Look back at floppy disks: while many people were caught by the write-protect tab/switch while they were still learning, it was an easy concept for people to understand once taught. I knew many non-technical people that quickly adopted habits that utilized write-protection.
The physical interlock is something that can be taught a lot easier than how to use crypto without screwing up. If you require proactive checking or fancy technique, it will be forgotten and skipped. On the other hand, if you fail the update with a message "did you forget to flip the write-protect switch? [picture of switch]", a lot of people will figure it out.
There are similarities to Schneier's (et al) recommendation to make good (long, random) passwords, but write them down and keep them someplace safe. (i.e. leverage the physical security knowledge that people already have)
It's actually specified in the SD spec [1], which says on p. 38 that the mechanical protect switch is "Host responsibility only" and that the "The position of the write protect switch is unknown to the internal circuitry of the card."
1. https://www.sdcard.org/downloads/pls/simplified_specs/part1_... [pdf file]
Hardware write protection is harder to find than you think..
The ultimate solution would be to make HDD firmware open-source, just like Coreboot for BIOSes, so the truly paranoid could download, verify, compile, and flash their drives themselves. Unfortunately, I don't see this happening due to all the trade secrets (including some existing backdoors into passworded drives that you can find on data recovery forums, but obviously manufacturers don't want you to know about...) that are likely involved.
To access a BIOS passworded drive all you had to do was swap it for another for which you knew the password, boot into the BIOS and change the HDD password. It will ask you for your old password, you enter it and you go to the new password input screen. Now you take out the HDD and put the locked one in its place. You press enter twice, setting the password as blank, and voilá, you have your locked drive unlocked. Just boot the computer and no more HDD password. Have fun.
Some targets may fall under surveillance and not acquire new hardware for long periods of time. Years.
As an example of a rather serious firmware update that likely went unnoticed by most drive owners, some Samsung F4 EcoGreen hard drives (the ones Samsung actually made before the Seagate buyout) had a serious bug[1] that caused data corruption if a specific S.M.A.R.T. command was issued to the drive during normal operation:
"The above suggests that the disk sometimes discards a
pending 64 sector write command when a IDENTIFY DEVICE
command is received. This data loss occurs silently.
There is no error message in kernel log, SMART Error log,
NCQ Command Error log page, or SATA Phy Event Counters
log page."
Manufacturers can't notify people directly about these things unless buyers contact info is submitted along with info about which specific drive model they own. I don't know if this patch was pushed out via Windows Update but I'd bet it wasn't. I only heard about it because Smartmontools warned me.Samsung fixed it in a firmware update but neglected to bump the version number of the firmware, so it's impossible to tell which drives have been fixed. As a result, it's quite easy to assume your drive is fine, so Smartmontools will print this in any system with any HD204UI or HD155UI detected:
==> WARNING: Using smartmontools or hdparm with this
drive may result in data loss due to a firmware bug.
****** THIS DRIVE MAY OR MAY NOT BE AFFECTED! ******
Buggy and fixed firmware report same version number!
See the following web pages for details:
http://knowledge.seagate.com/articles/en_US/FAQ/223571en
http://www.smartmontools.org/wiki/SamsungF4EGBadBlocks
[1] http://www.smartmontools.org/wiki/SamsungF4EGBadBlocksEven ignoring that, let's move on to... enterprise storage. I don't foresee someone with a 1200 disk storage array being enthused at the prospect of popping out drives one at a time to be able to update firmware (something that is currently an online operation).
http://www.samsung.com/global/business/semiconductor/minisit...
Now tedu being a BSD guy ;) probably is finding out some other way but I'm going to guess the vast majority of SSD customers have a Windows or Mac computer and just go with the utility provided by the hardware vendor, Samsung or some other company.
eg: http://www.hynix.com/datasheet/pdf/flash/HY27UF084G2M%20Seri...
For HDD firmware, I think it's something that should not be updatable at all through regular software; instead it's something manufacturers should be getting right before shipping product. I've owned disks from over two decades ago, and not once have I needed to update any firmware on them.
Somehow I feel that this "update culture" has just lead to more problems due to propagating an attitude of "it can always be updated later", where shipping devices with imperfect firmware becomes almost acceptable and it can sometimes become a case of fixing one bug and introducing others.
Don't forget feature bloat & the increased attack surface they inevitably create.
http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1283
"Locate the programmer's button on the side of the iMac, to the right of the reset button. Press and hold in the programmer's button. You may need to use a pen or a straightened paper clip."
Which they stopped making around 2003. Further the button was accessible from the outside.
Apple would likely just ask you to bring it into the Apple store.
http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201966
http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1378
Here's one from Lenovo:
http://support.lenovo.com/us/en/downloads/migr-62282
With suitable search terms you'll find similar updates from other OEMs.
Presumably stock external flash parts are okay, but it's still conceivable that evil circuitry could cause a write, or at least an addressing "mistake".
Yeah, I'm a suspicious cuss.
That is not a solution for this. You have to assume that a state-level attacker will be able to either coerce the vendor or its employees into signing malicious firmware or just compromise their network and steal the signing key.
The right way to secure firmware updates is with a hardware write-enable switch/jumper that has to be physically set to make any changes to the firmware.