The ultra-ultra paranoid might use their popular and widely read blog - a blog which is almost certainly read by more than one or two people at the NSA - to post an enormous boat-load of misdirection that is nevertheless also helpful advice for people who are actually stuck attempting to secure Windows computers. Advice that happens to highlight what a nigh-impossible task that really is. (TEN rules? Good luck.)
I can't think of any reason for someone in Schneier's position to publicize his actual security arrangements at this time.
Then again, maybe he feels he has a duty, as a security expert, to use and thereby remain familiar with the most popular systems around.
I think this is the case for security experts like Schneier and Krebs. Most of the threats they're interested in affect Windows. Most of their readers run Windows. They would be a less useful resource if their first recommendation was always "ditch Windows" even if that's accurate.
I don't know how maintaining a full off-Internet computer isn't much more extreme than switching OSes. If he is recommended an off-Internet machine, it seems clear he'd want to recommend the hard steps as well as the easy steps.
I mean, he says he's running open office so Linux should be able to work great for him.
Why not? He's the last person I'd expect to rely on security through obscurity.
Under constant and potentially aggressive surveillance, there is not much room for obscurity.
As to his using Windows - well, there may be good reason for that. Schneier has been using Windows for a very long time, and with his level of sophistication, I expect him to be rather good at digging in to the system and identifying potentially unwanted behaviour. This should make NSA less likely to deploy some of their highest-value tools, because it is probable that the tools used would be exposed.
Assuming he is less well versed in maintaining and excavating a Linux installation, it would be more likely for the machine to get silently infected by a zero-day, high-octane exploit.
After all: prevention is desirable, detection is crucial. (How else could you contain the damage once it happens?)
Thus clearly security through obscurity is a valid tactic to increase security. You just have to regularly alter your structure based on how quickly your attackers work- but this is no different from any other form of security. All forms of security have a time limit...
My point was simply that obsfucation will barely even slow down a determined attacker, ESPECIALLY one with the resources of a nation state (such as the US). It won't even register as a speed bump to anything other than a script kiddie or a worm designed for the majority case.
I'm really kind of shocked that my previous comment was voted -1, when the numbers blatantly agree with me on closed source vendors getting the living snot hacked out of them, even if their source is "obscured" due to not being available.
Simplified scenario: Your target will open a single file from you. How do you exploit them?
Im inclined to believe Scheiers real security arrangemetns are obscured for now.
Right?
Less safer than you earlier were. I think the whole point is that security is not a binary variable but a matter of degree.
Schneier is more and more about promoting Schneier. I can't imagine a reason why someone who is so concerned about security would provide details on exactly what they do security wise (that would be accurate at least) because the more information you have about someone's practices the easier it is to defeat those practices.
Not to mention the mere fact that he is so much a public figure now makes him much more likely a target which could negate many of the things he is trying to do.
By the way, how many of you guys have read his books? Having actually read Applied Cryptography, I felt his contribution to this field was very little.
I felt he did not even disseminate old knowledge because he does not know/comprehend old knowledge. He just disseminated old predicates.
It is weird, but I saw it coming. He has always used Windows. Back early 2000s it was because that was what his company was standardized on, and that was to make things simplest software distribution-wise. They did network security solutions (consulting-style, IIRC) and it may have been it was easiest to match their clients. I take it he hasn't bothered to migrate since then.
I'm curious to know which version of Windows, but I kind of assume it will be 7. XP was too security-poor, Win8 is too new. Security people who use Windows tend to lag major revs by a little (like most software releases).
For the record, the irony here isn't that a security guy is using Windows, it's that he's using Windows for security as he reports on deliberately backdoored commercial software.
The critical thing is to ensure you don't ever transfer nasty stuff to the machine. For the true paranoid, this means you are facing potential NSA zero-day vulnerabilities and such, so you could have the most patched version of Linux or Windows and still be at risk.
Now, it still makes sense to start with a good system, but the weakness here, whatever your OS, is the trustworthiness of the data you transfer to it on USB.
Not knowing if there are code exec backdoors, intentional or otherwise, in your kernel: a whole different ballgame.
Schneier should know better.
So about his only plausibly concern is if Truecrypt uses the Window's entropy pool switched to use say EC_DAUL_DRBG. That is a concern, but it's one with Truecrypt and can be checked.
This is assuming that even for the NSA, having Window's identify and modify the truecrypt binary is impossible. Realistically, if you are worrying about that, you should worry about Intel chips doing the same thing. At which point, you're screwed no matter what OS you use.
What might not be practical or possible with "anyone" becomes "possible" with a high value target. [1]
I'm remembering back to OJ Simpson case back in the early 90's. The police did things to try to pin the crime on him (searching trashdumps) that they simply don't do or don't have the resources to do in ordinary cases. (They found nothing but they tried and went to an extraordinary effort to try and find some evidence against OJ.)
[1] I'm wondering for example where physically the air gapped computer is kept and the physical security and/or alarms around that computer.
Don't be silly.
Is "those" referring to zero-day vulnerabilities?
You realize that a zero-day vulnerability means "they" accessed "those," right?
Is that really the best idea, though? One of the things Linux has going for it is a couple of decades worth of public scrutiny and hardening.
It is stupid to think that obscuring the OS would delay them by any more than a couple of hours at best.
You didn't really explain what was wrong with using Windows.
Don't be like, "Jesus christ, and he is using Windows !? WTF." without explaining why using Windows is insecure, and how the other OSes you claim will be any better.
Don't think that because you're not using Windows you are secure. If a well-funded entity wants what you have, they will get it.
Schneier, IMHO, is paranoid for no reason. I'd lay a wager that the US government cares very little about him or his air-gapped systems (lol). He just wants to be heard.
Windows is known to be deliberately backdoored. Schneier has publicly stated he's got the Snowden documents, and has been reporting on them for the Guardian. I can't think of a better need for an airgapped machine. On what planet would he not be being heavily surveiled?
Next you'll be saying Snowden is a fantasist too.
And can you back up your claim of Windows being deliberately backdoored? My third statement in this post makes this point moot, too.
RE: Schneier having Snowden documents, I don't know if Schneier's cleared or has access to compartments to view them. If he does not, people would arrive at his doorstep to confiscate them. And since we have not heard Schneier saying MIB have come to his door (which trust me he would since he's a publicity hog) leads me to believe that the US government cares _very_ little for him.
http://www.theguardian.com/profile/bruceschneier
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/519336/bruce-schneier-n...
Exactly. He's not using any applications that won't run on Linux (or one of the BSDs, or even OS X for that matter).
Because the NSA would have no idea who your friends are, and wouldn't dream of monitoring their internet connections.
He forgot to say that you must encrypt the entire usb-stick as well
Rule-10 says to consider encrypting everything you transfer. (How do you "write an encrypted blob" to a USB disk without using a filesystem, on a normal computer that you aren't writing your own fake-filsystem driver on, than you can also read on an internet connected computer, e.g. one at your friend's house?).
I think you need a filesystem if you are in the world of Bruce Schneier's article, using Windows on both sides, writing at the level where "don't connect your air-gap computer to the internet" is worth saying.
Of course you can C-x M-c M-butterfly[1] this scenario, increasing impracticality more than security at every step, as far as you find enjoyable.
I can think of a few reasons why that might be reasonable, but I agree that the advise could be better.
1. He IS using Linux/BSD/similar, but has changed the article to Windows to be useful to Windows users and/or add some obscurity to his setup. 2. More familiar with Windows security practices, so more confident in overall security by using Windows (not that really helps with 0days or NSA backdoors though) 3. He has NSA docs that show Linux is compromised in some way and Windows isn't (seems unlikely TBH).
That said, it does seem very odd to stick with Windows if you feel it necessary to air-gap the machine.
Be cautious of this advice dear readers.
" (The ultra-paranoid way to do this is to buy two identical computers, configure one using the above method, upload the results to a cloud-based anti-virus checker, and transfer the results of that to the air gap machine using a one-way process.)"
No, the ultra paranoid would buy two computers, perform install 1 from friend 1s internet connection, downloading everything keeping a copy and check-sums, then perform install 2 on a friend of a friends connection, then compare the results of both the downloaded check-sums and the installation. (For certain flavors of Linux it should be the same).
There is no point in uploading to a cloud-anti-virus checker if the NSA is after you, its not like they are going to use Slammer or some other known virus against you.
Jesus christ, and he is using Windows !? WTF. He is going against his own advice - to use public/free software as often as possible.
For the step of moving files between air-gapped computer, he suggests using USB sticks. He forgot to say that you must encrypt the entire usb-stick as well, You dont write a file-system to it! Only an encrypted blob. As "viruses" can be transferred on the NTFS he is probably using. Even Linux fs had a vulnerability - when the kernel tried to mount the fs it would privilege escalate to root and run code - code that can be hidden in the NTFS alternate (hidden) streams.
EDIT: For the NSA-agent wishing to leak, a good idea is too look into HaikuOS, MenuetOS etc and use those instead of GNU/Linux, or ArchHurd. Something very rare, something unexpected. Modify the installation from the default as much as you can. Hm, we should make an Ask HN thread - what is the best ingenious methods for current NSA employees to leak again, now that they have to share a computer with a partner?