Ideas like Nash equilibria and subgame-perfect equilibria are the only known formalizations of rational behavior in multiplayer games. I'm not obfuscating, I just don't know any other kind of math that would work...
If everyone knows what everyone else is going to do, then neither option is better or worse, sure. But where did you get this perfect knowledge from? Certainly you couldn't deduce your situation.
And why is 'no' your default choice: this isn't a repeated game. You're trying to decide what to vote, you don't have a mind to change, at this stage. And neither does anyone else. Therefore, if everyone knows I can choose to vote either way, your situation is irrational.
You're objecting to a problem that isn't the one being considered.
It may well be that there is a compelling mathematical argument you're trying to evoke, but at the moment you're not actually putting it forward. You're name-dropping, but not explaining. Well, not in a way I can follow, anyway.
> In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy.
Many people have tried to define mathematically what "rational behavior" means when there are multiple players. Nash equilibrium is the one idea that stayed. It's the first chapter of every game theory textbook. Since the 1950s, literally all publications about non-cooperative games have been based on Nash equilibrium. To understand why, you'd have to look at the history of the field, or you could take my word for it. If it's any consolation, it was very unintuitive for me at first, too.
"If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing strategies while the other players keep theirs unchanged..."
which is not the situation in this case.
Strategies for infinite games are not necessarily optimal if the game is finite, and vice versa.
That's a pretty unusual setup, because game theory usually just gives you a utility function over outcomes and lets you derive strategic behavior from that, without fiddling with individual actions. Though I guess most people solving the problem have tried to merge the two utility functions somehow? That's probably the root of the disagreement in this thread...
Right, so it meets the definition of an equilibrium.
> but is this really interesting for this game, i.e. is it a viable outcome of it despite being stable once reached?
In "reality" no. But the Nash Equilibrium formalism gives us no way of determining which of the two possible equilibria (this one and the usual solution) will happen in practice. So you need some more powerful idea to solve that (see references to "superrationality" and "trembling hand" elsewhere in this thread), and none of those theories is mathematically complete.
A pirate will vote YES if offered 0 when the alternative is getting killed in one of the following turns. Pirates always prefer to live first, and only then they prefer to maximize their money.
edit: to clarify, the only pirate that would have to consider being killed is the one making the offer. thus yes, offering yourself 0 is possible and in fact seems to be a requirement for the (one of the) stable solutions. But if I'm not most senior, I would never accept 0.
Theoretically, a pirate could accept a seemingly inconvenient proposal if he evaluates that rejecting it would result in himself getting killed further down the line, when it's his own turn to propose a split.
You're right that this never happens in the 5-pirate game as stated (I'm not sure about the general N-pirate, C-coins game). The pirates who are offered 0 coins reject the split, but they don't get to alter the result anyway.
Equilibrium meaning 'if everyone votes this way, there is no benefit for any individual to vote differently' - that doesn't apply when the pirates are trying to determine what to vote for the one and only time they'll ever vote on this question, not knowing what anyone else will be voting.
Which is why you've been unable to express your disagreement with the puzzle without resorting to language of 'changing' votes, or assuming that you know what other people are going to vote. None of which are reasonable assumptions here.
Equilibria just seem to me to be the wrong tool for the job, you have to (as you have) invent a related infinite game with additional axioms and expectations before that kind of analysis kicks in.
Check your responses. If you can't describe what you're trying to say without mentioning anyone 'changing' their strategy, or assuming that a strategy is default, then you've got the wrong framework, I'd suggest (modulo my admitted lack of specific expertise).
The point made was that your 'equilibrium' is not valid because a pirate voting that way decreases their expected return. I don't see how you need a different 'equilibrium concept' for your proposed solution, when the basic assumption of rationality excludes it.
Not trying to be mean, but your response seems obfuscatory.