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Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by phobitor on Friday August 01, 2014 @06:54PM (#8123269)
What about its design makes it secure? Do you guys have a design document or a description of how you've implemented security? Have any security experts audited the code?
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by irungentoo on Friday August 01, 2014 @07:15PM (#8123344)
Every peer is identified by a curve25519 public key. To add someone as a friend, you add that public key.

Connections between friends are encrypted.

http://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html

is the crypto used.

https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore/blob/master/docs/Tox_m...

describes the protocol used to connect securely to friends after they find themselves.

This protocol has PFS, message padding to prevent length based leaking and should be immune against replay attacks.

What makes it secure is that you know the long term public key of your friends making it really easy for the software to establish secure connections to them.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by nly on Friday August 01, 2014 @07:26PM (#8123375)
Are IP addresses encrypted in the DHT?
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by irungentoo on Friday August 01, 2014 @08:05PM (#8123504)
Instead of doing things like encrypting ips, peers have temporary DHT public keys.

The only way to get the ip of someone from their Tox id is by knowing their public DHT key which they will only send you if they are your friend.

How this works is described in detail: https://github.com/irungentoo/toxcore/blob/master/docs/Preve...

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by gcb0 on Saturday August 02, 2014 @12:49AM (#8124042)
this sounds insane. but im not familiar with all the concepts. it seems that now instead of alice and bob exposing their real keys, you have node a, b, c and d exposing theirs during bob handshake... which will lead to sociopath nodes that wont be part of this, but rely on nodes that accepts it for them.

also, if the message is encrypted, why not use a "torrent" of all the messages being shared and discarded after a while (no need for offline messages anyway) and each node decrypts its own as they please but relay all of them in the same stream? no way to know who could decode it. and it was delivered to everyone. much like a bitcoin transaction, but without the metadata.

it would probably be vulnerable to a dos by flooding it with bogus, expensive to try to read, requests... but will be the most reliable and private you can get

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by Byzantine on Friday August 01, 2014 @09:11PM (#8123661)
So basically, everybody who gives out their Tox ID on 4chan is also giving out their IP address. Great.
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by irungentoo on Friday August 01, 2014 @09:26PM (#8123685)
No.

They have to be friends with you.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by Byzantine on Friday August 01, 2014 @09:44PM (#8123715)
But you don't have to actually know them. If they posted their Tox ID on 4chan, which happens all the time, and they accept my friend request, I would have their IP address, correct?
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by tokenizerrr on Saturday August 02, 2014 @01:20AM (#8124083)
How else would you connect to them in decentralized fashion? Your IP address isn't really useful information anyway.

Note that being friends in this context means the users have added each other.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by 1ris on Saturday August 02, 2014 @05:54AM (#8124529)
You could implement onion routing. But yes, you are right the IP address is usually a useless piece of information.
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by tokenizerrr on Saturday August 02, 2014 @01:42PM (#8125397)
True, but for VOIP that is guaranteed to be terribly slow.
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by JoeAltmaier on Saturday August 02, 2014 @06:03AM (#8124535)
Ip addresses change. Sometimes they don't even work for P2P. Without ICE or something its hard to even know your public IP address programmatically. So often some kind of proxy or server is necessary for most people. True decentralized connections are a sketchy proposition.
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by alex_duf on Friday August 01, 2014 @07:13PM (#8123341)
This is a good question. What makes it secure ? "encryption" is not enough. Do you have central servers or is it protocol using P2P ? how do you connect one client to another ? What kind of encryption ? How are the key generated, can we change them etc...
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by dredmorbius on Friday August 01, 2014 @10:00PM (#8123748)
"Secure" is a lot of things.

"Secure against bulk surveillance" is a big push in a lot of areas, it's a button Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen have been pushing hard for the past year or so. See especially their joint lecture at Columbia Law School in December, 2013, and Schneier's presentation to Stanford Law School in April, 2014 (both are on http://FixYT.com).

Anonymized persistent IDs associated with physical / persistent IP addresses represents a different level of threat, particularly for those who are engaged in activities for which concern from a APT (advanced persistent threat) such as a state actor, with either legal impunity or significant resources, or both, is a concern. In that case, I'd want to see a system with repudiable identifiers and Onion routing such that endpoints aren't clearly determinable.

That said, yours is a crucial question.

Related: what are the threat models against which Tox is a response?

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by irungentoo on Saturday August 02, 2014 @09:58AM (#8124905)
Our threat model is an attacker that wants to read and record the contents of conversations between everyone, they have the ability to modify/add/remove and log any packets. We assume they do not have any access to the actual machines Tox is running on.

The main goal of Tox is to make it hard for a global threat to conduct mass surveillance on everyone at the same time without sacrificing performance.

If the majority of the people using Tox have "nothing to hide" and use it because it works better than skype, the minority that does need the crypto will be able to use it without being discriminated against.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by dredmorbius on Saturday August 02, 2014 @10:01PM (#8126760)
Thanks, that's a nice and concise statement.

NB, a comment by Peter da Silva, who's been doing networking / communications / security stuff for quite a while:

"Don't like the callback model in the API, they need a version of tox_wait() that takes a select() fd mask."

https://plus.google.com/u/0/104092656004159577193/posts/MDYU...

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by kragniz on Friday August 01, 2014 @08:01PM (#8123491)
The whole protocol is decentralized and peer to peer. Each person in the network has a public and private key. The NaCl library is used to do all of the encryption.
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by alex_duf on Friday August 01, 2014 @08:29PM (#8123570)
Cool. Is this direct connection from peer to peer or does the communication bounce from one node to another as a TOR communication would do ? (I'm guessing direct for obvious latency reasons when using audio / video)
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by irungentoo on Friday August 01, 2014 @08:39PM (#8123602)
Direct connection when possible.

Connection routed over one TCP node when direct connections are impossible due to NAT issues.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by walterbell on Friday August 01, 2014 @10:26PM (#8123805)
Does only the one-time signalling handshake go to a TCP node (NAT hole punching) or does all traffic? Are these TCP nodes similar to Skype "super-peers" - how are they selected?

Virtually all consumers are behind NAT devices.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by irungentoo on Friday August 01, 2014 @10:50PM (#8123845)
The majority of NATs can be hole punched.

If you can't hole punch then you will connect to your friend through a couple TCP nodes. They act like relays.

TCP nodes are pretty much randomly selected by peers and anyone can host them.

Everything is encrypted and TCP nodes are regarded as being possibly hostile so there should not be any security issues.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by sitkack on Friday August 01, 2014 @09:25PM (#8123683)
What if I don't want a direct connection for security/anon reasons?
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by eps on Saturday August 02, 2014 @03:43AM (#8124349)
Do you have exact crypto spec somewhere?

"NaCl library" is not a spec and it's still easy to use/apply it incorrectly.

Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by kragniz on Saturday August 02, 2014 @07:24AM (#8124646)
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by stqism on Friday August 01, 2014 @07:10PM (#8123330)
An audit is currently planned when the core stabilizes.
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by aalvarado on Friday August 01, 2014 @07:20PM (#8123361)
FAQ says it's using the NaCl crypto library, so I guess its protocol is as strong as the encryption. The audit would be less ambiguous, because so many other factors could come into play for all parts of an app, not just the communications part.
Re:Tox: A simple, distributed, free, secure Skype replacemen... by stqism on Friday August 01, 2014 @07:31PM (#8123398)
Yeah, it's more about the implementation and the design of the network/dht itself.