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Re:The pirate game by cousin_it on Wednesday January 13, 2016 @07:21PM (#10898753)
I'm sorry, now I don't follow. If not subgame-perfect equilibrium, what do you think is the right solution concept for the pirate game? Maybe it doesn't have a name, but can you describe it (at least informally)?
Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Wednesday January 13, 2016 @07:50PM (#10898879)
Can you explain a little more how this subgame-perfect equilibrium should be reached? From the game's description it appears that, all other things equal, I as a pirate reject a proposed coin distribution if I could kill the proposer. Thus, if offered 0 coins, I would always choose to reject that plan.
Re:The pirate game by cousin_it on Wednesday January 13, 2016 @08:04PM (#10898926)
Well, one pirate changing their vote to "no" wouldn't actually kill anyone. So it sounds like you want a utility function over outcomes (prefer outcomes where someone is killed) and another, separate utility function over actions (prefer voting to kill someone even if that won't actually kill them).

That's a pretty unusual setup, because game theory usually just gives you a utility function over outcomes and lets you derive strategic behavior from that, without fiddling with individual actions. Though I guess most people solving the problem have tried to merge the two utility functions somehow? That's probably the root of the disagreement in this thread...

Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Thursday January 14, 2016 @10:04AM (#10901767)
You keep saying "change their vote to no". Perhaps it would be educational why you think they should default to "yes" in the first place when offered 0 coins. It really doesn't seem that the problem you see necessarily arises from this specific set of rules for this game. Offered 0 --> vote no; no would at worst be equal and at best be better than yes.
Re:The pirate game by lmm on Thursday January 14, 2016 @11:49AM (#10902530)
The point is that everyone voting yes is a possible equilibrium solution (along with the "normal" solution), so a priori there's no rule that tells you which one is the equilibrium the pirates would reach.
Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Friday January 15, 2016 @08:34AM (#10909160)
Ok, I guess I need to understand how this is an equilibrium and read more carefully what the rules of this game are exactly. Because from reading it once I understood that pirates are supposed to decide on a proposed distribution. And according to my understanding, a pirate would never vote YES if offered 0. Therefore, I seem to not see how the situation we are discussing is a viable equilibrium. (I do see how once in this "state" unilateral change of votes means no advantage to any one player, but is this really interesting for this game, i.e. is it a viable outcome of it despite being stable once reached? Maybe I have it all wrong though.)
Re:The pirate game by lmm on Friday January 15, 2016 @10:53AM (#10909999)
> I do see how once in this "state" unilateral change of votes means no advantage to any one player

Right, so it meets the definition of an equilibrium.

> but is this really interesting for this game, i.e. is it a viable outcome of it despite being stable once reached?

In "reality" no. But the Nash Equilibrium formalism gives us no way of determining which of the two possible equilibria (this one and the usual solution) will happen in practice. So you need some more powerful idea to solve that (see references to "superrationality" and "trembling hand" elsewhere in this thread), and none of those theories is mathematically complete.

Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Friday January 15, 2016 @02:33PM (#10911524)
Yep okay. So is what this then shows, really, that a Nash equilibrium is not so meaningful for this game?
Re:The pirate game by lmm on Tuesday January 19, 2016 @07:21AM (#10930205)
It's meaningful, but it's insufficient to completely solve it.
Re:The pirate game by the_af on Friday January 15, 2016 @12:56PM (#10910864)
> And according to my understanding, a pirate would never vote YES if offered 0.

A pirate will vote YES if offered 0 when the alternative is getting killed in one of the following turns. Pirates always prefer to live first, and only then they prefer to maximize their money.

Re:The pirate game by kmonad on Friday January 15, 2016 @02:30PM (#10911508)
what "following turns"?

edit: to clarify, the only pirate that would have to consider being killed is the one making the offer. thus yes, offering yourself 0 is possible and in fact seems to be a requirement for the (one of the) stable solutions. But if I'm not most senior, I would never accept 0.

Re:The pirate game by the_af on Monday January 18, 2016 @04:04PM (#10926923)
The game has turns in theory: each split proposal is one turn. The most senior pirate proposes a split; if it's not accepted, he gets killed and the next pirate proposes a split. That's the next "turn", assuming the first split gets rejected.

Theoretically, a pirate could accept a seemingly inconvenient proposal if he evaluates that rejecting it would result in himself getting killed further down the line, when it's his own turn to propose a split.

You're right that this never happens in the 5-pirate game as stated (I'm not sure about the general N-pirate, C-coins game). The pirates who are offered 0 coins reject the split, but they don't get to alter the result anyway.

Re:The pirate game by sago on Thursday January 14, 2016 @06:48PM (#10905790)
No, the point being made is there is no 'equilibrium' because the game is not repeated.

Equilibrium meaning 'if everyone votes this way, there is no benefit for any individual to vote differently' - that doesn't apply when the pirates are trying to determine what to vote for the one and only time they'll ever vote on this question, not knowing what anyone else will be voting.

Re:The pirate game by cousin_it on Friday January 15, 2016 @07:47AM (#10908942)
The idea of Nash equilibrium isn't just for repeated games, in fact it was invented for one-shot games. (Now I understand why you keep mentioning "infinite games"...)
Re:The pirate game by sago on Saturday January 16, 2016 @05:50PM (#10917254)
It isn't, but it requires knowledge of the other strategies: there is at least a 'starting' strategy. That isn't the case here.

Which is why you've been unable to express your disagreement with the puzzle without resorting to language of 'changing' votes, or assuming that you know what other people are going to vote. None of which are reasonable assumptions here.

Re:The pirate game by sago on Wednesday January 13, 2016 @08:12PM (#10898961)
The solution is contained in the post. I can't find a problem with it. It was you who were suggesting this is a naive analysis.

Equilibria just seem to me to be the wrong tool for the job, you have to (as you have) invent a related infinite game with additional axioms and expectations before that kind of analysis kicks in.

Check your responses. If you can't describe what you're trying to say without mentioning anyone 'changing' their strategy, or assuming that a strategy is default, then you've got the wrong framework, I'd suggest (modulo my admitted lack of specific expertise).