Right, so it meets the definition of an equilibrium.
> but is this really interesting for this game, i.e. is it a viable outcome of it despite being stable once reached?
In "reality" no. But the Nash Equilibrium formalism gives us no way of determining which of the two possible equilibria (this one and the usual solution) will happen in practice. So you need some more powerful idea to solve that (see references to "superrationality" and "trembling hand" elsewhere in this thread), and none of those theories is mathematically complete.
A pirate will vote YES if offered 0 when the alternative is getting killed in one of the following turns. Pirates always prefer to live first, and only then they prefer to maximize their money.
edit: to clarify, the only pirate that would have to consider being killed is the one making the offer. thus yes, offering yourself 0 is possible and in fact seems to be a requirement for the (one of the) stable solutions. But if I'm not most senior, I would never accept 0.
Theoretically, a pirate could accept a seemingly inconvenient proposal if he evaluates that rejecting it would result in himself getting killed further down the line, when it's his own turn to propose a split.
You're right that this never happens in the 5-pirate game as stated (I'm not sure about the general N-pirate, C-coins game). The pirates who are offered 0 coins reject the split, but they don't get to alter the result anyway.