Not knowing if there are code exec backdoors, intentional or otherwise, in your kernel: a whole different ballgame.
Schneier should know better.
So about his only plausibly concern is if Truecrypt uses the Window's entropy pool switched to use say EC_DAUL_DRBG. That is a concern, but it's one with Truecrypt and can be checked.
This is assuming that even for the NSA, having Window's identify and modify the truecrypt binary is impossible. Realistically, if you are worrying about that, you should worry about Intel chips doing the same thing. At which point, you're screwed no matter what OS you use.
What might not be practical or possible with "anyone" becomes "possible" with a high value target. [1]
I'm remembering back to OJ Simpson case back in the early 90's. The police did things to try to pin the crime on him (searching trashdumps) that they simply don't do or don't have the resources to do in ordinary cases. (They found nothing but they tried and went to an extraordinary effort to try and find some evidence against OJ.)
[1] I'm wondering for example where physically the air gapped computer is kept and the physical security and/or alarms around that computer.
Don't be silly.
Is "those" referring to zero-day vulnerabilities?
You realize that a zero-day vulnerability means "they" accessed "those," right?
The critical thing is to ensure you don't ever transfer nasty stuff to the machine. For the true paranoid, this means you are facing potential NSA zero-day vulnerabilities and such, so you could have the most patched version of Linux or Windows and still be at risk.
Now, it still makes sense to start with a good system, but the weakness here, whatever your OS, is the trustworthiness of the data you transfer to it on USB.