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Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by peterwwillis on Monday May 13, 2013 @12:31PM (#5699618)
There needs to be an RFC for Postcard Key Encryption - send each other public keys on hand-written postcards to single-use P.O. boxes to avoid mitm of the initial key exchange. I don't understand why anyone trusts CAs any more.
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @12:35PM (#5699640)
Nobody trusts CAs. There is a lot of work being done on layering more trustworthy authentication features on top of the TLS CA system, one good one being TACK:

http://tack.io/draft.html

The problem with simply abandoning CAs is that it creates a situation in which it's even easier for government sponsored agencies to mass-intercept traffic, at least for a window of time (probably several years), and all that window buys us is the ability for sites that don't really care about security to save $10-$100 dollars on cert costs.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by runjake on Monday May 13, 2013 @12:46PM (#5699724)
> Nobody trusts CAs.

No. The problem is that pretty much everyone trusts them, at this point in time. That was Peter's point.

Sure, there are researchers and engineers who rightfully don't trust CAs. But we don't really matter. The users, the consumers, the parents, the grandparents, the activists do.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:06PM (#5699871)
I am not sure what the point of this comment is. What conclusion do you come to as a result of this "everyone trusts CA" belief that is different from mine?
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by runjake on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:30PM (#5700032)
The point I'm trying to make is that the CA trust problem has been known for quite a long time now (although it's only recently arrived in the hivemind).

Sure, there's a lot of research being done to find the Next Great Thing (tm), but how about a short/mid-term emphasis on shoring up the glaring problems in the existing technologies first? Tighten the number of default CAs, shore up bad SSL and TLS code, tighten default settings in client software.

Things like Chrome popping up warnings about self-signed, expired, or invalid certs may have been a great start, but nobody's really tidying up much on the server end, so the end effect is that the users blindly click through the Chrome warnings.

TL;DR: The Next Big Thing (tm) is going to be great, I'm sure, but how about fixing/tightening existing configurations in the mean time?

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:35PM (#5700066)
You and I are saying exactly the same thing. TACK, for instance, doesn't replace the CA system; it creates a vehicle by which browsers can pin certificates on the fly, the way Chrome already pins certificates for certain web properties, which creates a key-continuity system without changing browser UI or the protocol as it is run between browsers and servers.

You and I might also agree: browsers make it too easy to click through the bad-cert warnings. It used to be a trendy thing to argue on HN that these warnings were entirely pointless and should be done away with, which, of course, would have done grievous harm to security above the harm already done by the click- click-click- you're- done UX browsers have already established here.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by benatkin on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:18PM (#5699960)
I disagree with the list he uses, I would have said that most developers and many sysadmins trust CAs. The point is that, no, the phrase "nobody trusts CAs" is wrong, many people trust CAs.

In fact I think that so many people trust CAs that if someone provides a more secure alternative it should look like an evolution of CAs so it doesn't piss off people who have been trusting CAs all this time.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by EthanHeilman on Monday May 13, 2013 @12:57PM (#5699807)
The users, the consumers, the parents, the grandparents, the activists, ... don't even know what CAs are. To the degree that people trust computers at all they trust what their browser tells them is safer.

Generally almost everyone has experience with malware, bugs and broken software. No one who has used a computer for more than 10 minutes absolutely trusts computers in any capacity including security.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by harshreality on Monday May 13, 2013 @03:30PM (#5700879)
Everyone is forced to trust them by default because of liberal cert inclusion policies of browsers and other ssl-enabled software.

Ask some random people on the street if they trust a mainland Chinese entity with ensuring the security of their communication with their banks, however, and I think you'll get a different answer.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by jasonjei on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:59PM (#5700261)
What about a crowd-sourced decentralized list of known bad-CAs or certificates known to be used by Government security services? At the very worst, it will raise some warnings and let the user think twice before connecting to that service (which may or may not be annoying), but at best it would shield users from surveillance?
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by runjake on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:09PM (#5700348)
The government and corporations (and thus defense contractors) are experts at manipulating crowdsourcing for their own ends. I sure as hell wouldn't trust crowdsourcing.
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by sneak on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:24PM (#5699985)
> Nobody trusts CAs.

Hundreds of millions of consumers use devices that implicitly trust CAs today.

You're usually spot on, but in this case you're dead wrong. Most humans that use the internet use devices that trust CAs absolutely - which is exactly why they're being subverted for government interception.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:26PM (#5700004)
This boils down to a semantic disagreement. You say people "trust" CAs because they don't know or care about them. I say that to "trust" a CA, you have to know what one is, and nobody who knows what a CA is trusts them anymore.

The distinction between these two vantage points isn't particularly relevant to my point; at least, I don't think it is.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by throwaway2048 on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:41PM (#5700557)
The difference is explicit and implicit trust. Even if you explicitly distrust CAs, almost everything on your system implicitly trusts them.
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:53PM (#5700637)
Sure, that's a good way to put it, and I'm obviously aware of this, but it's not the point I'm making. :)
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by EthanHeilman on Monday May 13, 2013 @12:52PM (#5699772)
CAs solve a very specific threat model, governments or corporations are not included. It is purely designed to protect against Computer criminals with very limited resources. PKI is designed to be about as strong as the lock on your front door, experts and police could pick it or get a key from the manufacturer but many thieves will just break a window and run a small risk of being detected in the process.

If we want real security we have to build it separate from the CA model, but as you point out CAs do provide some security against government inception, just as a locked door does provide some security against police wondering into your house, and we should not abandon it wholesale.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by peterwwillis on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:50PM (#5700184)
So, even though the government can snoop on us, we shouldn't stop using CAs, because then the government could snoop on us.

With TACK you depend on CAs to establish the initial connection, set up a "pin", and then no longer rely on the CA for future connections. That initial connection is fungible by a MITM, so it's not secure. We need a term for connections that are "probably" secure, but for which there is no complete assurance of security, which is what any connection based around a CA really is.

This is why the postcard method is superior. Unless someone spends the time to intercept every anonymous postcard with a secret code on it, rewrite the message with perfect imitation handwriting, and send it on to the unknown P.O. box, without more than a couple days delay, it's next to impossible to circumvent this initial key exchange. For those that need real privacy I would recommend this method; for those that just want to order Jolt Cola on an open wifi connection, CAs are good enough.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:53PM (#5700205)
Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. The current CA situation is bad, the "abandon the CAs and come up with an interim plan" solution is worse.

Meanwhile, the world in which most of the mainstream browsers support TACK is imperfect, but immediately better than what we have now. TACK also sets us up to continue decoupling ourselves from the CA system.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by peterwwillis on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:19PM (#5700419)
Nobody has to abandon CAs just because a new model is adopted. It's not like the old infrastructure will stop working (as long as there's a free market)

Pre-loaded public key pinning shipped by modern browsers is a better way forward IMHO. If you're trusting your browser enough to run their software, you might as well get your public keys from them, too. IMO, TACK works about as well as self-signed certs with the 'remember this certificate' option - just don't use a Starbucks connection the first time you browse the site.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:22PM (#5700440)
No, that's not true. When you bring your laptop to Starbucks and deal with a site with self-signed certs, you're susceptible every time to that MITM attack; on the other hand, you're susceptible only the first time you connect to a site using TACK.
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by willvarfar on Tuesday May 14, 2013 @03:58AM (#5703503)
(Small technical nit-pick: the mass automated MITM of all postcards is entirely possible and with a ridiculously small budget too.)
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by josephlord on Tuesday May 14, 2013 @05:36AM (#5703796)
"In the US Department of Defense, a `trusted system or component' is defined as `one which can break the security policy'." [1]

This really gets to the crux of it. We might deem the CA's untrustworthy but we currently trust them anyway because there isn't really that much choice.

[1] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html - Ross Anderson (Trusted Computing FAQ - Q24)

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by anologwintermut on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:29PM (#5700025)
To be fair, CA's and SSL in general were designed to protect e-commerce. As a risk-reword calculation, it probably works for that. The problem is, neither SSL or CA's are robust enough to protect against state-level actors.
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by mseebach on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:18PM (#5700409)
You could also just email your certificate and text or call with the fingerprint. You'd have to be very directly and very actively targeted by a very competent government for that to fail.