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Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by icebraining on Thursday June 13, 2013 @09:07PM (#5877754)
OTOH, if they can get a CA - any CA - to cooperate, they can MITM anyone without having to break SSL.
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by sirclueless on Thursday June 13, 2013 @09:18PM (#5877775)
Not without someone noticing. Some sites have pinned certs in Chrome, which would stop this, and even without that you would expect some knowledgeable techie at Facebook or Github or something to be using their home laptop and say, "Wait a sec, this isn't my company's public cert!"

Not having seen any blog posts screaming, "OMG, my site is being hijacked wholesale," I can only assume that the NSA isn't doing this (or has managed to squelch by legal order every single person privy to the real cert at MITM'ed sites, which is absurd and would beg the question, why not obtain the private key from these people in a similar way?).

Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by wisty on Friday June 14, 2013 @07:59AM (#5879384)
Could they do this selectively, and only MITM people on watchlists?
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by lessnonymous on Friday June 14, 2013 @01:40AM (#5878447)
Do they need to MITM? If they have a copy of the private key, can't they just use it to decrypt the data .. even old data for which they've only just acquired the key?
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by soitgoes on Friday June 14, 2013 @01:53AM (#5878476)
Having the root CA's private key doesn't give them access to the end entity's private keys. When you ask a CA for a cert, you only provide them with your public key (in the form of a CSR) for them to sign. The CSR does not contain the private key.
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by mtrimpe on Friday June 14, 2013 @03:38AM (#5878745)
But getting an employee to hand over the private key and giving him a gag order afterwards is an option of course.
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by pilsetnieks on Sunday June 16, 2013 @06:13PM (#5890235)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECDHE

Google is using it, a few other sites, too, though they are in the minority. OpenSSL supports it since version 1.0.0 that was released in March 2010.

Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by meowface on Saturday June 15, 2013 @01:07AM (#5884142)
True, but they would have to do this for every single web server they would want to collect information from. Not impossible, but it'd be a lot of work.
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by mh- on Friday June 14, 2013 @03:56AM (#5878792)
to your latter question: no, not with the right ciphers.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy

Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by jrockway on Friday June 14, 2013 @08:58AM (#5879613)
Perfect forward secrecy doesn't apply if the NSA has broken the key exchange algorithm and has your session keys.
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by bigiain on Thursday June 13, 2013 @10:03PM (#5877889)
They have to set up impersonating SSL certs for every connection they want to MITM. While there'd clearly be value in them inserting or subverting network hops between "the great unwashed" and gmail/facebook/aim servers, there's very little chance the NSA have access to hops along the path between my (Australian) adsl connection and my vps (located in Australia).

For internal (or routed through) US traffic - while Verizon's lack of interest in protecting customer data is probably shared by major backbone providers - I _strongly_ doubt even the NSA has enough gear hanging off backbones to actively MITM any significant proportion of the firehose that'd represent. Even the AT&T "secret room" probably doesn't house enough gear to be able to create fake(signed)certs and MITM every SSL connection for millions or more simultaneous users browsing every https site under the sun.

Having said that, I'd bet good money the _do_ target specific SSL traffic - has anyone checked the SSL connections to TOR entry and exit points recently? That'd be one spectacularly obvious path to try "speculative MITM attacks".

Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by nwh on Thursday June 13, 2013 @09:11PM (#5877760)
Only for targeted traffic though. They can't record, go back, and break it.
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by Sami_Lehtinen on Friday June 14, 2013 @12:51AM (#5878354)
This is why I tell people that actual fingerprint check is much better than any CA.
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by icebraining on Friday June 14, 2013 @03:53AM (#5878778)
Yes, but how do you get the fingerprint to check against?
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by jlgaddis on Saturday June 15, 2013 @06:33PM (#5886512)
The EFF's "HTTPS Everywhere" extension is a great place to start.

    https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by erhardm on Saturday June 15, 2013 @07:04AM (#5884726)
I assume he also implies that fingerprints aren't any safer
Re:PRISM fears give private search engine DuckDuckGo its bes... by icebraining on Saturday June 15, 2013 @01:50PM (#5885744)
Who?