Let's not talk about realistic AI for a moment, let's talk about hypothetically building a human protein by protein (or whatever building block you're comfortable with saying doesn't have qualia on its own). We're going to write the computer program to build this human. Nanobots will carry it out, every part of the process is understood and nothing is left for biology to do for us. We're just putting together lego blocks and at the end is a human indistinguishable from any other human.
Does this person experience qualia? How would you know? Apparently you can't just ask, since this isn't a valid thing to do with a computer (it's not really experiencing qualia! It's just saying that!).
Let's just say you come up with some objective qualia test. Now we can build a slightly more deficient human protein by protein and test it for qualia. In fact, we can do a qualia binary search and...
Once you take apart the argument like this, it's easy to see that arguments that computers can't experience qualia are arguments against materialism or reductionism, or are patent attempts to sneak souls and other woo into the discussion.
If you forget your fear of "soul" and other terms not ratified by science journals, you'll find out there are plenty of theories in metaphysics and spirituality on what it means to be and what awareness is. It requires you to at the very least read those philosophical/theological concepts instead of dismissing it as "woo". Cattle dwellers in India wrote many things about it eons ago. Joseph Campbell's work is a nice place to start.
I have encountered these theories. In the past I have been under the sway of them. They can be interesting to think about, but without any evidence for them there isn't any reason to give them particular consideration. (I am including rational, mathematical, or logical arguments based on experimental evidence as evidence here)
Without evidence, how do we pick which of these myriad theories to believe? How do we decide what the actual answer is? Science and materialism have repeatedly produced predictions that pan out in experiments. Theories of souls and sprituality have repeatedly had to retreat from testable predictions.
To take another tack, how did these spiritual theories come about? If they're true, then the ancient theorist must have seen some phenomena in the real world, and extrapolated correctly from that evidence. If that's the case, these ancient theorists were unparalleled geniuses, but we don't need to worry about ancient spiritual theories themselves, we'll rediscover them in time through our plodding (but safe) scientific method. If we don't rediscover them, then they were interesting theories that didn't pan out.
I'm glad we're discussing this because you're an example of the kind of thinking that is a mystery to me.
The fact that I have qualia when looking at, for example, the color yellow, is directly knowable by means of just a little introspection. This is not "rational, mathematical, or logical" or based on "experimental evidence". It is simply direct observation. Observation is where the scientific processes you name start. Observation does not depend on those processes. They depend on it and build from it. Observations are the most fundamental thing.
From the direct observation of your experience of yellowness, which I think you must agree is something more than merely classifying the wavelength as being in a certain range, I would think you would know that qualia exist. That is enough evidence.
"How do we decide what the actual answer is? Science and materialism have repeatedly produced predictions that pan out in experiments. Theories of souls and sprituality have repeatedly had to retreat from testable predictions."
So, let's not have a theory of souls or spirituality at this point. We don't know enough. That doesn't mean that those things don't exist, it only means we don't understand them.
Suppose a cave man-level creature on another planet encounters an iPhone because we somehow send one there. This cave man creature knows how to build fires and has used reasoning to make weapons, etc. In doing those things, he probably tried different ideas about how best to make fires and rejected the ones that didn't work well. In other words, he has a rudimentary understanding of the scientific method.
Now he tries to figure out how an iPhone works. He constructs theories based on what he knows. The theories are all shown, over hundreds of years, to be wrong. Therefore, he is told, iPhones don't exist because when he constructs theories about them, they are wrong.
But he directly observes the existence of the iPhone because he holds it in his hand. He knows they exist. He doesn't need a scientific theory to prove that they exist. Maybe, eventually, he will have a correct scientific theory as to how they work; it will just take more time. Or maybe he never will. Either way, iPhones exist.
Awareness is, in my view, exactly the same, and it is mystifying to me that people such as yourself come to a different conclusion.
Yes, that's the point. He has "experimental evidence" (aka something observable) right there in his hand. Understanding of how it works is immaterial for the question of existence (if you're not a constructivist :) So then we use that as analogy to look back at the question at hand:
> From the direct observation of your experience of yellowness, which I think you must agree is something more than merely classifying the wavelength as being in a certain range, I would think you would know that qualia exist. That is enough evidence.
Enough evidence of what? Certainly evidence of internal thoughts and feelings. I don't see how you can demonstrate anything beyond that, with or without an understand of how that "thing" might work.
What we shouldn't do, is say humans have qualia and jump to the conclusion that machines can't have qualia, and can't be "aware" in the same sense a human can be. I apologize if that wasn't your intended argument.
"What we shouldn't do, is say humans have qualia and jump to the conclusion that machines can't have qualia, and can't be "aware" in the same sense a human can be. I apologize if that wasn't your intended argument."
No, we can't make that jump. But my intuition as a programmer (and one who is interested in A.I. and does A.I. in the sense that some of my mathematical ideas were incorporated into a number of spam filter products) is that they don't. There is simply nothing there that would "add" awareness to the algorithm. All there is is information processing. It can classify something as either having the attribute of yellowness or not. But something beyond that functionality is required to have it experience the qualia of yellowness.
My point is that we have no idea what that something extra is. Somehow, people have it. But we don't know how. There are hypotheses, like those of Roger Penrose who discuss quantum phenomena as possibly being behind it, as made manifest in certain microscope structures in the brain. Suppose Penrose is right. Then, maybe one day a quantum computer can incorporate the same phenomena and be conscious for the same reasons we are.
But I do not believe that, for example, a spam filter as we know it today has the slightest experience of qualia. There is just no "room" for it. Everything in the spam filter has a specific function for the classification task and has nothing to do with experiencing qualia. The same is true for the most complicated deep learning network.
Maybe software as we know it can induce qualia as some kind of an emergent phenomenon, and the brain also induces it through some kind of emergent phenomenon. But I tend to hypothesize there would be something that causes that, some mechanism that the emergent phenomenon grows out of, that is not embodied in something like a current-day deep learning network.
My hypothesis is that to create a machine that experiences qualia, we will first understand the mechanism behind our own experience of qualia, and then reproduce that mechanism in a machine. I hypothesize that this would be a new and extremely fundamental, and transforming, scientific discovery.
And if we do reproduce that mechanism in a machine, and THEN that machine passes the Turing Test without us programming mechanisms to merely MIMIC human behavior, then I'll tend to assume that we've created a truly conscious entity -- though we may never be able to completely prove it.
On the other hand, there's no reason to assume we'll ever discover how it works -- for instance, we can't rule out the idea that there is a God who doles out souls to human bodies, and that we'll never have the means to understand God or souls. I don't believe that's the case -- but plenty of people do, and we can't presently prove they're wrong.
From my experience with machine learning I think that we (humans) dont need to understand a problem to be able to build a tool (AI) which can solve that problem. The necessity of understanding problems in order to solve them is obsolete :-P
I've read them. They are, from a scientific point-of-view, all woo. Almost by definition. They necessarily appeal -- if they can be epistemologically justified at all -- to a non-utilitarian epistemology. Science is based on a radically utilitarian epistemology: claims are justified to the extent that they are demonstrably useful in explaining and predicting observed phenomena. Theories -- in the non-scientific sense, obviously -- that involve entities that produce results in the physical universe but which are not governed by physical law or controlled by physical events as they are conjectured to be outside of the physical universe -- are non-utilitarian. They are irrelevant to any predictive model of observed behavior, and it is impossible to distinguish by observation between the existence of such non-physical, uncaused causes and processes that are purely physical. Either (a) there exists an adequate scientific model of the process, in which case the model being an accurate model of an underlying physical process is indistinguishable from the uncaused cause merely mimicking the behavior of the model at the times it has been observed, or (b) there exists no adequate scientific model, in which case the physical process not yet being discovered is indistinguishable from a non-physical cause.
That's not to say that such conjectures cannot be true, just that they can never be validated or distinguished from either known or unknown physical processes.
Say we create a machine that behaves like a human to all outward measures. There is no way to distinguish between:
(1) Human and machine alike being purely physical,
(2) Humans having metaphysical features like a "soul" and internal awareness and machine simply mimicking behavior,
(3) Humans and machines alike having metaphysical features like a "soul" (perhaps because God chose to reward human ingenuity by creating a "soul" for the machine.)
I avoided "Pragmatist" specifically because I'm familiar enough to know it refers to a philosophical school of thought that touches on the epistemological questions I was referring to, but not quite certain that the exact position I was referring to was within its scope (I knew it was along the same general lines.)
To me, that's kind of a silly question. Yes, it might be true. Of course, it might be that there are no other human beings and I'm just a brain in a vat. I just find that hypothesis to be too unlikely to care about.
"We're just putting together lego blocks and at the end is a human indistinguishable from any other human. Does this person experience qualia?"
I would guess so.
"How would you know?" For me, this is a little like your first question. I wouldn't necessarily know. But if this entity is physically indistinguishable from a human at even the most infinitesimal level of physical reality, I'd assume it experiences.
But, I may be wrong here, because it might be that there is something non-physical called a "soul" that resides in humans, and a physically identical entity might not be provided with one by God or whoever/whatever the soul-provider is. That's not what I tend to assume, but I have no evidence either way.
Your question "How would you know" is an interesting one because it assumes that it matters whether or not an observer knows. Maybe some entities have awareness and others don't, and an observer can't tell the difference. So what? That wouldn't imply, in any way, that the phenomenon of awareness doesn't exist.
"Once you take apart the argument like this, it's easy to see that arguments that computers can't experience qualia are arguments against materialism or reductionism, or are patent attempts to sneak souls and other woo into the discussion."
That doesn't mean that such arguments/hypotheses aren't true. It just means they may not be testable using the scientific method. Much as many people don't like the multiverse theory because it may not be testable using the scientific method. But that merely means that there are limits to the truths that can be discovered by the scientific method; it doesn't change the reality of what is true.
It's a bit reminiscent of Godel's completeness theorem. Many great mathematicians assumed that there were no truths that weren't provable within the systems they were studying; Godel proved that such assumptions were simply wrong.
Consider this - if conscious observers didn't exist, in what sense would anything else exist?
If I told you that right now there is a universe out there which you can never detect nor deduce its existence from any evidence in the one you're exposed to. You won't be able to verify its existence in your lifetime. But, I tell you, it EXISTS! What doss that mean?
If you say it's meaningless, you'd be onto something. Furthermore if I told you that, if you wash your hands you'll be killing 10 innocent little bunnies in that universe. Will you stop washing your hands? No. You will err on the side of that undetectabld universe and bunnies not existing - after all how have I come to possess this knowledge if you don't?
If anything, you'd say that universe can only exist in the sense that some conscious observer in the future will VERIFY ITS EXISTENCE.
Now, if you subscribe to atheism, then in order to even build a machine, you need an intelligent animal that arose organically. So, in what sense would OUR universe exist if humans never arose?
YOU SEE even the concept of existence is tied into our subjective experience! It is the dual of it and equally mysterious. Why is there something rather than nothing, indeed?
> [A] universe can only exist in the sense that some conscious observer in the future will VERIFY ITS EXISTENCE.
> So, in what sense would OUR universe exist if humans never arose?
I think things exist independently of whether anyone is observing them. That's because "observing" is just a description of a bunch of particles interacting with each other. Some of those particles are part of a larger pattern of particles we call human brains. There's nothing particularly unique about our brains in terms of physics.
At a higher level, we can look at the interactions between our brains and the environment and think about brains as a different kind of thing. A pattern recognizer, a prediction maker, an effective evolutionary adaptation that leads to the propagation of the genes that create it. But there's no reason to suspect it creates universes.
I absolutely agree that a lot about our brains is mysterious and there are a lot of questions that need answers. The next few decades are going to be very interesting as we discover many of those secrets. I just don't think we'll discover that among those secrets is the ability to make universes real or not.
Certainly, we can only observe the universe we are in and phenomena that are within our light cone. But that's a limitation on us, not on universes.
Can you define what existence means as you use the term?
To illustrate the difference, look at the universe before intelligence evolved. The most reasonable scenario is that this universe existed, even though there were no observers. Something was going on before anyone was looking, because that process led to the creation of intelligence.
It's possible that the universe didn't truly exist until consciousness existed to be aware of it. That it popped into existence once consciousness did, and everything just happened to be consistent with a universe that already existed beforehand for billions of years. But that's a pretty surprising theory. It's much more likely the universe just already existed.
Or do we? You'd have to define the word "exist" in some terms that relate it to things we are familiar with. Otherwise it is meaningless. That's my point. Trying to define existence is like trying to explain consciousness. If you think consciousness explained by souls is "woo" perhaps you should consider the nature of your concept of existence! You take it for granted and use it in a sentence without really exploring its definition.
This seems to be a misjudgement. There are actually plenty of people who have studied traditional philosophy and dualistic approaches to consciousness for years and eventually arrived at a naturalistic conclusion after they've studied neuroscience. I would actually be very much interested in the numbers for the opposite case: How many subscribers to dualism have knowledge in neuroscience, human behavioral biology, the theory of evolution and physics?
This is literally the point of Turing's thought experiment: if a machine gives you answers indistinguishable from a human, is it alive?
These thought experiments are very interesting and thought provoking. But - still - it's a mathematician asking if something is alive/human. Not the most authoritative source on the subject matter.
The original computers were women in warehouses calculating actuary tables. They had a set of criteria to perform evaluations of numbers.
In short, you can reduce a subset of the human experience to algorithmic emulation, which, in effect, reduces a human to a computer. It's sort of what it means to do any job to be frank.
> In short, you can reduce a subset of the human experience to algorithmic emulation, which, in effect, reduces a human to a computer.
You're underestimating everything associated with being human. The computer won't make mistakes because a familiar is sick. He won't perform slower than usual because he slept less. He won't have a urge to poop affecting is performance, also. This is somewhat what I meant: these thought experiments are interesting, but if you look closer there's really not much to them. Human computers were, of course, computing. They didn't, however, became "not human".
Race conditions cause mistakes. Seems similar to having your mind elsewhere.
> He won't perform slower than usual because he slept less.
Didn't clean up memoery so now your computer is resource starved and running slower.
> He won't have a urge to poop affecting is performance,
GC pause.
I feel like people often focus too much on the "implementation" when it comes to consciousness. Beyond what instinct gives us, which is really just a pre defined set of conditionals, everything we know and understand is learned, programmed in a way. I don't see why it's unfeasible that given enough time and the right environment that an AI could do the same.
> Beyond what instinct gives us, which is really just a pre defined set of conditionals,
I don't think even neuroscientists have a definite answer to this. However, computer people - as always - do. That's, I think, the problem. A KISS approach is great; being oblivious of complexity isn't.
I don't think computer people think they have the definite answer, it's just easy to apply familiar abstractions to things when they map well. Plus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fixed_action_pattern seems quite like a conditional to me, and neuroscientists seems to agree. Comparing things at a higher level doesn't mean being oblivious to the lower levels, it just means it's outside the scope you care about. If we could 1:1 replicate every single possible input/output/decision/etc that happens in the human brain with transistors and have the exact same properties as a human when interacting with it, does it really matter if the path to get to those interactions is different? To me, it doesn't. We don't define people by which neurons fire in their brain, we define them by the actions and decisions those chemical reactions cause, and I don't see why it should be any different if they're made of silicon.
So you'll consider it impossible up to the point when such a machine exists?
No one says it is impossible.
It is more a question of whether our current efforts are enough to get us to the point.
Can we get to another galaxy? Probably, if we have enough resources and we discover enough to do it, and we actually go through with it. But it can seem unlikely, even given an unlimited amount of time.
Not to mention that we as a species may be facing a severe catastrophe in the future as a result of how we have populated this planet in the last 200 years. Hopefully we can avoid it, but once again are you sure?
I don't find it hard to assume that algorithms will one day be able to write posts that an observer may classify as seeming to be heartfelt.
But that doesn't mean that the machine actually experienced anything in writing it. That it's "heartfelt"-seeming post was actually felt by the algorithm at all.
"This is literally the point of Turing's thought experiment: if a machine gives you answers indistinguishable from a human, is it alive?"
Turing assumed it was. I think the issues are orthogonal. If it is indistinguishable by a human, all that means that I can see is that it's a very effective mimic, not that it has awareness.
Do you think that everyone reading that experienced it as heartfelt?
Did you have the "awareness" that it was heartfelt from birth, or did you only know that because you can recognize that it's much like other writing described as "heartfelt", that is, is it something you learned?
If you did in fact learn it, which I assume you did, since we're not born knowing language or even what heartfelt means, why do think that an AI couldn't learn the same? Do you think that how you "experience" it is universal to all humans? Or does it come from things you've encountered in the past.
Regarding your argument about being aware of the color yellow upthread, have you asked someone that is red-green colorblind how they tell the difference or how they experience red and green? It's clearly not the same as people who can see the full "visible spectrum", so do they not have awareness of those colors?
In the past when I asked a friend of mine who is red-green colorblind how he can distinguish the difference, he told me it was because he'd seen things people call red or green in the past. I asked if it was the same as the difference between colors, he said yes, but more like the difference between teal and a slightly different teal. So if you were never told what yellow is, would you be aware of it, or just know it as a slightly different orange? Personally, I know what colors are only because I know what other things of the same color look like, the same wavelength hits my retina so I know that it's the same color. How is this any different from an AI recognizing that?
Because I wrote that original post, and I had experiences while writing it. I know that from direct observation and I don't need other evidence.
"Regarding your argument about being aware of the color yellow upthread, have you asked someone that is red-green colorblind how they tell the difference or how they experience red and green? It's clearly not the same as people who can see the full "visible spectrum", so do they not have awareness of those colors??"
Yes, I was wondering if someone would bring that up, but my point wasn't that they have the exact same experience of yellow as me, but rather that they have an experience of a color (or sound, or taste, or anything) at all. And sure, some people experience fewer colors. That doesn't change the argument.
"I asked if it was the same as the difference between colors, he said yes, but more like the difference between teal and a slightly different teal." Interesting!
Well I said "a" heartfelt seeming post, not that specific one. If an AI told me the same thing, what difference would that make? I have nothing but the word of the author. How do I know you're not just an AI, and does it make any difference if you used neurons or transistors to come up with the concepts expressed? To me, the difference is meaningless.
> but rather that they have an experience of a color
But what defines that experience? Is it not just a wavelength of light hitting your eye, and your brain interpreting it?
I also find it interesting that you addressed the questions that were easy to refute, and left most of them unanswered. I am genuinely curious on your thoughts, as I find your conclusions as mystifying as you find mine.
EDIT: > And sure, some people experience fewer colors.
Ah, but do they experience fewer colors, or do they experience them differently? Since the wavelength of a color isn't what defines experiencing it, then what does? And surely you can't say they don't experience it just because of the wavelength.
This question was asked and answered concerning blue and green:
"The Himba tribe from northern Namibia, for instance, does not classify green and blue separately, the way Westerners do, but it does differentiate among various shades of what we call green. And when tested, members of the tribe, who are likely to have trouble with blue-green distinctions that most Westerners make easily, readily distinguish among greens that tend to look the same to Western eyes."
http://6thfloor.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/its-not-easy-se...
What you experience when you see yellow is what you experience when you see yellow. Nothing more can be said about it and it cannot be compared to anyone elses experience of yellow, human or machine.
So if you make that experience a condition for calling another being intelligent, you are effectively saying that nothing but yourself can ever be intelligent.
You need to break down that thing you call experience of yellow or awareness of yellow and explain what properties it has (intension) or you need to be able to show that it influences the behaviour of humans in a way in which machines cannot be influenced by it (extension).
I think you are confusing the principles of whether an observer can determine whether an entity has an attribute with the question of whether it does in fact have that attribute. But those are entirely different issues because, for one thing, the observer may simply not have the tools yet to make such a judgement.
Matter is made of atoms. For a long time we did not have the tools to determine that. But that didn't change the fact that it was, and is, true.
Now suppose the human race died out before it ever developed such tools. Obviously, it would still be true.
Now suppose that due to our limited intellectual abilities or for some other reason, it never was, or will be, possible to ever develop such tools. To me, it's obvious that that has no bearing on the truth of the proposition any more than if we didn't have time to develop the tools.
Similarly, the question of whether you have awareness is independent of whether I or any other third party can prove you do.
But I do agree with you in that the question you asked is worth asking. Not even mentioning the issue is certainly a frequent mistake made by authors taking a purely technological perspective.
No... I'm not inviting you to be convinced based on my experience. I'm inviting you to notice how you yourself feel when you yourself look at something yellow. My bet is that you'll experience that which is referred to in the literature as "qualia".
So if someone built a very complex machine that was able to communicate with me like a human, and if that machine claimed to feel something very specific at the sight of yellow, it would not feel right for me to say "no, you're not feeling anything like a human would feel" because I don't know how other humans feel. I have no way of comparing my own feelings with those of other humans or non humans.
:-p
Which is all we might be doing with each other as well. That awareness could merely be an illusion and there's even some evidence to think it is. Experiments show your brain makes a decision before you are consciously aware of it despite you thinking you made the decision consciously. That leads to the conclusion that awareness is simply a lie your brains tells itself to feel in control.
I have begun to suspect that our concepts of consciousness and morality are the result of our language and the way we have defined them. With morality is has become clear to me that personal duties are relative to personal goals. That is, "X should do Y" is incoherent, it really implies "X should do Y if X wants Z to happen" which is what the colloquial understanding is. Always being careful to mention Z removes any feeling of mysticism from morality!!
Perhaps with statements about consciousness, the situation is similar. I couldn't really formulate any sort of mystical question once I was carefully adding the SUBJECT of each sentence explicitly in.
The main question I have about consciousness is not about the processing - that can be explained mechanistically. But about the final result of perceiving this orchestra - why am I in my brain and not anyone else's? What is this extra element that is required for the conscious experience and can we ever be sure a machine we built is really subjectively perceiving anything in that metaphysical sense?
Thoughts?
I've been wondering about this for a few years, can't find anything about that because it's too generic a search term. Is there a name, or references about this ?
ps: ha, these in-thread answers already give pointers https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9864468 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9864479
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I disagree: it would be mimicking the output of an entity that is mimicking....
My point is that these qualia arguments are begging the question, because they posit some 'real' entity that is somehow different from all the 'mimics', despite the fact that no-one is saying what the difference between them is.
Which one do you really want to build in a computer? The intelligence, plainly.
Purple is the weird one as it doesn't correspond to a wavelength, but can only be represented by a set.
Edit - all colours correspond to sets of sets, if you think about it, as you can experience exactly the same colour for essentially an infinite set of different sets of frequencies.
For me, the real question of interest is not about that kind of intelligence, but of "awareness". Computers may process environmental information and perform all sorts of logical operations based on it. But there is zero reason to think that any computer has any awareness whatsoever. It has no experience. There is something it is like to experience the color yellow, as opposed to merely classifying observed light as being of a certain wavelength; no computer has begun, in any way, to make that leap.
It seems like a lot of people, including the author, don't even notice that this is a question. They seem to assume that computer-like information processing is all that happens in a human mind, and that awareness itself doesn't even exist as something to ponder. So they equate any doubt about whether a computer can do what we do as a form of vitalism.
But with just a little bit of introspection, the fact that there is something it is like to experience the color yellow, as opposed to classifying a visual stimulus as being of a certain wavelength, or logically classifying it as having the attribute of "yellowness", is absolutely clear -- and absolutely fundamental to our existence as human beings (although many would assume that many other forms of life also have this basic ability to experience, if not the same ability to process information in computer-like ways).
This is why, for me, the Turing Test is orthogonal to the question of whether a machine is actually conscious. I have no problem imagining that a software system, even on hardware that is basically the same as what we have now but bigger and faster, will one day be able to pass the Turing Test. But that doesn't prove it has any experience of the color yellow; it merely means it can mimic the output of an entity that does.