And perhaps the bigger risk to using the 'it prevented terorrist plots' argument is that it creates a convenient excuse for more surveillance and curtailing of rights. All that needs to happen is for a few more terorrist plots to slip through, then the argument will be, 'We need MORE power to stop these people' or, 'If you just allowed us to do this, this, and this, we could've prevented that'.
Then long after a significant threat of Jihadist terrorist attack is gone, we'll still be dealing with a uber-powerful police state.
1) More money being wasted to support certain corporations (Booz etc) in return for future plum jobs by these representatives/senators or heads of these agencies. Thus the cycle continues in favor of supporting these programs rather than analyzing whether we really need it or not.
2) Abuses by contractors or employees when they have this much access and power in seeing all the private data
3) Corruption of these committees due to the feeling of being "in" where others are not.
In other words, it's going to get worse.
And they'll listen to who is pregnant in the future, and force us to all get implants for the babies, thereby making a super race of Americans to rule the world! lightning flash MWAHAHAHA.
Please cite any proof you have.
There is ZERO reason to believe this doesn't happen for ALL sectors of government. So, I would say, the burden of proof would land on the shoulders of those who say that it DOES NOT happen.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolving_door_(politics)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_capture
This isn't exactly here say and speculation.
How about McConnell?
Lot of examples out there. Not hard to connect the dots if you spend less time reacting like a third grader.
"The 4th amendment doesn't apply under the Patriot Act."
Metadata is JUST number + duration. Not localtion, cell phone tower...
targetting cannot be done on citizens or permanent citizens, or people in the US. Permanent citizen in Madrid is safe.
No "reverse" targetting(targetting foreigner but really interested in US nat'l)
if citizen/perm. res accidentally targeted, info not used, FISA court signalled, house intel + judiciary signalled.
If targeted person is initially out of US, but venture in, targeting stops IMMEDIATELY.
Info accidentally gotten (for example, lag when stopping of the targetting mentioned previously), ineligible info is purged. All ineligible info is purged.
All targeting is reviewed beforehand , both by DNI and judiciary. All targets are audited
This hearing restored some confidence in checks and balances. And a good point by Deputy AG Cole: This is for foreign surveillance ONLY. There used to be no oversight for foreign surveillance. Now there is through FISA Court and this second court order with all these rules in it.
Also, NSA can't listen to the calls without fixed warrant, and the brothers were in the US at the time of planning their thing, so out of NSA jurisdiction anyways.
I don't have that much of a problem with this because the warrant is needed in order to actually do anything with the information. Also, to be precise, it's more as if the USPS scan the mail sender/receiver info (metadata after all). No content.
How do they stop him? It sounds like "can't access the data" means "the rules say he cannot access it, and if he is caught he'll get in trouble." Given that the people we are talking about think in terms of "the least untruthful statement" they can make, I would demand as much detail as possible.
"I don't have that much of a problem with this because the warrant is needed in order to actually do anything with the information."
Today a warrant is needed. Tomorrow, maybe not. What if tomorrow, the law changes, and the government starts hunting down anyone with leftist leanings? The first thing they'll do is query the database.
Laws are not sacred. Laws can be ignored or changed at any time. When we have to worry that the list of people we speak with today might be used against us tomorrow, there is a chilling effect on free speech. That is the danger of these databases. It is not enough that the data is held but can only be touched with a warrant; the data should not exist without a warrant.
If you think that's a possible reality you're living in a paranoid lala land - which isn't surprising given all the apocalyptic narratives we get from the media (gov't turning evil, zombies/robots taking over, evil agencies controlling the world).
The reality is that no wealthy democratic government in the past 50 years (some of which are less obsessed with protecting liberties) has slid back into tyranny. There are statistics that indicate that past a certain GDP threshold tyrannical governments become unsustainable.
This kind of thing is simply never going to happen.
When you start looking more than 50 years into the past you need to realize that this was a time when people thought blacks were lesser people than whites, women couldn't vote, many people were illiterate, people didn't have access to information, and maybe most importantly people were much much poorer (just look at the GDP). Now a days people for the most part live comfortable lives, and what we think of as "hard times" now is not the same as before (where it would often mean starvation for a large segment of the population) So to think history will repeat itself seems to me very simplistic.
The metadata is still collected and presumably stored for all, they just escalated it to additional surveillance for 300 numbers.
> 20 people in the world have access to the info.
[citation needed] Keith Alexander today said they have 1000 sysadmins like Snowden, most contractors. Snowden said, and the other NSA whistleblowers confirmed, that a sysadmin at the NSA has access to all data with little to no restrictions.
> This is for foreign surveillance ONLY.
And how do they determine whether or not it's foreign or domestic? Surely they must analyze content in order to be sure?
The metadata is collected, destroyed after 5 years, but cannot be queried except under the stringent circumstances. So it's basically if they could just go "back in time" on looking at certain phone numbers.
and the 20 people is in the conference. Alexander said that 20 analysts and 2 managers (himself and Inglis) are the only people with access to this database.
The data that was queried, however, is not -- so the query could be run again later if someone wanted to.
"The metadata is collected, destroyed after 5 years,"
An awfully big window for policies to change. Destroyed after 5 years can become destroyed after 10 years, or never destroyed at all, when the people in charge change their minds. How would we even know about the change, when everything is done in secret? The fact that members of Congress need to be told what the period of time is means that they did not know beforehand; will they be told when the period of time is lengthened (I have no hope for it getting any shorter)?
"Alexander said that 20 analysts and 2 managers (himself and Inglis) are the only people with access to this database."
Assuming everyone always follows the rules, which is a pretty stupid assumption.
That's why there's oversight. What's the point of making rules if you assume no one follows them? This is Rule of Law 101.
The problem here is that you have a secret agency that is saying, "Look, really, we have these policies and we promise that we follow them. Of course, you cannot come in and check to see if we are following them, because our operations are a secret." It does not help that whistleblowers are considered to be traitors in this situation. How exactly do you think the rule of law works?
They've also said they are not allowed to monitor U.S. citizens living abroad. What if they have a number outside the U.S. How do they detect that a number belongs to a U.S. citizen or resident? If a non-U.S. person has a phone number from the U.S. but they are not a citizen/resident and are not inside the U.S., is that protected or not?
> The metadata is collected, destroyed after 5 years, but cannot be queried except under the stringent circumstances.
That seems to contradict what they also said today, that no court order is required to query the database and it just requires reasonable suspicion on the part of the analyst.
> Alexander said that 20 analysts and 2 managers (himself and Inglis) are the only people with access to this database.
Is that technical access or legal access? In other words, are there technical limitations preventing anyone but those 22 people from accessing the data, or is everyone else just not supposed to? If they have sysadmins managing the databases, surely they have access too, as Snowden and Binney have both said?
I'm frustrated by them asking the wrong questions to the wrong people. They should be asking FBI about listening to Americans' phone calls. They're not dong it, in the bits I've heard, yet.
Edit: FBI did chime in on reading emails in real-time, indicating FISA court as the means for doing so, but nothing else I heard. (~1:28?) Edit2: Grunt. I clearly don't understand what's going on here. (~1:42). I'm just going to shut up for another couple days and see what the Guardian releases in response.
You're also the kind of person that would be up in arms when the FBI takes someone into custody because Russia says he's trouble.
Also, a student with a naturalized American brother who travels to visit family and speak with radical Islamists at his old home is not the kind of thing that either collecting phone call information or using Facebook Open Graph^W^W^W Prism is going to work well against. There are other types of terroristic threats, Prism/phone watch lists will work better against those.
If anything Maj. Nidal Hasan would almost be a better example, except that the NSA system worked perfectly... it was only in the follow-up investigation that it was decided that Hasan was just making innocent probes, so it was the investigation that failed and not the NSA system.
Arguing that monitoring every communication on the planet makes no sense... even with contractor augments there are not enough U.S. citizens to monitor all world communications, and the pool of available analysts quickly drops when you consider security clearance issues, training required, pay available, the qualifications needed, etc.
So no, it doesn't follow that you could perfectly foil terrorist plots even with interception and monitoring of worldwide communications, so the fact that NSA is as successful as they are can't be waved away by saying "anyone could do it". They can't monitor everyone even with their Utah data center, so apparently they've been doing a good job at focusing their resources at the mission at hand.
Any either way there's always a tradeoff. You wouldn't accept a 9/11 in your country every day to ensure absolute privacy as soon there would be no one left to be private from, so let's not act like the priority value is ∞. The staggering success of Twitter, Facebook and Google reveal how much people truly value their privacy.
Even the Constitution is in on the act, as both warrants and "reasonable searches" are explicitly mentioned as limits to Fourth Amendment rights, and people don't seem to freak out about those.
So while people may have different answers about where they fall on privacy <==> security (where a given program has a tradeoff between the two), don't act like the extreme choice is the only one; even the Framers didn't think that.
The 4th Amendment covers the relationship between you and the government. It does not cover the relationship between the government and a third-party, unless Congress passes additional legislation to add that protection.
Congress has done so for the mail, for landline telephone, beepers, and cellular telephones. They have not done so in the general case for email or other electronic data hosted by a third-party, and yet email and other electronic services somehow have become incredibly popular.
>The 4th Amendment covers the relationship between you and the government.
Yes, of course it does. And it's because the gov't cannot scan and fish facebook for crimes to solve that people feel comfortable enough to share such information.
The effectiveness isn't what's at issue here, though. The problem is the loss of privacy for innocent civilians, to which Obama and other government officials respond to with wishy-washy arguments about "tradeoffs" between security and privacy.