It's unfair to put the article in the same bucket as "UFO stories". No one who has read it (and is being fair) would describe it as "speculation". It isn't anything like counterfactual fan fiction. Almost the entire piece does nothing but cite facts, such as: the dropping of the nuclear bombs does not figure significantly in historical records of the Japanese leadership's discussion about surrender; the Japanese war council decided on August 8 not even to discuss the Hiroshima bombing; damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not out of scale with the earlier fire-bombings of other cities; Japanese leaders had expressed a willingness to sacrifice their cities if necessary; Japan's war strategy was predicated on the Soviets staying neutral; and so on. Are these wrong? If so, how? Are there other, more important facts omitted? If so, what are they?
The negative responses to this article so far are so insubstantial that they form a defense of it by omission. I'm very curious now to hear a credible counterargument. Surely there is one?
For those who disagree with the article, why don't you ask Japanese what they think, instead of speculating about these two bombs ending the war? It was clearly obvious that these two bombs were, just like the article said, just another two drops in a long history of bombing on Japan that has destroyed most of the largest cities. Come to Japan and see from yourself how little is left of Old Japan. All cities are built of concrete here, because there was nothing left of what they were before. And check Japanese litterature of the time - there was ample suffering and hardship without even talking about the atomic bombs.
There's nothing "revisionist" about these claims.
> Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japan's interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
Logically, this section asserts that the atomic bomb, though not successful in doing physical damage, actually created a political situation that allowed graceful surrender, and it aligned with the Japanese government's desire to preserve Japan's culture and forms of government. It's very difficult to speculate what the Japanese response would have been at this point had Hiroshima and Nagasaki been destroyed with conventional weapons. However, their way of life would have been more at risk without a clear way to appease the enemy, which we have evidence to suggest was on their minds.
It's important to note that the entire last section is speculation and offers no facts at all to support the claim that Japan consciously blamed the atomic bomb with these goals in mind. Yet, this is the crux of the article -- the idea that the atomic bomb won the war singlehandedly is a myth supported in part by the Japanese government's desire for self-preservation.
I think that's what the original reply author means when he says "all taken together." The atomic bomb clearly did not put a dent in the Japanese leadership's attitude, but, according to the article's speculation, it did allow them to make a life-saving decision more easily.
> 'During the early days of the occupation, many Japanese officials worried that the Americans intended to abolish the institution of the emperor. And they had another worry. Many of Japan's top government officials knew that they might face war crimes trials (the war crimes trials against Germany's leaders were already underway in Europe when Japan surrendered). Japanese historian Asada Sadao has said that in many of the postwar interviews "Japanese officials... were obviously anxious to please their American questioners." If the Americans wanted to believe that the Bomb won the war, why disappoint them?'
I think it was addressing the overall idea of speculation in historical events.
1. To meditate on a subject; reflect. 2. To engage in a course of reasoning often based on inconclusive evidence.
If you mean 2., the article doesn't do anything of the sort. It lays out specific pieces of evidence based on observed historical fact and draws specific conclusions from them. On the other hand, the top-level comment above is pretty vague in its rebuttal.
> Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japan's interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
It basically argues, yeah, both Stalin AND the bomb likely contributed to a surrender. This part is not cited as well, however. It relies on implication based on the dissonance between records before the surrender and statements by the Japanese government after the surrender.
dspeyer's point is a good one if (but only if) the article actually does make the two claims he mentioned. Does it? I don't remember.
Well, Hirohito himself mentioned the bomb and its 'incalculable' destructive potential in his formal announcement of surrender.
So at the very least the bomb played a very substantial role in ending the war in the Pacific.
On the other hand, according to [1], Hirohito also cited the Soviet invasion when convening the council to discuss surrender.
[1] http://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/u6qqo/there_h...
Contrary to your assertion, the essay is not asking "What if action X did not end the war in the Pacific?". It is stating - categorically - that the commonly accepted narrative is based on an insufficient accounting of the facts, and that this narrative is unsustainable in the face of a more complete record of what actually happened.
Here's the key passage:
"It didn't take a military genius to see that, while it might be possible to fight a decisive battle against one great power invading from one direction, it would not be possible to fight off two great powers attacking from two different directions. The Soviet invasion invalidated the military's decisive battle strategy, just as it invalidated the diplomatic strategy. At a single stroke, all of Japan's options evaporated. The Soviet invasion [of Manchuria] was strategically decisive -- it foreclosed both of Japan's options -- while the bombing of Hiroshima (which foreclosed neither) was not."
Again, that's not "speculative" or "pseudo-historical" writing. And there's no way an attentive reader of good will could characterize it as such. Now, you may dispute the veracity of the facts. Or you could bring additional facts to bear. And you may reasonably disagree with the writer's conclusions. But for a guy who is ostensibly adverse to arguments that "smell of a political agenda and manipulation", you do yourself no favors by (a) seriously misrepresenting the basic nature of what's being said, and (b) responding to your straw man in the most inappropriately condescending manner possible. (Seriously, lumping this in with UFO conspiracies, as though the Soviet military were what? A figment of unreliable imagination?)
If you want to see some real slimeball rhetoric, sir, look no further than your own remarks. The only good thing about dishonesty of this sort of is the amusingly ironic dearth of self-awareness that it also represents.
>"Most of Japan's best troops had been shifted to the southern part of the home islands. Japan's military had correctly guessed that the likely first target of an American invasion would be the southernmost island of Kyushu. The once proud Kwangtung army in Manchuria, for example, was a shell of its former self because its best units had been shifted away to defend Japan itself."
It wasn't that the best troops were defeated; just that Japan couldn't fight a war on two fronts. Once the Soviet Union invaded, they had no other viable options other than surrender or fight a losing battle.
However, even if the author's analysis is correct, I still think it best to believe that the nuclear weapons were the main cause but the other variables also influenced the outcome.
Here's the opinion of the leader of the US military at the time.
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons." -Fleet Admiral William Daniel Leahy (May 6, 1875 – July 20, 1959), the senior-most United States military officer during th Second World War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_D._Leahy#Atomic_bomb
The bomb was dropped not to win the war, but to intimidate the USSR.
What a lot of revisionist writings gloss over is that yes, certain parts of the Japanese leadership were "ready to surrender." But it is well documented that some were only ready to surrender if conditions X and Y were met. Others were only ready to surrender with conditions Z and A. And of course others weren't ready to surrender at all.
Yet until a credible leadership figure actually _offered_ unconditional surrender, it was going to be war as usual.
And so if this phrase, "ready to surrender," is taken alone (notwithstanding its distinguished source), then it is facile in that it deliberately ignores both the wide diversity of opinion which existed within Japanese leadership, and the complex process which was necessary for the leadership to converge and make a firm, unified political decision.
Yes, later Leahy apparently said, "It is my opinion," not, "At the time we all believed" ["that the Japanese were defeated and ready to surrender...."]
I'm willing to believe that some, maybe including Leahy, thought the US had only to stand back and wait for the inevitable surrender, with no ratcheting up of force necessary. But, at the same time, somebody [not including the Fleet Admiral?] was also preparing for a full boots-on-the-ground invasion of the Japanese mainland, which (going by the US death tolls of previous island invasions) would have sent thousands of Americans to their deaths.
Unless that invasion plan was entirely fake--something nobody is suggesting--there were obviously plenty of people at the top who thought that the Japanese might not be ready to surrender.
Suddenly a middle option appeared between just waiting and hoping and sending thousands of Americans to their deaths: drop atomic bombs. Even though an atom bomb would actually kill fewer people than the firebombings, it would represent an even greater threat of what could happen if they didn't surrender immediately.
Maybe the Japanese were about to surrender. Maybe they would keep fighting and Americans would keep dying. Maybe the atom bombs would convince them to surrender. Or maybe not. Maybe nothing short of a full invasion would be required. Maybe even that wouldn't be enough to end it quickly, and the dying would continue for a very long time. The Japanese in many places had gone on fighting until they were dead without ever surrendering.
In that context, with no benefit of hindsight, to say that the bomb was not dropped to win the war but just to intimidate the USSR is nonsense.
In that context, with no benefit of hindsight,
to say that the bomb was not dropped to win the war
but just to intimidate the USSR is nonsense.
Not just nonsense, but also part of a propaganda war. I cannot read it otherwise (unless the comment had offered a more profound historical analysis, which it has not).But it wasn’t. The A-bombs were quite unusual. They were extraordinary weapons, and would have required extraordinary justifications to use on the military, let alone on civilians.
(To the argument that it wasn’t possible to target the military apart from civilians: that’s exactly why nuclear weapons are so problematic.)
it deliberately ignores both the wide diversity of opinion which existed within Japanese leadership
An alternate interpretation is to not take it alone, and to see it as deliberately summarizing the wide diversity of opinion which was already going through the complex process that you rightly point out. News of Nagasaki’s destruction interrupted a meeting by the Japanese Supreme War Council, not so much about whether to surrender as about how. I don’t think it’s facile at all to call this, in context, “ready to surrender”.
The US did not know the details of the meeting, of course, but they chose to spend 70,000 human lives on an assumption with no particular justification, while under no special immediate military threat – at that point, Japan was relatively contained, and the fear was that if left alone it would reach out again in a matter of months or decades, not weeks. The threat was diplomatic: that Japan might surrender to the USSR. That seems worth presenting as something other than the rueful conduct of justified, proportional warfare as an absolute last resort.
As an American, sometimes I look at other countries that haven’t come to terms with major war crimes – the Armenian Genocide, for example, or indeed Imperial Japan’s crimes in China – and I shake my head.
Then I remember that the US has the A-bombs on our record, and we’ve made it almost 70 years now without admitting as a nation (meaning in standard textbooks, in mainstream entertainment, etc.) that these were, by any sensible definition, crimes against humanity of the highest gravity.
There’s this objection people sometimes raise: that it’s easy to say these things if you weren’t there, if you weren’t under the pressures of command, knowing your nation’s people were dying by the day. That’s true. I don’t know what that was like. It’s easy for me to moralize from a distance. But that argument isn’t actually justifying the act of the A-bombings, merely moderating judgment on the people who did it. Saying they didn’t really know what they were doing is very different from it was a good idea.
If you haven't already, do some research on how the Japanese fought at Okinawa. At the defensive plans they had in place for defending the Home Islands. The toll of an invasion would have been horrendous for both sides. This is without dispute by serious historians.
Your idea that the Japanese were "relatively contained," implying that there was no need to do any further action is almost laughable as a military or political strategy.
When you go to war, you should go to war til the other side cries "Uncle."
Furthermore, the idea that war should be "proportional" is also a sophomoric argument without merit. War is hell for a reason. If someone engages you in war, you fight them to the death. You don't go back and forth in a tit for tat manner that negates all of your advantages and magnifies theirs.
And to lump the A bombs with what Japan did to China? Read up on the Rape of Nanking. Or find out how many Chinese civilians the Japanese Army killed on the mainland. Or how they treated POWs during the Bataan Death March.
War is hell.
Did you just agree that people, army and paramilitary forces of Afghanistan are right to go to total war "to death" with the USA, USA army and USA civilians. Because even one innocent dead man in Afghanistan can justify action of, for example, poisoning NYC water supplies?
Or this "unproporional" punishment of enemy is justified only if it's the USA that is doing it, not when it suffers it?
I personally wouldn't advocate targeting civilians; but if there was no alternative, and my culture, country and way of life was being destroyed, I could see a rational actor choosing to do so.
The US would have been far better served by simply conducting a punitive raid in AFG to knock over the original Taliban and let the assorted tribes learn not to stir the hornets nest. Instead we've decimated the country without creating any real change. And we've also grown accustomed to a sanitized style of warfare where drone operators in Creech, Nevada plink small targets without working up a sweat.
War should be hell, lest we grow to like it too much.
Edit:
> You have the privilege of tarring the commanders of US forces as war criminals "of the highest gravity" because of the sacrifices US soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines made during WW2.
In reality, we Europeans have the privilege because of United Kingdom, Soviet, United States, Canada, Finland, and countless volunteers and freedom fighters from the occupied areas. I appreciate the sacrifices, suffering and determination from a nation I so admire; in fact we celebrate it once a year, but please remember that United States were never alone in the fight.
War is still hell. The Romans razed Carthage, a war crime? The Germans in WW1 bombed London, war crime? The British torched Dresden, war crime? The Nazis bombed Rotterdam, war crime?
It's far too easy to conflate "war" with war crime. Some feel that the two are synonymous. I think each generation has a tendency to feel superior and more advanced than the previous generation; I think this is naive and ill informed. We're all savages of a sort.
Yes, yes, yes and yes.
I'm not even saying that I would act differently if I were a military commander. War is hell, granted. But that doesn't make it right, and we should be honest with ourselves. It's not right. Killing innocents is not okay; using civilians as leverage in an act of terror is never okay.
We should strive to be better than that.
We can be grateful for the outcome and many sacrifices and still speculate about whether or not specific actions were necessary and justifiable.
And we can actually recognise the atrocities committed by the Japanese military and question actions by the allies at the same time.
It is understandable that a lot of decisions were taken that had horrible outcomes, and that many of them were taken in good faith and probably the only viable decisions despite how atrocious they might seem in retrospect. That does not mean we should just gloss over everything.
Extraordinarily efficient, one plane, one bomb, one city, but we'd already methodically bombed pretty much every other city (along with Kyoto for political reasons, the A-bomb targets and their alternates were reserved), with e.g. the firebombing of Tokyo killing a conservative 100,000.
What would be unusual is if weapon technology _didn't_ increase exponentially in lethality over time.
Given enough time even Little Boy will, to future generations, look to be nearly as puny as a flintlock. Hope we don't do ourselves in.
If you want to target cities then you keep making city-sized bombs.
If you want to target larger areas, you're probably going to be most efficient by targeting the cities in that area; go back to the previous step of city-sized bombs.
What's the incentive to increase lethality? If you make huge nukes or equivalently powerful weapons, they overkill your target and have negative side effects back on the homeland.
The dangerous super-weapons of the future are small, simple ones that can kill just the right person, anywhere, anytime. That arms race is happening right now, and progress is rapid.
Compared to e.g. canister shot from canons I don't think it would have awed them that much (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canister_shot).
Since at least the Napoleonic Wars, which followed shortly after our Revolutionary war, artillery has generally been the biggest killer on the battlefield.
They were extraordinary weapons, but as the article points out: The bombing campaigns were not, other than in doing the damage with much fewer bombs. Japan had seen similar levels of destruction in dozens of cities that summer, and was running out of larger undamaged cities.
With that context, they should require extraordinary justification to use, but no more so than the previous months of firebombing, and the focusing on the use of a nuclear bomb vs. "just" the fire bombing is detracting from the issue of how much of that overall bombing should have been acceptable and how much of it was necessary or served much purpose.
I don't want to excuse the A-bombs, but the article does make a compelling argument that they were not qualitatively different in the suffering caused.
The atom bombs saved millions of Japanese lives because the alternative was a protracted brutal ordinary war.
Reminder: the firebombing that preceded the atomic bombs killed a lot more.
The only thing that matters is that Japan surrendered. That they were "thinking" about it or "close to it" is pretty much irrelevant.
But they convened the council to discuss surrender before the second one. The timeline given by the article is:
Hiroshima bombed
Soviet declaration of war
Surrender council convened
Nagasaki bombed
SurrenderThe cherry-picking on this topic is extreme. One guy claims Lehey was the leader of the U.S. Military during WWII. He was not. He was the senior-serving military official, who worked as chief of staff to Roosevelt. You could call him an early CJCS, or you could just use his title: chief of staff. Marshall was probably the closest we had to a senior person actually running the war, as anybody with a modicum of WWII history can tell you. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Marshall The only reason to pump up Lehey is to add authority to the quote, which was made years later during a completely different political situation. When you see this kind of thing, it never bodes well for the argument.
But you beat down one red herring and three more pop up. It's like talking to those 9-11 guys. They already know the answer. Just a matter of selectively arranging facts in a convincing narrative.
The author gives it away towards the end "...There is real resistance to looking at the facts. But perhaps this should not be surprising...They fill an important psychic need."
Well there you go. From the author's comments, and those on this board, I take it this is supposed to be some kind of argument between "patriotic" Americans and the facts (as told to us by the revisionists), instead of what it is: rewriting history to suit current fashion.
I actually wish the revisionists well. Maybe they can get their way and we can go through 100 years or so of believing that the A-bomb was not the proximate cause of the end of WWII. Then a new fashion will take hold, and we can come back to believing what 95% of the people at the time it happened believed. The neat thing about this is that people get educated about history. Frankly, if history is your passion and you spend time on this and know your stuff, I could care less which theory you pick. These stories need to be remembered.
Whenever this topic comes up I reminded of this quote:
But perhaps George M. Elsey, a young naval intelligence officer assigned to the Truman White House, provided the best reply to revisionist historians and others who question the decision to drop the atomic bombs. Asked by David McCullough for his biography of the President (Truman, Simon & Schuster, 1992) about the decision, Elsey replied: "Truman made no decision because there was no decision to be made. He could no more have stopped it than a train moving down a track. It's all well and good to come along later and say the bomb was a horrible thing. The whole goddamn war was a horrible thing."
Surely if you had found even the tiniest flaw in the OP, you'd have shared it with us by now. Instead your comments are positively incontinent with innuendos and slurs: "UFO stories", "pseudo-science", "revisionists", "9-11 guys", "cherry picking", "selectively arranging facts", "pump up", "add authority", "rewriting history to suit current fashion", "emotional reasoning" (since deleted, unless my memory is playing tricks), and my favorite: "From the author's comments, and those on this board"—as if the two were colluding instead of obviously having nothing whatever to do with each other.
I don't have an opinion about why Japan surrendered in WWII, but when an apparently well-reasoned case provokes this kind of thing, it seems likely that there is something to it.
What were the conditions? Because if they were "you help us rebuild" or "and we get a grill-cheese sandwich" then really they're not much. Plenty of peace treaties have taken place with conditions.
I won't do your research for you, but various factions within the Japanese leadership wanted to put lots of significant things on the table, like maintaining the seat of the emperor, the existing political structure, etc. All were showstoppers to the US.
But that isn't true. The seat of the emperor was maintained, at least nominally, so it clearly wasn't a showstopper. The US may have demanded unconditional surrender before the atomic bombings, but it accepted a conditional surrender after.
1945: Japan signs unconditional surrender > Japanese officials have signed the act of unconditional surrender, finally bringing to an end six years of world war.
> Under the terms of the ceasefire, Japan has agreed to end all hostilities, release all prisoners of war, and comply with the terms of the Potsdam declaration, which confines its sovereignty to the four main islands which make up Japan.
> Under the terms of the ceasefire, Japan has agreed to end all hostilities, release all prisoners of war, and comply with the terms of the Potsdam declaration, which confines its sovereignty to the four main islands which make up Japan.
> It has also agreed to acknowledge the authority of the US supreme commander. Although Emperor Hirohito will be allowed to remain as a symbolic head of state.
---
I'm pretty sure the surrender was unconditional and later the Allies announced that the Emperor would keep his position(probably mostly to help ease the occupation) ---
> www.history.com/this-day-in-history/japan-accepts-potsdam-terms-agrees-to-unconditional-surrender
At the behest of two Cabinet members, the emperor summoned and presided over a special meeting of the Council and implored them to consider accepting the terms of the Potsdam Conference, which meant unconditional surrender. "It seems obvious that the nation is no longer able to wage war, and its ability to defend its own shores is doubtful." The Council had been split over the surrender terms; half the members wanted assurances that the emperor would maintain his hereditary and traditional role in a postwar Japan before surrender could be considered. But in light of the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, Nagasaki on August 9, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, as well as the emperor's own request that the Council "bear the unbearable," it was agreed: Japan would surrender.
--
> www.history.com/this-day-in-history/japan-accepts-potsdam-terms-agrees-to-unconditional-surrender
From Wikipedia[1]: 'Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, observed that "unconditional surrender" applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that it should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments—"they seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various points."'
So it seems that both Japan and the Allies understood that unconditional surrender only applied to Japan's military.
Further: 'That day, Hirohito informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai (national polity) could not be preserved. The emperor simply replied "of course."'
In other words, Japan was willing to continue fighting, even after the atomic bombings, if it didn't get to insist on a few conditions. That doesn't sound like unconditional surrender to me.
I should also point out that the parent of my original post asserted that any and all Japanese conditions were "showstoppers." I pointed out that, whether or not the emperor's seat was a condition explicitly writing into the surrender documents, at least one of Japan's surrender conditions, namely keeping the emperor in place, was clearly not a showstopper.
"Unconditional" doesn't mean "there are no terms." It means that the loser dictates no terms, while the victor dictates all the terms.
Given Japan's current record on how they engage with World War 2 history, I honestly wouldn't trust any of their claims. Wikipedia has an overview of the subject:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_war_crimes#Debate_in_J...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_history_textbook_contr...
I'm not saying that they would lie, but at this point I think the propaganda war is going to eclipse any useful qualitative data that could be gained.
What confuses me about this debate is what purpose is serves. Minus patriotism, why does it matter? I've maintained a neutral stance on the matter precisely because I don't understand this. (But I'm also a relatively non-nationalistic person, and I also have seen people who still think we need to get revenge for Pearl Harbor (4srswtf), so maybe it's just me.)
To find out what motivated Japan to surrender? Whatever conclusion you draw from their actual motivation is up to you.
This was actually the essay topic on my US History AP exam.
If the Emperor had not accepted defeat we might well have a guerrilla war still going today.
Or the equivalent of North and South Korea.
Is it even possible to imply any causality without a counterfactual? You can obviously take things too far and start speculating on an alternative time line, but the immediate turn of events is surely a legitimate area of speculation (even for 'serious' historians) and I would say the decision to surrender in japan is one of those.
It's much more like saying 'well, this body was stabbed through the heart and then burned, but they almost certainly would have been dead even without the burning' than 'some complex series of actions occurred and we have no idea which of them was actually relevant in the resulting outcome'.
Yeah the US played ball by nuking japan. But saying it saved japanese people and their culture because it quickly ended the war, it's a little fast. I mean we're talking about nukes, not some poker games, those are war decision, you're still talking like the winner won because it took the best decision. Nuking is not a good decision, but it was a necessary one at the time. You're saying it like japan also thought "yeah, you nuked us, that really saved us, thanks !". When I read "bombs saved japanese", it sounds a little weird.
At least the article offer the reader some opportunity to think about the japanese perspective.
> Smells of a political agenda and manipulation.
UFO and conspiracy theories at it again ! The internet is never holding the truth, it's mandatory to not believe everything, it applies especially for this article. Consider the alternative like an opportunity to explore perspectives, not just like another one of those "deviant zealot".
Speculation may be made in this case if we ascribe significance to the near simultaneous release of The New Digital Age by Eric Schmidt (Google CEO) and Jared Cohen (Council of Foreign Relations member and head of Google Ideas; somewhat spooky in and of itself), which Julian Assange variously described as a startlingly clear and provocative blueprint for technocratic imperialism and an enticement to Western soft power.
One of the advanced praise writers for the book (aside Kissinger, Blair, Clinton, Albright and Bloomberg - who, it must be noted, recently declined presidential candidacy as billionaire and 7th richest American to run New York) was General Keith Alexander, who is the present Director of the NSA (former Deputy Chief of Staff, Army; formerly Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command; Director of Intelligence, US Central Command; Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff). Jacob Applebaum (of The Tor Project, also Wikileaks affiliate) described General Alexander as the most powerful man in the world and a fucking liar for claiming to congress that the NSA does not routinely intercept the communications of US citizens.
Why has this article been published by Foreign Policy in the current climate? The author has been developing these ideas awhile (http://cns.miis.edu/staff/wilson_ward.htm).
This assumes an invasion of the island of Japan would somehow have been a necessary goal.
"You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life – but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War, 1963
1 - Japan was already defeated and it was only a question of time
2 - Atomic bombs didn't drop on Germany because the Third Reich surrendered before
3 - The US needed an actual use case to assert the damage and potential of this as yet unknown weapon
4 - It was as much about threatening the sowjets as it was about ending the war in the Pacific if not more so
What I know about the late days of the second world war is that they were regarded by both the future NATO allies (read the Commonwealth and the US) and the Sowjets as the basically the first days of a future conflict between these parties. Germany and Japan didn't play much of a role in this picture any more.
So what the US got from the use of nuclear weapons was much more than just the japanese surrender. It was a stronger position compared to the Sowjets and the garantee that the war in europe didn't continue on after the German surrender. In order to prevent this, the western allies even slowed their advance to Berlin to allow the Sowjets their successes. Which doesn't mean they didn't have their fair share of it anyway.
But that is just my point of view and I'm no historian.
And finally to the point about saving lives. I've grown tired of nationalistic people stating an unverifiable estimate of probale deaths as the herois reason to kill any number people right know. You don't save people by killing others and it is certainly not heroic. I know that the victors writes the history, but this argument mostly comes up in cases where some really bad things have to reinterpreted.
What does that mean, and how is it supported by the historical evidence in the article or elsewhere?
The way the article ends with the bogeyman, "What if we didn't fear nukes as much?" has a circularity to it. What "nuclear warfare" meant in 1945 was obviously different from what it became just 15 years later - a political football that diverted people's attention, vs. an entire strategic doctrine that acted to encourage low-level proxy wars and interventions, while discouraging the "total war" practice that was conventional through the World Wars.
But these things are the province of speculation, not knowledge.
Think for a minute about what this essay is asking "What if action X did not end the war in the Pacific?"
Well dang, Action X could be just about anything. The fact of the matter is that all of the actions, taken together, were the reason for the war to end. Yes, Stalin played a big role. But it's not an either-or situation; it's an amalgam. The logical structure of trying to support a statement such as "The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan" is flawed. It's like saying the landing on Tarawa didn't beat Japan. Well no, and yes. The assertion itself is flawed.
While I love all sorts of semi-non-fictional essays, I have a little warning bell that goes off when I'm mostly through an essay and the essayist starts telling me a story about how I've been misled. Smells of a political agenda and manipulation.
Japan was threatened on many fronts and made the best choice it could. That much is clear. Atom bombs did not cause as much building and population damage as the fire-bombing did. That's also clear. But atom bombs represented one thing that Stalin and fire-bombing did not: the end of Japanese culture. A few dozen atom bombs would not only have made huge holes in the landscape, it would have erased the culture of Japan.
Nobody is finding comfort in simplistic stories. In fact, the more details people know, the happier I am. But dropping the bombs on Japan saved millions of both Japanese and allied lives. It served as a quick end to a long war, and it saved thousands of allied prisoners whom the Japanese were ready to execute. It also allowed the great Japanese culture to continue.
Most serious historians don't get into counter-factuals, except maybe as fiction. It just doesn't work.