This seems to me to be the major takeaway for organisations outside github from this sorry affair. I'm sort of surprised you are the only person to raise this so far.
In the UK, the employee who resigned could have a successful day in an employment tribunal. And one aspect of the hearing would be privacy and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act provisions.
The right to be sued for libel whenever they write something that someone else doesn't like?
Employment rights however are slightly better. The employee interviewed in the OA would have recourse to an employment tribunal for what used to be called 'constructive dismissal' - the terminology may have changed recently. The monetary compensation would be quite basic by Valley standards, but the public exposure of the employers, subject to cross-examination, would be most satisfying I imagine.
Get all their details, and complain if you think you were treated unfairly.
Unfortunately, this doesn't invalidate the fact that you're correct in a way. If Simon Singh hadn't been able to afford the time and money to defend this case, the libel suit would probably have stood.
Still, it's a step in the right direction, and an important legal precedent.
If this happened in my company, lawyers would be crafting a settlement right now.
'They purposefully allow this glaringly obvious mechanism for insulting and annoying their members and are actually involved in the joke. Until I broke their server they were all laughing at my "testing", then they were pissed when they had to fix the bug I found. If you don't believe me, look at the HackerNewsTips twitter account, which I know is astroturfed by a github employee.'
In one of the first few paragraphs, there's this block:
"The other piece of information you need to understand is that there's a sort of running hidden gag among the Ruby Iluminati (aka Rubynati) within San Francisco. Employees from Engine Yard, PowerSet, and ... github love this joke where they create code that generates ASCII art penis pictures and then force other people onto their project without permission. Here's another one called dicks by Martin Emde."
It's a shame that companies doing some useful things have to encourage a culture of brutish behavior.
That assumes that the story, as told in the accusation, is completely accurate. One could envision a scenario where the founder felt his wife may be able to relate to the situation better and could actually assist the accuser. However, in spite of best intentions, its possible that the wife's actions were misinterpreted by the accuser. Until Github or the wife gives their side of the story, perhaps withholding judgement is the optimal strategy.
Yes, but its the difference between malice and an innocent error in judgement.
It's not uncommon for business owners to rely heavily on non-employees for advice, even in the day-to-day operations. Spouses are especially common. What confuses me is that the wife, as portrayed, seems a bit irrational--if not delusional. There's a big difference between even vocal trusted advisors, and the sort of power the wife described herself as having.
So much so that I think there's a third possible interpretation: the quotes are accurate, given by a wife that genuinely believes her statements even though they have no basis in reality. This sort of delusion, in varying degrees, is quite common across the population. We convince ourselves of something--in this case, the wife that she has power in the Github organization--and then attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance that arrises from the belief and the evidence to the contrary. As time goes on, we try harder and harder to justify those irrational beliefs.
It's entirely possible that there's no truth whatsoever to the wife's words, but that the wife genuinely believed them in spite of it. And that Julie Horvath is entirely accurate in detailing the conversation and the implied hostility she felt from the founder and his wife. So now, not only do you have to determine whether the conversation took place, but also whether the power the wife alleged existed in the first place. Unfortunately for Github, even if the wife never had that power, the wife was still able to contribute to a hostile work environment and that can have significant legal ramifications even though she wasn't an employee.
Friends you go out for drinks with to talk about life and work slowly transform into "spies" who keep you informed of what's happening in the office under the guise of gossip. Curiously taking a peek at an open chat tab on the husband's laptop becomes "access." Commenting on whether you liked a potential hire you met earlier becomes "responsibility over hires." Love for your husband and concern for his work becomes an overprotective desire to shield him from harm.
Given how rapidly Github has grown, the idea that any trusted non-employee, wife or not, would have that sort of power and influence described seems absurd. Hell, for a while it seemed as though they announced a new hire daily. Far too many for one non-employee, no matter how often she went into the office, to have that sort of power. Especially when most were technical positions.
Time will tell, but for now, more information is needed. Anyhow, I suppose I took issue with the phrase "undocumented employee" and ran off on a tangent :). The wife needn't have been an employee at all to have helped cause a shitstorm.
If someone was not on payroll and interacting with my employees on a personal level and on a daily or weekly basis I would have reasons to be concerned.
Being a "start-up" doesn't make you impervious to these problems. It simply means you haven't run into them... yet.
What business do I have with my husband's colleagues other than being polite at the summer barbecue and the holiday party?
Of course that doesn't include "accessing private chats of company members", but for that reason the more I read about that story the less I believe "the victim".
Also looking at her github account, she is a designer, not a developer A bit different education.
Completely ridiculous and unprofessional.
But, not sexist. Just terrible.
I've met the opposite as well, charming, well dressed, and physically fit engineer types who can hold a conversation with the opposite sex without any awkward vibes at all.
The awkward types seem to lack some dating experience and thus cannot discern positive/negative social cues or read body language as well.
> The awkward types seem to lack some dating experience and thus cannot discern positive/negative social cues or read body language as well.
I hate replying to this, but here it goes: have you even given positive social cues to guys who weren't "charming, well dressed and physically fit engineer types"? Also, if you're only getting "awkward vibes" from unattractive guys, that might not be a problem with their social skills (at least not in the way you're putting it; charm is a social skill).
Not to mention, what does "well dressed and physically fit" even have to do with "awkward"?
And no, a man sexually harassing a woman isn't always sexist (even though I'd imagine that in the large majority of cases sexism plays a role).
Sexual harassment ≠ Sexism
What's important to discern is the reason behind the harassment. If a man is harassing a woman because he views his gender as superior to hers, or that she's nothing more than a sexual object, then that's a pretty clear-cut case of sexism. But if a man acts inappropriately towards someone because he lacks self control/tact, has poor social skills, etc. and is only targeting that person because he's attracted to them, then it's sexual harassment.
I am against using private github repos simply because: it's safe to assume that the NSA can access them via hardware backdoors on github's premises (as per many US ISPs), or by compromising crypto keys that github holds (as per lavabit).
It's also safe to assume that github will be legally compelled to either remain silent on this topic or lie and deny it.
Github is great for my open source work. Everyone's allowed to see that code, even the NSA. However you can find source to LOIC on github. I'm sure that who put that there and who worked on it when would be of interest to them and form a suitable pretext for a dragnet.
You can also use Tor to sync small github projects through ssh. Employee internal communications should all be done away from Github and encrypted if you're working on something like p2p software and worried your flippant piracy jokes might be held up in a court room one day as "proof" your project is criminal. I would always assume all comms are stored forever and available to anybody who requests them, like lawyers looking to sue you and would like all your HipChat logs.
It's just a .onion github clone to pseudoanon share booters/LOIC and other "evil" code. It was called GitTor but I guess they recently changed the name.
People keep confusing targeted attacks with bulk data collection. Nobody doubts the NSA can successfully launch a targeted attack against nearly any organization.
But that's not economical to do against everyone all the time. Whereas bulk collection of unencrypted or poorly-encrypted data from the handful of biggest cloud providers and network operators is cheap and easy.
So yes -- leaving the big providers in favor of competently-managed small-scale, lesser-known providers is probably a step up in privacy.
For U.S.-based cloud infrastructure it's at least possible to take it to court (as Levison did).
So it's a pick your poison thing unfortunately. If you think you can outwit targeted surveillance then by all means use an overseas hosting provider but if they would be targeting you either way then it might actually be safer doing what The Guardian does, and using U.S. law as a shield.
Treating notionally allied countries as free-fire zones is a curious definition of "easy". You run this kind of risk: http://en.alalam.ir/news/1528560
And for that reason, anyone with regard to the long term would deploy that kind of thing cautiously, if at all. But I have no idea if that applies to the NSA.
It's curious, I have seen this kind of comment on HN before, essentialy saying "US law doesn't apply in other countries therefore the NSA can do anything that they want there" ignoring that other countries have their own laws, often stricter in terms of privacy. My suspicion is that this is a particularly USAian myopia, which does not bode well for the NSA. Clearly they have gotten away with for a decade or more; but it relies on goodwill and secrecy; and those reservoirs are looking very low lately.
I am telling you literally like it is. Whether or not you want the Fourth Amendment to apply outside of the U.S. (keeping in mind that amendment is the only part of U.S. constitutional law restricting electronic surveillance by the U.S. government anywhere in the world), the fact is that legally speaking it doesn't. I'm not telling you how the world should be here, I'm telling you how it actually is.
This is not specific to the U.S. though. Does Germany have constitutional laws forbidding them to collect intelligence from networks in France?
Now you have changed the subject. The original assertion was that it was "easier" for the NSA to collect bulk data outside of the USA. If the 4th amendment was the only factor then it might be so. My point was that the 4th is not the only factor.
For another example of this, how seriously would someone like Lavabit take a US court order to hand over keys and shut up if they were based in Reykjavík?
Did you miss the "legally speaking" in my original sentence before you accused me of changing the subject?
TAO (I.e computer network exploitation) may be easier if you possess a legal/ethical framework whereby allied counties are free-fire zones; at least up to the point when they're no longer allied.
But bulk data collection is not TAO. As far as I can see, it relies on firstly on physical access to network infrastructure, so you can put a secret room at the Phone company or copy off the network traffic off the undersea cable as it lands. This is legally easier in your own country.
Secondly it relies on legal authority over companies. US agents arrived at lavabit with a US court order to hand over the crypto keys and tell no-one. How would that play for a company based in Reykjavik? I expect that after the laughter and blog posts, a bit like this: http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/30559/iceland-expe...
Except, of course, when TAO allows you access to data in bulk. That was my whole point, and if you guys keep conflating legal jurisdiction, technical capabilities, and scope of effect with each other then you'll have only yourself to blame when you get outwitted and your data ends up in a database with ALLCAPS naming conventions. :P
You should write an article about that, I do like to learn more. So long as it doesn't consist of "lol you got outwitted :P" style taunting.
Interesting how your loyalties are expressed in that comment. BTW, based on your other comments, what exactly do you do "in the military" ?
This sounds a lot worse and blatant than just shoulder surfing at home.
This is the point that stands out for me. That the wife is not an employee of Github but claims to be able to access private company chat records, and also is able to "work" from within the office and interact with the staff.
Even with allowances that company property remains company property and private chat rooms are in fact non-private to the company... there is no scenario in which a non-employee should have access to those chat rooms.
The wife, and the husband (founder), have displayed an incredible lack of professionalism here. There may even be a question about whether those acts are illegal if they are substantiated.
And for companies that use Github to host private repositories, the question should be asked very loud and clear... "Who can access private company data, why, and for what reason?".
If a non-employee can access information that is presumed (even by their own employees) to be private, then our (external companies) assumptions about what is private and secure at Github are weakened and demand very clear statements backed up with clear processes to reassure.