Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by sz4kerto on Friday November 20, 2015 @04:16AM
(#10600374)
What should I use for casual, daily chatting with friends that runs on Android, iOS, Linux, Windows, Windows Phone, web, and allows group messaging and message history search?
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by klagermkii on Friday November 20, 2015 @04:59AM
(#10600465)
I keep seeing these dire warnings whenever Telegram is mentioned, and I don't understand the hate. Is it some super secure platform? Probably not, but people needing a provably NSA-resistant chat client is such a tiny percentage of the people interested in regular chatting. None of the warnings I see have the nuance of "don't use it if you think it'll keep you safe from the government, but otherwise it's a pretty nice service to use" nor do they list the chat services that they feel are more secure.
Compared to the alternatives of Skype, WhatsApp, SMS, Hangouts, iMessage, etc it's a good chat service, with a relatively lightweight native client on multiple platforms, actual working sync, and good recovery when used on poor Internet connection.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by fabulist on Friday November 20, 2015 @06:09AM
(#10600667)
People don't like Telegram because they claim to be a company which cares deeply about security and privacy, offering a "200% secure" chat client, while blatantly ignoring the concerns of the security community. Doing things like using a hand-rolled, proofless KDF isn't just a bad idea when considering a nation-state adversary. It's a bad idea against every adversary. It's the cryptographic equivalent of staking an ADT sign in your yard without purchasing an alarm.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by sarciszewski on Friday November 20, 2015 @11:06AM
(#10601880)
> I keep seeing these dire warnings whenever Telegram is mentioned, and I don't understand the hate.
The hate stems from two main sources:
1. They're claiming to be secure in a very flamboyant (even arrogant) manner by challenging the world's cryptographers to break their protocol, but the contest is structured to be unwinnable regardless of how shitty their crypto actually is.
2. Telegram spends less time improving their crypto (which is full of WTFs) and instead markets themselves to people who aren't technical enough to figure out how shitty it really is.
Seriously, avoid Telegram. If you want Signal to work on more platforms, send a check to Open Whisper Systems and help them build up their team to cover more area.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by Chris2048 on Friday November 20, 2015 @08:18AM
(#10601000)
The press have been bad-mouthing our cars recently based on the fact that they explode violently if they crash.
Are they super-duper safe? No. Will driving our cars grant you immortality? also, No.
But no car can promise this, and driving any car inherently runs the risk of dying - No car is provably 100% safe! If you're really worried about this, just don't drive!
Most car drivers won't care anyway, very few people crash their cars on a day-to-day basis, so it's not really relevant.
</good-natured-sarcasm>
exaggerated/straw-man comparisons, or appeal-to-low-standards doesn't really satisfy these kind of concerns...
<good-natured-sarcasm>
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by mikeash on Friday November 20, 2015 @09:57AM
(#10601419)
"Telegram is a messaging app with a focus on speed and security...."
If it's not actually secure then they shouldn't advertise it as secure.
An app that advertises itself as secure but isn't is naturally going to attract more hate than an app which doesn't advertise security in the first place.
Nobody forced them to advertise security. If they just wanted to be a a good chat service with the advantages you listed, they could just do that. But if you advertise security, you had better deliver!
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by Spearchucker on Friday November 20, 2015 @08:01AM
(#10600939)
And it's a good recommendation, IMO. Still not something I'll ever use because it too slurps up contacts. I mentioned this some time ago, and the responses were interesting - from "that's not a bad thing" to "but they do it in a nice way".
Claiming to be secure, and then taking what's mine away from my control is unacceptable to me.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by sigil on Friday November 20, 2015 @10:03AM
(#10601460)
Signal doesn't upload your contacts anywhere. That was the whole point of their "Private Contact Discovery" blog post. ("How do we determine which contacts are registered with a service, without revealing the contacts to the service?") [1] A hard problem that no other messaging app has bothered to solve, AFAIK.
Yes, Signal The App reads your contacts to construct the blinded signature query. Does it then do something nefarious with them? No: https://github.com/WhisperSystems
What alternative solution to the PKI key introduction problem would you rather see? You could go the iMessage central key broker route, but that means trusting that Apple won't introduce the wrong key to you (or be compelled to do so). [2] Or, you could let users exchange keys in person a la key signing parties. That's a reasonable feature request at this point, but advanced usage and not something that gets you traction with normal people. TextSecure/Signal wouldn't have gotten to where it is today with that much friction around key introduction.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by maxerickson on Friday November 20, 2015 @11:25AM
(#10602008)
I have not carefully checked, but based on the paragraph from your contact discovery link
For RedPhone, our user base is still manageable enough (for now) to use the bloom filter technique. For TextSecure, however, we’ve grown beyond the size where that remains practical, so the only thing we can do is write the server such that it doesn’t store the transmitted contact information, inform the user, and give them the choice of opting out.
I would expect that Signal does share contact information with the server.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by sigil on Friday November 20, 2015 @12:47PM
(#10602575)
I believe that comment is out of date, since there are multiple entries on the support forum about what to do if the contacts bloom filter fails to download. [1] [2]
But now you've got me curious. I'll dig back into the code and find out for sure.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by maxerickson on Friday November 20, 2015 @01:21PM
(#10602828)
Redphone was only on IOS and there are not similar entries under Android->Signal.
It'd be nice to figure it out, but I guess it isn't that important, Signal still leaks lots of metadata, so anyone that would be burned by sharing their contacts isn't gaining much by using it (or any other mobile comm...).
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by StavrosK on Friday November 20, 2015 @08:45AM
(#10601082)
Phil Zimmermann has developed a new protocol, which Silent Phone uses, which makes it impossible (or very hard) for the server to know the contacts on your phone while doing discovery.
I'm going to write up the protocol and publish a reference server I wrote in Go in a few days. I'll post it here and send it to Open Whisper Systems as well, they may want to integrate it.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by pmjordan on Friday November 20, 2015 @09:42AM
(#10601339)
Considering the source is available - https://github.com/WhisperSystems/ - it should be reasonably straightforward to take the piece of code out that accesses your contact list? (On iOS, and by the sound of it, latest Android OS, you can also just disallow contact access via the system UI.)
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by darklajid on Friday November 20, 2015 @04:37AM
(#10600421)
I'm in the same boat. I use Telegram. Not because it's secure (I don't know, I believe others that claim that it might not be), but because it works for me.
I'd say 'Use Telegram' with the caveat that you shouldn't trust it blindly? Use it as a better and cross-platform SMS/text experience, which might or might not be more secure.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by fabulist on Friday November 20, 2015 @06:16AM
(#10600683)
If you're a Telegram user who's cautious with what you say, assuming that anything you transmit could potentially be intercepted, you will certainly be more secure than a {Chat,Text}Secure user with complete faith in their technology.
Edited to add: The same could well be true for someone using plaintext.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by lmm on Friday November 20, 2015 @05:44AM
(#10600596)
What do you mean "at least"? You're better off with Hangouts or Facebook chat - Telegram flags you up as someone trying to hide, while not offering any actual security.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by celticninja on Friday November 20, 2015 @06:02AM
(#10600650)
and google is probably an open system to the NSA and US government, you dont need to even appear to be someone who has something to hide they will target you because they easy have access to your data.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by upofadown on Friday November 20, 2015 @07:01AM
(#10600777)
Obviously the same app will not run on every possible platform. So the question should be; what protocol should I use for casual daily chatting? Message history search would be the part implemented at the client level.
This tendency to talk about the name/brand of the client instead of the protocol is a current problem with IM. The ISIS people should really be writing articles about OTR and TOR to address their particular application.
I have a friend that thinks I use the Pidgin chat system because that is what she uses when she chats with me on XMPP. Since Pidgin does not run on her phone she thinks she can only chat with me when she is at her computer. So far all attempts to explain the idea of an interoperable protocol have failed.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by antihero on Friday November 20, 2015 @07:41AM
(#10600879)
Da'esh, ignoring the fact that they're a terrorist organisation, are actually trying to solve an interesting problem, which is, they need to be both secure, but also engage with/recruit people who are not so tech savvy and are used to easy social media apps with simple UX - basically they NEED to be BOTH secure AND accessible. So whilst they likely know of more secure options like PGP or OTR, these are not what their target audience are using or have the capability to use - they are interested in keeping the dragnet for new recruits wide, so have to tailor their approach for the current generation, hence Telegram, which is supposedly secure and also already making inroads in the current market as an alternative to WhatsApp, and is less geeky than something like Signal.
I remember years back when I attempted the same problem with a thing called Wire, for activists, that I posted on here and combined Facebook/Twitter type stuff with "secure" messaging, which was a web based UI that implemented AES256 based browser encryption based on the Stanford JS library. I got thoroughly roasted by people that knew what they were doing, so I shut the project down realising that what I was doing was dangerous due to lack of qualification. It's interesting seeing all the projects that have sprouted up since, and clearly I was on the money with the initial idea.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by antihero on Friday November 20, 2015 @06:02AM
(#10600649)
Telegram. For secure things, Signal/ChatSecure or something else by moxie. For 99% of the shit you do, the convenience will usually outweigh the limitations brought on by doing crypto properly, for instance not having a desktop client.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by Aoyagi on Friday November 20, 2015 @04:37AM
(#10600423)
Considering this or the other blogpost about Telegram "waving their math PhDs" is under literally every Telegram-related comment section I've ever been in on HN, I think people know.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by asherkin on Friday November 20, 2015 @05:20AM
(#10600525)
They did, which ended in February (https://telegram.org/blog/cryptocontest-ends) - I've also seen mention of a round 3 with even more relaxed rules due for around now, but I can't find it anywhere now.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by fabulist on Friday November 20, 2015 @07:07AM
(#10600794)
It really bothers me that VICE Motherboard (I've not read much from their other sections), who markets themselves as a controversial, alternative news source, distinguishes themselves by publishing more reasonable and better researched articles.
I've never gotten the impression from any other reporting (Wired, CNN) on this issue that they so much as skimmed Moxie Marlinspike, Michael Green, or anyone else's criticisms of Telegram.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by nnq on Friday November 20, 2015 @08:27AM
(#10601028)
How can one even remotely think that an app like Telegram can be secure, as long we know the very platforms it's running on are hackable (there are more than enough 0days on the market)?! Yeah, maybe it's expensive and a bit friendly-fire-ish to target platform holes on a large scale, but still...
My bet is that the real bad guys always use face2face when possible, and voice/video with codewords and visual cues when there's no other choice... and maybe an encripted sdcard carried by hand/mail when they really need to cary large volumes. They can't be stupid enough to use anything else for such high risk stuff!
I'd guess that the only people actually depending on good consumer-lever crypto are whistleblowers, anti-goverment protesters and individuals and companies that truly value their privacy for one reason or another! Are these the people we want to hurt here?!
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by nickpsecurity on Friday November 20, 2015 @07:20PM
(#10604794)
Glad at least one person mentions it albeit near the bottom of the comments. I've been telling them that since before the Snowden leaks. Nice summary of required assurance activities and areas where issues pop up:
The one exception is Ottela's Tinfoil Chat. It needs a robust, low-level implementation instead of Python. Yet, he cleverly dodged much of the TCB problem by creatively applying what he learned from others plus input we gave him on Schneier's blog for high assurance security & general improvements. So, you can build on and use that* but the rest depend on what top-tier and organized crime can buy attacks for. Ridiculous....
* Again, without Python and with TCB enhancements. OpenBSD at the least for its lower 0-days.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by mtgx on Friday November 20, 2015 @05:07AM
(#10600483)
The most disappointing thing about Telegram is that they are completely unwilling to accept any kind of criticism or use any outside suggestions for improving their crypto. Kind of goes against the whole "open source" thing they're doing there.
Also the fact that it doesn't even have end-to-end encryption by default means it shouldn't even be in the same class as "secure messengers". It's better suited in the Skype/Hangouts class of apps.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by seren on Friday November 20, 2015 @07:07AM
(#10600795)
The thing is that as a random user, you might want to keep the content of your message secret for various reason (like ad profiling for example).
Once you are more or less identified as a terrorist, from the point of view of an intelligence organization, they might be sad to not get the content of the messages, but is they can have the graph of your contact, they'll be more than happy (and find the weakest link in there).
Incidentally I have also checked that the Telegram and Signal app are requesting a Location permission on Android. I don't know if it is sent to some sort of central server, but this does seem not safe if youe life depends on it.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by kds on Friday November 20, 2015 @07:36AM
(#10600861)
Misleading title. This has nothing to do with privacy and encryption. Just to quote a couple of recent Pavel Durov's tweets: "To media covering us this week: Telegram channels are public broadcasts. They are the opposite of private chats. Please don't mix the two."... "Our policy is simple: privacy is paramount. Public channels, however, have nothing to do with privacy. ISIS public channels will be blocked."
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by rekoros on Friday November 20, 2015 @11:58AM
(#10602237)
Here's why Telegram is important: it is the only communication service with mass worldwide adoption that isn’t backed by a corporation, venture capitalists, or a government.
Everything else—including the company's cocky and downright insulting attitude—doesn't matter nearly as much. I actually think a lot of what they say gets lost in translation.
We recently integrated with Telegram (without their knowledge, support, or blessing, of course—because Telegram), which sent me on a little research journey. Results are here: https://sameroom.io/blog/announcing-support-for-telegram/
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by nickpsecurity on Friday November 20, 2015 @07:27PM
(#10604819)
You mean its security or impressions from a pro looking at its code matter less than who backed it? I think not. Its design, implementation, and evidence they're correct matter more than who backs it. It has to measure up before those things are even an issue.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by Aoyagi on Friday November 20, 2015 @09:12AM
(#10601204)
Well, the headlines in regular news outlets are completely different. Something along the lines of "The terrorist have been using encrypted 'app', were stopped by owners".
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by EGreg on Friday November 20, 2015 @11:30AM
(#10602041)
If the headline is true then that is excellent.
But I think Pavel Durov should make a system that gives up terrorists' communications if it detects indicators eg words that will lead to planning a violent attack. And without informing everyone about it.
Re:Telegram probably isn't as secure as ISIS thinks
by kds on Friday November 20, 2015 @08:07AM
(#10600955)
Nicely implemented chat services are in demand, or so it seems. They might be sold into the billions and monetized with ads, and I guess the negative spin comes from purely business origin, though disguised as concerns of crypto professionals.
BTW, if Telegram crypto was that much insecure why members of the so-called "security community" haven't yet compromised the Telegram chat for real (regardless of any contests and petty rules) and proven they had been right?
I don't rule out this as impossible - I just think that without such proof it's all just a kind of stupid whining.
http://thoughtcrime.org/blog/telegram-crypto-challenge/
I don't think you should use Telegram.
Compared to the alternatives of Skype, WhatsApp, SMS, Hangouts, iMessage, etc it's a good chat service, with a relatively lightweight native client on multiple platforms, actual working sync, and good recovery when used on poor Internet connection.
It is unethical to market snake oil.
The hate stems from two main sources:
1. They're claiming to be secure in a very flamboyant (even arrogant) manner by challenging the world's cryptographers to break their protocol, but the contest is structured to be unwinnable regardless of how shitty their crypto actually is.
2. Telegram spends less time improving their crypto (which is full of WTFs) and instead markets themselves to people who aren't technical enough to figure out how shitty it really is.
Seriously, avoid Telegram. If you want Signal to work on more platforms, send a check to Open Whisper Systems and help them build up their team to cover more area.
The 4 or 5 people in the nsa that actually do any work don't stand a chance against several hundred million baby breeders with ak47s.
Are they super-duper safe? No. Will driving our cars grant you immortality? also, No.
But no car can promise this, and driving any car inherently runs the risk of dying - No car is provably 100% safe! If you're really worried about this, just don't drive!
Most car drivers won't care anyway, very few people crash their cars on a day-to-day basis, so it's not really relevant.
</good-natured-sarcasm> exaggerated/straw-man comparisons, or appeal-to-low-standards doesn't really satisfy these kind of concerns... <good-natured-sarcasm>
If it's not actually secure then they shouldn't advertise it as secure.
An app that advertises itself as secure but isn't is naturally going to attract more hate than an app which doesn't advertise security in the first place.
Nobody forced them to advertise security. If they just wanted to be a a good chat service with the advantages you listed, they could just do that. But if you advertise security, you had better deliver!
Claiming to be secure, and then taking what's mine away from my control is unacceptable to me.
Yes, Signal The App reads your contacts to construct the blinded signature query. Does it then do something nefarious with them? No: https://github.com/WhisperSystems
What alternative solution to the PKI key introduction problem would you rather see? You could go the iMessage central key broker route, but that means trusting that Apple won't introduce the wrong key to you (or be compelled to do so). [2] Or, you could let users exchange keys in person a la key signing parties. That's a reasonable feature request at this point, but advanced usage and not something that gets you traction with normal people. TextSecure/Signal wouldn't have gotten to where it is today with that much friction around key introduction.
[1] https://whispersystems.org/blog/contact-discovery/
[2] http://blog.quarkslab.com/imessage-privacy.html
For RedPhone, our user base is still manageable enough (for now) to use the bloom filter technique. For TextSecure, however, we’ve grown beyond the size where that remains practical, so the only thing we can do is write the server such that it doesn’t store the transmitted contact information, inform the user, and give them the choice of opting out.
I would expect that Signal does share contact information with the server.
But now you've got me curious. I'll dig back into the code and find out for sure.
[1] http://support.whispersystems.org/hc/en-us/articles/21274348...
[2] http://support.whispersystems.org/hc/en-us/articles/21247614...
It'd be nice to figure it out, but I guess it isn't that important, Signal still leaks lots of metadata, so anyone that would be burned by sharing their contacts isn't gaining much by using it (or any other mobile comm...).
I'm going to write up the protocol and publish a reference server I wrote in Go in a few days. I'll post it here and send it to Open Whisper Systems as well, they may want to integrate it.
Obviously, if you're extremely liberal with the upvote button, this may not be useful as a bookmark....
Useful?
I would call it Show.hn :-)
https://github.com/SilentCircle/contact-discovery
http://o9i.de/2015/10/23/howto-gmscore.html
There's even an fdroid repository[1] you can add to track libreSignal apks.
----
[0] https://github.com/JavaJens/TextSecure [1] https://fdroid.eutopia.cz/
WhatsApp (most popular?) doesn't. ChatSecure (most secure?) doesn't.
I'd say 'Use Telegram' with the caveat that you shouldn't trust it blindly? Use it as a better and cross-platform SMS/text experience, which might or might not be more secure.
Edited to add: The same could well be true for someone using plaintext.
I think I agree that using encryption on Telegram singles you out though!
This tendency to talk about the name/brand of the client instead of the protocol is a current problem with IM. The ISIS people should really be writing articles about OTR and TOR to address their particular application.
I have a friend that thinks I use the Pidgin chat system because that is what she uses when she chats with me on XMPP. Since Pidgin does not run on her phone she thinks she can only chat with me when she is at her computer. So far all attempts to explain the idea of an interoperable protocol have failed.
I remember years back when I attempted the same problem with a thing called Wire, for activists, that I posted on here and combined Facebook/Twitter type stuff with "secure" messaging, which was a web based UI that implemented AES256 based browser encryption based on the Stanford JS library. I got thoroughly roasted by people that knew what they were doing, so I shut the project down realising that what I was doing was dangerous due to lack of qualification. It's interesting seeing all the projects that have sprouted up since, and clearly I was on the money with the initial idea.
https://github.com/radiosilence/wire
FB Messenger works fine but of course is not private w.r.t. FB
Seems a good enough reason to use something different
https://threema.ch/en/faq/why_secure https://threema.ch/validation/
I've never gotten the impression from any other reporting (Wired, CNN) on this issue that they so much as skimmed Moxie Marlinspike, Michael Green, or anyone else's criticisms of Telegram.
My bet is that the real bad guys always use face2face when possible, and voice/video with codewords and visual cues when there's no other choice... and maybe an encripted sdcard carried by hand/mail when they really need to cary large volumes. They can't be stupid enough to use anything else for such high risk stuff!
I'd guess that the only people actually depending on good consumer-lever crypto are whistleblowers, anti-goverment protesters and individuals and companies that truly value their privacy for one reason or another! Are these the people we want to hurt here?!
http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V
The one exception is Ottela's Tinfoil Chat. It needs a robust, low-level implementation instead of Python. Yet, he cleverly dodged much of the TCB problem by creatively applying what he learned from others plus input we gave him on Schneier's blog for high assurance security & general improvements. So, you can build on and use that* but the rest depend on what top-tier and organized crime can buy attacks for. Ridiculous....
* Again, without Python and with TCB enhancements. OpenBSD at the least for its lower 0-days.
Also the fact that it doesn't even have end-to-end encryption by default means it shouldn't even be in the same class as "secure messengers". It's better suited in the Skype/Hangouts class of apps.
Once you are more or less identified as a terrorist, from the point of view of an intelligence organization, they might be sad to not get the content of the messages, but is they can have the graph of your contact, they'll be more than happy (and find the weakest link in there).
Incidentally I have also checked that the Telegram and Signal app are requesting a Location permission on Android. I don't know if it is sent to some sort of central server, but this does seem not safe if youe life depends on it.
Everything else—including the company's cocky and downright insulting attitude—doesn't matter nearly as much. I actually think a lot of what they say gets lost in translation.
We recently integrated with Telegram (without their knowledge, support, or blessing, of course—because Telegram), which sent me on a little research journey. Results are here: https://sameroom.io/blog/announcing-support-for-telegram/
edit: atm. 111 points and I love that. Wish pg could fix my karma, I really like even numbers and I feel that the karma crave is addictive..
btw. I agree with you. It's clever and the tools intelligence services have created for these purposes are fascinating
But I think Pavel Durov should make a system that gives up terrorists' communications if it detects indicators eg words that will lead to planning a violent attack. And without informing everyone about it.
BTW, if Telegram crypto was that much insecure why members of the so-called "security community" haven't yet compromised the Telegram chat for real (regardless of any contests and petty rules) and proven they had been right?
I don't rule out this as impossible - I just think that without such proof it's all just a kind of stupid whining.