Sure, there's a lot of research being done to find the Next Great Thing (tm), but how about a short/mid-term emphasis on shoring up the glaring problems in the existing technologies first? Tighten the number of default CAs, shore up bad SSL and TLS code, tighten default settings in client software.
Things like Chrome popping up warnings about self-signed, expired, or invalid certs may have been a great start, but nobody's really tidying up much on the server end, so the end effect is that the users blindly click through the Chrome warnings.
TL;DR: The Next Big Thing (tm) is going to be great, I'm sure, but how about fixing/tightening existing configurations in the mean time?
You and I might also agree: browsers make it too easy to click through the bad-cert warnings. It used to be a trendy thing to argue on HN that these warnings were entirely pointless and should be done away with, which, of course, would have done grievous harm to security above the harm already done by the click- click-click- you're- done UX browsers have already established here.
In fact I think that so many people trust CAs that if someone provides a more secure alternative it should look like an evolution of CAs so it doesn't piss off people who have been trusting CAs all this time.
Generally almost everyone has experience with malware, bugs and broken software. No one who has used a computer for more than 10 minutes absolutely trusts computers in any capacity including security.
Ask some random people on the street if they trust a mainland Chinese entity with ensuring the security of their communication with their banks, however, and I think you'll get a different answer.
No. The problem is that pretty much everyone trusts them, at this point in time. That was Peter's point.
Sure, there are researchers and engineers who rightfully don't trust CAs. But we don't really matter. The users, the consumers, the parents, the grandparents, the activists do.