I'd bet quite a bit, though not "my life", that they do not have a generalized "read everything" ability for all forms of SSL. They may have what cryptographers would call "a crack", but that's a low bar, and doesn't prove they have a practical attack.
However, DDG is currently using 128-bit RC4, which is very weak. [1] I wouldn't care to bet anything that the NSA doesn't have an RC4 cipher crack that is practical to run on wide swathes of traffic.
RC4 is very popular, which I believe is because some people claimed it was a defense against the BEAST attack. I researched this for work, and I couldn't find anyone whom I trusted saying that was a good mitigation. The people I trusted merely observed that RC4 was not vulnerable, but never said you should switch to it. Only secondary sources ever suggested that. My conclusion was that there was a reason for the primary sources never suggesting that; in response to a theoretical break of the rest of SSL, the correct move was not to move to a solution that had much more practical attacks already known than what BEAST demonstrated. But now it's even sillier; BEAST has been either entirely or almost entirely mitigated in browsers (there's no server-side defense against BEAST, but there's a client-side one you can use, and browsers now have it). As far as I can tell, RC4 should be abandoned and we should resume using stronger ciphers for SSL. Anyone still concerned about BEAST should update their browser.
[1]: http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/16/has-https-finally...
Not having seen any blog posts screaming, "OMG, my site is being hijacked wholesale," I can only assume that the NSA isn't doing this (or has managed to squelch by legal order every single person privy to the real cert at MITM'ed sites, which is absurd and would beg the question, why not obtain the private key from these people in a similar way?).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECDHE
Google is using it, a few other sites, too, though they are in the minority. OpenSSL supports it since version 1.0.0 that was released in March 2010.
For internal (or routed through) US traffic - while Verizon's lack of interest in protecting customer data is probably shared by major backbone providers - I _strongly_ doubt even the NSA has enough gear hanging off backbones to actively MITM any significant proportion of the firehose that'd represent. Even the AT&T "secret room" probably doesn't house enough gear to be able to create fake(signed)certs and MITM every SSL connection for millions or more simultaneous users browsing every https site under the sun.
Having said that, I'd bet good money the _do_ target specific SSL traffic - has anyone checked the SSL connections to TOR entry and exit points recently? That'd be one spectacularly obvious path to try "speculative MITM attacks".
https://www.eff.org/https-everywhereOn the one hand, don't take my word for it; I also have not found anyone I trust who has verified my explanation directly. On the other hand, I did do my best to read the primary sources very carefully, both for what they say and what they don't say, and I was confident enough to implement more conventionally strong ciphers on the services I'm responsible for, so my money is where my metaphorical mouth is.
When you combine that with the beam splitter logo, things get a bit scary.
If it's less expensive to ask someone to hand over the data (in bulk) rather than burn CPU cycles cracking SSL (again: in bulk), then go for it.
Even if it's feasible to crack SSL for a few crucial messages, it's likely not so for the volumes of data the NSA are capturing.
I don't think there's a way to guarantee your mail always travels over TLS/SSL secured connections, but I suspect more of it does than you think.
This is a hard one to solve. GPGmail seems to get broken with every Mac Mail.app release. Vast numbers of people rely on webmail - which'd need server-side or in-browser GPG decryption. My Mom's not going to use command like gpg tools. How the hell do we bootstrap our way up to ubiquitous encrypted email?
If I implement this, will I become famous?
I think there are complications though - you need to be very sure that rogue javascript can't dig around in your plugin and extract my private key. I'm not sure how securely sandboxed plugins can be.
It's upsetting. It's a breach of trust for the provider and the government. It's more principle than technical.
Both the "upstream" and "direct" methods are upsetting, just in different ways and for different reasons.
But in the light of the PRISM documents it's even more likely than it was before that the NSA doesn't have the ability to decrypt HTTPS, or at the minimum that the US considers it too important to risk giving it away by using it on routine Top Secret signals intelligence. (And/or maybe too resource-intensive to use for that.) The strongest evidence for this is that we haven't heard anything about such a capacity yet from Snowden, Greenwald et al., who all have the full PRISM deck (along with other documents) in their possession and would surely tell us about it if they knew of it. So either 1) the PRISM slides do mention the ability to decrypt SSL or SSH streams but Snowden and the journalists haven't picked up on it (not impossible given the apparent incompetence they displayed over "direct access"), 2) it's too sensitive to mention in a self-aggrandising Top Secret overview of upstream and "direct collection" Internet signals intelligence, which probably means it's not in use (or at least not in regular use) for upstream collection or 3) they really don't have it.
A supporting reason to think that they don't have it, or hardly ever use it, is the apparent emphasis on "direct collection" in the PowerPoint. Why go to the hassle of dancing the frenemy minuet with Google and other fairly-anti-surveillance Silicon Valley firms when you can just get what you want from upstream collection at the apparently more-accommodating telcos? This isn't conclusive because even if you could understand all the traffic into and out of someone's Facebook account you'd still like to be able to see the internal state of the account, in particular so that you'd know what they'd been doing before the upstream surveillance began. But I think it's at least as likely that the whole new focus on direct collection is a workaround for the fact that, thanks to SSL and SSH, upstream collection just isn't what it used to be back in the days of ECHELON.
As the slide said, You Should Use Both: direct collection to give you access to US-company servers, probably bypassing the HTTPS problem, and upstream access to give you data, probably only unencrypted data (email!), that passes through the US without going to a US-company server.
(If you want an exotic alternative theory, you could speculate that the PRISM document is a fake, a limited hangout http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limited_hangout by the US spooks, maybe precisely to direct attention away from their ability to decrypt HTTPS streams. But this now seems unlikely, for example because DNI Clapper would surely have to have approved a managed release of a set of documents that both gave away the Verizon metadata surveillance and so also implicated him in perjury.)
They still don't have the private keys of the sites if they break into the CA.
Also, given that the world's best engineers work at either high-tech companies or the NSA there will be some who have switched between these industries, giving the NSA/CIA a headstart to get any information these companies hold through old-fashioned spy-tactics.
They were doing the spying and actively sending the data out.
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Upstream_slide_of_the...
They're logging all your URLs and headers. How much are you willing to bet they can't decrypt https? I dont understand all the hubbub _is focused solely_ on direct server access (the bottom half of the slide), when "Upstream" access is just as big a concern.
EDIT: rephrased my concern about direct vs upstream