more helpful to think about such problems in terms of "how would I write a program to solve all problems in this class?", rather than "how would I act using common sense in this particular problem?" That often makes things clearer.
I would strongly challenge that assumption as having any realism (even for perfectly rational agents and no communication): if an agent decided to vote, he could assume all other perfectly rational agents (another usual assumption) would also take the same decision (by symmetry), so he can safely vote yes. This symmetry could only be broken if the agents have access to randomness.
If you take the time to think it though, you might well reinvent superrationality, updateless decision theory and other fascinating things. In fact, you'll quickly get to questions that I have no idea how to solve!
In the case of Prisoner's Dilemma, if the cooperate/defect outcome had sufficiently large cooperation bonus for fixed other payoffs (large enough T>>R in wikipedia's notation), then with my assumptions it's clear that each prisoner should flip a coin to decide, and each one gets ~T/4 expected payoff.
But the most glaring problem is of course assuming every player is perfectly rational. Personally I'd only assume that if your players are all game theorists with enough of time and paper :) I probably wouldn't even assume myself as rational.
In conclusion, I believe equating maximin with optimal play/perfect rationality is misguided, but maximin is a good safe bet.
Like someone else said, you seem to be speaking in jargon. "Superrationality", "updateless decision theory", none of this matters in order to understand the Pirate Game. The rules of the game are very simple, maybe the pirates thing is throwing you off? That's just a theme for the puzzle (people aren't rational like this, and of course pirates aren't, and the whole situation is extremely artificial and unrealistic). The non-intuitive solution is derived from the rules as stated without any need for additional theory.
The point made was that your 'equilibrium' is not valid because a pirate voting that way decreases their expected return. I don't see how you need a different 'equilibrium concept' for your proposed solution, when the basic assumption of rationality excludes it.
Not trying to be mean, but your response seems obfuscatory.
Ideas like Nash equilibria and subgame-perfect equilibria are the only known formalizations of rational behavior in multiplayer games. I'm not obfuscating, I just don't know any other kind of math that would work...
If everyone knows what everyone else is going to do, then neither option is better or worse, sure. But where did you get this perfect knowledge from? Certainly you couldn't deduce your situation.
And why is 'no' your default choice: this isn't a repeated game. You're trying to decide what to vote, you don't have a mind to change, at this stage. And neither does anyone else. Therefore, if everyone knows I can choose to vote either way, your situation is irrational.
You're objecting to a problem that isn't the one being considered.
It may well be that there is a compelling mathematical argument you're trying to evoke, but at the moment you're not actually putting it forward. You're name-dropping, but not explaining. Well, not in a way I can follow, anyway.
> In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy.
Many people have tried to define mathematically what "rational behavior" means when there are multiple players. Nash equilibrium is the one idea that stayed. It's the first chapter of every game theory textbook. Since the 1950s, literally all publications about non-cooperative games have been based on Nash equilibrium. To understand why, you'd have to look at the history of the field, or you could take my word for it. If it's any consolation, it was very unintuitive for me at first, too.
"If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing strategies while the other players keep theirs unchanged..."
which is not the situation in this case.
Strategies for infinite games are not necessarily optimal if the game is finite, and vice versa.
That's a pretty unusual setup, because game theory usually just gives you a utility function over outcomes and lets you derive strategic behavior from that, without fiddling with individual actions. Though I guess most people solving the problem have tried to merge the two utility functions somehow? That's probably the root of the disagreement in this thread...
Right, so it meets the definition of an equilibrium.
> but is this really interesting for this game, i.e. is it a viable outcome of it despite being stable once reached?
In "reality" no. But the Nash Equilibrium formalism gives us no way of determining which of the two possible equilibria (this one and the usual solution) will happen in practice. So you need some more powerful idea to solve that (see references to "superrationality" and "trembling hand" elsewhere in this thread), and none of those theories is mathematically complete.
A pirate will vote YES if offered 0 when the alternative is getting killed in one of the following turns. Pirates always prefer to live first, and only then they prefer to maximize their money.
edit: to clarify, the only pirate that would have to consider being killed is the one making the offer. thus yes, offering yourself 0 is possible and in fact seems to be a requirement for the (one of the) stable solutions. But if I'm not most senior, I would never accept 0.
Theoretically, a pirate could accept a seemingly inconvenient proposal if he evaluates that rejecting it would result in himself getting killed further down the line, when it's his own turn to propose a split.
You're right that this never happens in the 5-pirate game as stated (I'm not sure about the general N-pirate, C-coins game). The pirates who are offered 0 coins reject the split, but they don't get to alter the result anyway.
Equilibrium meaning 'if everyone votes this way, there is no benefit for any individual to vote differently' - that doesn't apply when the pirates are trying to determine what to vote for the one and only time they'll ever vote on this question, not knowing what anyone else will be voting.
Which is why you've been unable to express your disagreement with the puzzle without resorting to language of 'changing' votes, or assuming that you know what other people are going to vote. None of which are reasonable assumptions here.
Equilibria just seem to me to be the wrong tool for the job, you have to (as you have) invent a related infinite game with additional axioms and expectations before that kind of analysis kicks in.
Check your responses. If you can't describe what you're trying to say without mentioning anyone 'changing' their strategy, or assuming that a strategy is default, then you've got the wrong framework, I'd suggest (modulo my admitted lack of specific expertise).
EDIT: As explained in the replies, this is not actually a zero-sum game.
The verbal agreement "If you do this and I do that then I will split the money 50/50 with you after the show" is a verbal contract which (due to the cameras recording the event) is nevertheless indisputable. You are giving them a task to accomplish in exchange for a promised financial reward. They have all rights to sue you in court if they did what you asked and you didn't pay them for it.
What's really interesting is that he promises to split 50/50. In theory a rational actor who could commit to these things absolutely would say, "Look, I am pre-committing to steal, and I will give you $100 after the game if you choose split." Then it is still rational for the other guy to choose "split" (getting $100) rather than "steal" (getting 0). However most people, in study after study, will be insulted by the disparity of only getting 1% of the winning, and the insult is magnified by the camera: it is public shame. So in some sense being insulted by unfairness introduces out-of-band costs that also tend to pull you to splitting the money, and splitting it more fairly.
An anonymous, blind experiment would be more interesting, but less entertaining.
I remember seeing this clip in 2012, and back then I proposed a solution based on correlated equilibria which still seems pretty good to me:
"We have two minutes to talk, right? I'm going to ask you to flip a coin (visibly to both of us) at the last possible moment, the exact second where we must cease talking. If the coin comes up heads, I promise I'll cooperate, you can just go ahead and claim the whole prize. If the coin comes up tails, I promise I'll defect. Please cooperate in this case, because you have nothing to gain by defecting, and anyway the arrangement is fair, isn't it?"
> Third, each pirate would prefer to throw another overboard, if all other results would otherwise be equal.
If a pirate found themself in a situation where they thought their vote wouldn't change the outcome -- i.e. all other results would otherwise be equal -- they would vote to murder the proposer. In the situation you describe, every pirate would find themselves in that situation, and would thus vote for blood.
A group of superrational players may choose an outcome which is not even a NE! For example, two superrational players playing the prisoner's dilemma game will choose to cooperate.
Conversely, Nash equilibria are no longer "stable" in the original sense that there is no incentive for any player to unilaterally deviate. The concept of "unilaterally deviating" doesn't even make sense, because a group of superrational players will all choose the same strategy. The superrationality allows them to cooperatively deviate.
To demonstrate, I consider the smallest case for which your equilibrium strategy differs from the wiki pages' strategy, that is n=3. Suppose there are 3 pirates, A, B and C. Suppose the first pirate proposes that he gets all the coins. Then the state where everyone votes yes is a Nash equilibrium because no one has an incentive to unilaterally. However I claim that a group of supperrational players will vote to kill A.
Here is the proof of my claim (caveat: I don't think this is actually a valid analysis - see next paragraph. however it's the same level of rigor as the wiki page and demonstrates how B and C can cooperate to kill A, "escaping" the NE of both voting Y). C will vote No because accepting the proposal is the worst possible outcome for him (he gets 0 gold and no one dies; note that it is not possible for C to die), so strategies where he votes No in this round dominate strategies where he votes Yes in this round. B knows that C is thinking this. Hence he will vote No.
Explanation of caveat: actually, the nonstrict dominance proof in the above paragraph suggests that C does not know how B will vote and the dominance is nonstrict because of this unknown. However, since B and C are superrational, there is no such thing as not knowing how someone would vote; C knows that B will vote No, so the dominance is strict. However this argument seems circular (even though, because of superrationality, I think it really isn't).
Unrelated point: If we ammend the rules of the pirate game to include another tiebreaker with lowest priority: that all pirates prefer to vote "no", then your situation is no longer even a Nash equilibrium (much less a subgame-perfect NE). Then how many NEs are there in the ammended game?
Wouldn't Alice, Bob and Carol realize that then and agree to divide the cake evenly since it's the only solution that is fair to everybody?
For a single cake, offering a fair split is just as hard to predict success as any other split. It also assumes there are no other signals, which is why it's not very insightful to begin with.
Is there a name for this problem? I can only find the fair cake cutting problem, which has been solved for 3 people.
Or more specifically, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Envy-free_cake-cutting
On a tangential note, something that's always bothered me about write-ups of "envy-free" division is that they assume a couple of things I don't think are true:
- That someone cutting a cake always executes exactly the cut they planned.
- That once the cake has been divided, no one will experience envy because their piece is worth, to them, at least their "fair share" of the total.
Take the classic example of envy-free division of one cake among two people. The solution is simple enough that most people understand it instantly: person A divides the cake into two portions however they please, and person B then selects one of those portions, A receiving the other. Everyone will agree that this is intuitively fair. But it's certainly not fair for either of the two reasons I dispute -- A might still envy the portion of the cake that went to B, imagining a different world where the entire cake was theirs... or A might slip up with the knife and create one portion which is obviously better than the other portion, which B then chooses.
Rather, I think the benefits of envy-free division come from two other points:
- The parties involved agree beforehand that the process is fair. This requires them to be able to understand it, which is easy for the two-person division and quite difficult for more than two.
- Instead of assuming that division goes off without a hitch, we can observe that if you receive a portion you're unhappy with, it's because you messed up. The blame falls on you rather than someone else.
a) not once have I seen an 'Arrr matey' in the comments b) the article didn't mention walking the plank at all c) I don't think that we can count on lower level pirates to be competent at complex logic
True story.
Another problem which puzzles me even more is dividing a cake among three people by majority vote. Let's say Alice and Bob make an agreement where each of them gets half of the cake and Carol is left out. But that's unstable, because Carol can offer Bob a different agreement where Bob gets 60%, Carol gets 40%, and Alice is left out. Since Bob gets 10% more than before, he has an incentive to switch. But that's unstable as well, because now Alice can make a similar offer to Carol, etc. In the end there's no possible setup that everyone will stick with. As far as I know, this problem is still mostly open (though a few advances have been made).
To sum up, the idea of "perfectly rational" decision-making is surprisingly difficult to nail down. It's been definitively solved only for the case of two-player zero-sum games. When the game is not zero-sum, you get complications like bargaining and equilibrium selection, and when you have more than two players, you get an explosion of complexity without any clear-cut answers.