anologwintermut
anologwintermut on Hacker News
But there is a point you are leaving out that comes up if you talk to anyone who does treat firearms seriously: many people do not take those classes and/or do not treat guns safely. Go to a range on Sunday and that will be really clear. Or read the comment history by people who bring this up whenever guns come up in a general forum. Often they rightly end up complaining about safety of other gun owners in posts in more topic specific forums. But somehow, when it comes to a general audience, those issues get omitted.
Taking the class would give you a distinctly wrong impression about the responsibility of all gun owners. As does the suggestion to take the class.
Sorry, not to single you out specifically, it really is a good suggestion. But the net rhetorical effect of people making points like this is (and I think it's intentional) to skew the framing of the issue. Yes, you may be responsible, but with the exception of some people who would never heed your advice, people who want more regulation of firearms aren't worried about you. Guns don't kill people, some people with guns kill people.
Looks like they feed the output through a standard CPRNG. Assuming it's true, that pretty much breaks the DUAL_EC attack because you can't use the output of the final CPRNG to recover the DUAL_EC state.
Cool trick in that one, the Prover(i.e. the key fob) does the distance measuring part of the challenge response protocol using analog only components. This means its response time is <1 nano second.
So you can do it with only the car having a good timer.
So, unless one seriously thinks that the entire field of programming/IT/computer science as a whole requires that level of talent, Summer's point doesn't apply and there are certainly other reasons for the gender gap in computer science.
Lets suppose it actually was a valid defense. But what does that have to do with going through the Facebook and personal email of individual employees to know who to target. That was done up close, in personal, by hand. By any definition, those people had their privacy specifically and intentionally violated by actual human analysts.
But the means of doing so is truly questionable, even given all their assertions about trust us and we don't look at everyones stuff.
That's different than collecting everyone'ss data and claiming you never look at it unless someone does something to loose their innocence. Orwellian nightmare that that is and probably bullshit, revelations along those lines are not surprising. The systematic targeting of the personal lives of random employees (at least of non-governmental/ non defense industry ones), is new.
The absolute lowest bar for surveillance seems to be that a government doesn't use it to intentionally target innocent people/ those not in the game (hell, lets lower it even further to be only people the government themselves believe are innocent).[0]
That potentially allows dragnet collection of data if no one looks at it. It might allow hacking just a company's servers to get access to third party data. It probably allows you to spy on foreign heads of state (even if it's a boneheaded move). But it damn well doesn't allow you to go through the personal communications of people who you know have done nothing wrong and aren't even working for someone who has.
[0] This is precisely the woefully low bar Obama has been espousing : “The bottom line is that people around the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that the United States is not spying on ordinary people who don’t threaten our national security and that we take their privacy concerns into account in our policies and procedures,”
Arms control limitations (SALT,START), the hague convention, etc, work because there are means of verifying countries adhere to what they agree on (and ostensibly punishing those who don't).
Given the difficulty of attributing cyber attacks (e.g. Sony), much less cyber espionage, there's little reason to think this is possible in this case. And that's just for direct action.
If we're talking about tactics and capabilities, it's impossible. How are you going to make sure there aren't 30 people somewhere writing malware for a government? You can't, at least absent far more invasive spying or some kind of DRM that makes writing malware illegal.
The device you're authenticating must have the secret you're authenticating with in it in a retrievable format. So it can't be used for e.g. disk encryption, etc, because the attacker can just get the secret from the device and decrypt.
All it can be used for is authentication, and for that they require a human security guard to ensure it's actually a human playing the authentication game. If you were to attach a computer, its likely it could impersonate you. So almost completely useless (except for getting people's hopes up).
More discussion here : https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4266115
This is Bernstein's entire stick. Which is fine, but if you can't use it on ARM and therefor on mobile, you've killed a large area where adoption of new crypto could actually happen. Arguably, a slower constant time cross platform library would have been a better idea if he actually wanted to see it used widely. This is what Sodium claims to be ....but well who knows if that's secure.
And I don't think I agree with you that this is Bernstein merely saying here's why you need what I've done. It's an explanation of why it didn't happen that basically argues that people' are being so stupid about crypto that they might as well be NSA shills. As a narrative it ignores a lot of reasons this stuff didn't happen and a lot of lessons that should be applied in getting it right this time.
As a random example: Nacl, which is pretty good, isn't portable. The portable version that someone made, Sodium ripped out a bunch of the platform specific stuff to make it portable, but because no one knows which parts were security critical and which weren't,there more than some doubts. These kind of things matter.
Put another way, as a piece of self reflection at least he could figure out how to make it harder for the NSA to marginalize his ideas if that's really the reason they haven't been adopted.
"Defendant could have established such a personal privacy
interest by submitting a sworn statement that could not
be offered against him at trial as evidence of his guilt
(though it could be used to impeach him should he take the
witness stand)"
Actually autonomous ones are as far as I know only good for static targets (effectively they are reusable cruise missiles).Close air support or deciding whether to engage an enemy airplane or not gets tricky.
Again, the presumption about a a post-racial society requires evidence. That evidence may be that ethnic identity issues explain discrepancies, but it can't be an argument because we live in a post racial society , data to the contrary should be ignored.
Given the history of legal and social discrimination in the US, the impetus is on the people claiming we live in a post-racial society to back that fact up.
If we are talking about recorded data, it's less clear. The imagery data may be encrypted to provide access control after the drives are removed from the plane and handed somewhere else. In which case, there's little reason the drone wouldn't have the decrypt keys.
You could encrypt the data with a public key and store it so that the drone itself can't read it. About the only reason to do this would be to ensure if it was captured, the target wouldn't see what was on it. I'd suspect the way the military planed to handle that eventuality, however, would use on an exothermic random number generator (a.k.a. a self destruct mechanism/ explosive charge) rather than encryption. There's a lot of way more sensitive thing on the aircraft than just what it took pictures of that you need to destroy.