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Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @01:53PM (#5700205)
Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. The current CA situation is bad, the "abandon the CAs and come up with an interim plan" solution is worse.

Meanwhile, the world in which most of the mainstream browsers support TACK is imperfect, but immediately better than what we have now. TACK also sets us up to continue decoupling ourselves from the CA system.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by peterwwillis on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:19PM (#5700419)
Nobody has to abandon CAs just because a new model is adopted. It's not like the old infrastructure will stop working (as long as there's a free market)

Pre-loaded public key pinning shipped by modern browsers is a better way forward IMHO. If you're trusting your browser enough to run their software, you might as well get your public keys from them, too. IMO, TACK works about as well as self-signed certs with the 'remember this certificate' option - just don't use a Starbucks connection the first time you browse the site.

Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:22PM (#5700440)
No, that's not true. When you bring your laptop to Starbucks and deal with a site with self-signed certs, you're susceptible every time to that MITM attack; on the other hand, you're susceptible only the first time you connect to a site using TACK.