I think this is the case for security experts like Schneier and Krebs. Most of the threats they're interested in affect Windows. Most of their readers run Windows. They would be a less useful resource if their first recommendation was always "ditch Windows" even if that's accurate.
I don't know how maintaining a full off-Internet computer isn't much more extreme than switching OSes. If he is recommended an off-Internet machine, it seems clear he'd want to recommend the hard steps as well as the easy steps.
I mean, he says he's running open office so Linux should be able to work great for him.
Why not? He's the last person I'd expect to rely on security through obscurity.
Under constant and potentially aggressive surveillance, there is not much room for obscurity.
As to his using Windows - well, there may be good reason for that. Schneier has been using Windows for a very long time, and with his level of sophistication, I expect him to be rather good at digging in to the system and identifying potentially unwanted behaviour. This should make NSA less likely to deploy some of their highest-value tools, because it is probable that the tools used would be exposed.
Assuming he is less well versed in maintaining and excavating a Linux installation, it would be more likely for the machine to get silently infected by a zero-day, high-octane exploit.
After all: prevention is desirable, detection is crucial. (How else could you contain the damage once it happens?)
Thus clearly security through obscurity is a valid tactic to increase security. You just have to regularly alter your structure based on how quickly your attackers work- but this is no different from any other form of security. All forms of security have a time limit...
My point was simply that obsfucation will barely even slow down a determined attacker, ESPECIALLY one with the resources of a nation state (such as the US). It won't even register as a speed bump to anything other than a script kiddie or a worm designed for the majority case.
I'm really kind of shocked that my previous comment was voted -1, when the numbers blatantly agree with me on closed source vendors getting the living snot hacked out of them, even if their source is "obscured" due to not being available.
Simplified scenario: Your target will open a single file from you. How do you exploit them?
Im inclined to believe Scheiers real security arrangemetns are obscured for now.
Right?
Less safer than you earlier were. I think the whole point is that security is not a binary variable but a matter of degree.
Schneier is more and more about promoting Schneier. I can't imagine a reason why someone who is so concerned about security would provide details on exactly what they do security wise (that would be accurate at least) because the more information you have about someone's practices the easier it is to defeat those practices.
Not to mention the mere fact that he is so much a public figure now makes him much more likely a target which could negate many of the things he is trying to do.
By the way, how many of you guys have read his books? Having actually read Applied Cryptography, I felt his contribution to this field was very little.
I felt he did not even disseminate old knowledge because he does not know/comprehend old knowledge. He just disseminated old predicates.
The ultra-ultra paranoid might use their popular and widely read blog - a blog which is almost certainly read by more than one or two people at the NSA - to post an enormous boat-load of misdirection that is nevertheless also helpful advice for people who are actually stuck attempting to secure Windows computers. Advice that happens to highlight what a nigh-impossible task that really is. (TEN rules? Good luck.)
I can't think of any reason for someone in Schneier's position to publicize his actual security arrangements at this time.
Then again, maybe he feels he has a duty, as a security expert, to use and thereby remain familiar with the most popular systems around.