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Re:The pirate game by lmm on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:49AM (#10902530)
The point is that everyone voting yes is a possible equilibrium solution (along with the "normal" solution), so a priori there's no rule that tells you which one is the equilibrium the pirates would reach.
Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Friday January 15, 2016 @08:34AM (#10909160)
Ok, I guess I need to understand how this is an equilibrium and read more carefully what the rules of this game are exactly. Because from reading it once I understood that pirates are supposed to decide on a proposed distribution. And according to my understanding, a pirate would never vote YES if offered 0. Therefore, I seem to not see how the situation we are discussing is a viable equilibrium. (I do see how once in this "state" unilateral change of votes means no advantage to any one player, but is this really interesting for this game, i.e. is it a viable outcome of it despite being stable once reached? Maybe I have it all wrong though.)
Re:The pirate game by lmm on Friday January 15, 2016 @10:53AM (#10909999)
> I do see how once in this "state" unilateral change of votes means no advantage to any one player

Right, so it meets the definition of an equilibrium.

> but is this really interesting for this game, i.e. is it a viable outcome of it despite being stable once reached?

In "reality" no. But the Nash Equilibrium formalism gives us no way of determining which of the two possible equilibria (this one and the usual solution) will happen in practice. So you need some more powerful idea to solve that (see references to "superrationality" and "trembling hand" elsewhere in this thread), and none of those theories is mathematically complete.

Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Friday January 15, 2016 @02:33PM (#10911524)
Yep okay. So is what this then shows, really, that a Nash equilibrium is not so meaningful for this game?
Re:The pirate game by lmm on Tuesday January 19, 2016 @07:21AM (#10930205)
It's meaningful, but it's insufficient to completely solve it.
Re:The pirate game by the_af on Friday January 15, 2016 @12:56PM (#10910864)
> And according to my understanding, a pirate would never vote YES if offered 0.

A pirate will vote YES if offered 0 when the alternative is getting killed in one of the following turns. Pirates always prefer to live first, and only then they prefer to maximize their money.

Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Friday January 15, 2016 @02:30PM (#10911508)
what "following turns"?

edit: to clarify, the only pirate that would have to consider being killed is the one making the offer. thus yes, offering yourself 0 is possible and in fact seems to be a requirement for the (one of the) stable solutions. But if I'm not most senior, I would never accept 0.

Re:The pirate game by the_af on Monday January 18, 2016 @04:04PM (#10926923)
The game has turns in theory: each split proposal is one turn. The most senior pirate proposes a split; if it's not accepted, he gets killed and the next pirate proposes a split. That's the next "turn", assuming the first split gets rejected.

Theoretically, a pirate could accept a seemingly inconvenient proposal if he evaluates that rejecting it would result in himself getting killed further down the line, when it's his own turn to propose a split.

You're right that this never happens in the 5-pirate game as stated (I'm not sure about the general N-pirate, C-coins game). The pirates who are offered 0 coins reject the split, but they don't get to alter the result anyway.

Re:The pirate game by sago on Thursday January 14, 2016 @06:48PM (#10905790)
No, the point being made is there is no 'equilibrium' because the game is not repeated.

Equilibrium meaning 'if everyone votes this way, there is no benefit for any individual to vote differently' - that doesn't apply when the pirates are trying to determine what to vote for the one and only time they'll ever vote on this question, not knowing what anyone else will be voting.

Re:The pirate game by cousin_it on Friday January 15, 2016 @07:47AM (#10908942)
The idea of Nash equilibrium isn't just for repeated games, in fact it was invented for one-shot games. (Now I understand why you keep mentioning "infinite games"...)
Re:The pirate game by sago on Saturday January 16, 2016 @05:50PM (#10917254)
It isn't, but it requires knowledge of the other strategies: there is at least a 'starting' strategy. That isn't the case here.

Which is why you've been unable to express your disagreement with the puzzle without resorting to language of 'changing' votes, or assuming that you know what other people are going to vote. None of which are reasonable assumptions here.