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Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by SOLAR_FIELDS on Saturday November 14, 2026 @02:18PM (#50499905)
The part people are ignoring is Supabase's culpability in this matter: https://github.com/orgs/supabase/discussions/4547

This was supposedly fixed on October 30, but there are reports floating around that for existing projects, the defaults still apply

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by neathack on Saturday November 14, 2026 @02:31PM (#50500006)
While we’re at it, I was quite surprised to discover that Supabase leaks schema information through the `hint` field in error messages:

https://docs.postgrest.org/en/latest/references/errors.html

For example, if you try to access a table named "secret" that doesn’t exist, Supabase might return a hint saying, "Perhaps you meant the table 'public.super_secret'."

Thanks for volunteering that information, I guess.

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by doctorpangloss on Saturday November 14, 2026 @04:56PM (#50501351)
nobody needs supabase.
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by steve-chavez on Saturday November 14, 2026 @08:20PM (#50503000)
The hint is not a problem if you use the PostgreSQL default of deny for every table, Supabase is migrating to this default https://github.com/orgs/supabase/discussions/45329. If the defaults are in place even if you see the table name on the hint it will be inaccessible (fails immediately before RLS checks).

Note that the hint is added by PostgREST and it was introduced at a time where users manually typed table names, causing them to report malfunctions on typos. These hints are not that as necessary anymore so they're usually disabled via config[1] and will likely be dropped on a next version.

[1]: https://docs.postgrest.org/en/v16/references/configuration.h...

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by yard2010 on Saturday November 14, 2026 @03:03PM (#50500272)
> I've realised that the supabaseKey needed for creating the client on the frontend also grants users access to the database by default.

I can't believe someone actually made this by design

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by SOLAR_FIELDS on Saturday November 14, 2026 @04:57PM (#50501356)
If your goal is to onboard nontechnical users quickly and not have to deal with them churning because they have to deal with thinking about those pesky "security rules" before they can get a working app, it totally makes sense that you would do this, especially if you just drop a get out of jail free "well, it's the end user's fault for not configuring their app securely" in your T&C
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by sharts on Saturday November 14, 2026 @05:25PM (#50501611)
I believe it
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by reassess_blind on Saturday November 14, 2026 @06:03PM (#50501957)
The idea was that RLS (Row-level security) would be enabled on any tables exposed to the data API, and RLS was “heavily encouraged” to be turned on by default in the dashboard, and RLS was on by default since at least 2025. Tables require explicit RLS policies to be accessible by the data API, so by default it’s not open like that anymore.

In practice it’s an absolutely stupid design. If you create tables without using their dashboard, like with an ORM or with SQL directly, it’s incredibly easy to have them not use RLS and be wide open to the public.

Taking a step back, the whole “query the database straight from the frontend” is a terrible design in general. For example, they still don’t offer rate limiting! Even if the tables data is secured, there’s nothing stopping someone from hammering the database directly with reads/writes until it overloads it, as there’s no application level rate limiting in the middle. Bonkers.

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by dabbz on Sunday November 15, 2026 @01:05AM (#50504412)
I think the idea is to use edge functions against the database with RLS helping with low level access control, but it's still a tough design pattern to hold people accountable to. May as well as write the whole thing in a backend and just skip Supabase's API/RLS entirely.
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by reassess_blind on Sunday November 15, 2026 @01:17AM (#50504465)
The whole proposed benefit of their "query the database from the client" concept was the speed and ease of development. If you need edge functions (cost per invocation too, mind you) to make this happen, it's just a terrible design in general.

I agree. If AI agents are doing all the code anyway, as is the case with Lovable, just turn off the Data API entirely and access the DB from the backend only like a typical Postgres setup.

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by skeeter2020 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:05AM (#50507427)
Have you looked at PocketBase? If I understand correctly it solves both of these to some degree and from my perspective pretty cleanly. Building a self-hosted, OS version of Firebase and SupaBase was the inspiration I believe.

https://pocketbase.io/

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by weird-eye-issue on Saturday November 14, 2026 @11:10PM (#50503935)
There is nothing wrong with this. It's no different from unauthenticated API routes to get public information. The issue is when somebody doesn't use RLS correctly.
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by skeeter2020 on Sunday November 15, 2026 @10:06AM (#50507433)
>> The issue is when somebody doesn't use RLS correctly.

True, but I've seen staff+ level developers get bit by this. What hope do vibe coders have?

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by SOLAR_FIELDS on Sunday November 15, 2026 @12:18PM (#50508679)
You have called out the issue precisely! The problem is that Supabase, and Lovable, market this product to people who are basically guaranteed to not know how to use RLS correctly. And that the defaults set assume that they do. So on one hand, you're saying "This product is for everyone!" Then on the other hand "You should have security expertise to use this app, and it's not our fault if you misconfigure it! Oh, by the way, we gave it to you misconfigured by default to make it easier for you, the end user, who is somehow both a rube and an expert who definitely understands how security works, to use the app, without configuring anything for security".
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by fudged71 on Saturday November 14, 2026 @03:55PM (#50500711)
This 5 year old issue was only just fixed this October? Got a link to where it was fixed?
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by SOLAR_FIELDS on Saturday November 14, 2026 @05:01PM (#50501404)
https://github.com/orgs/supabase/discussions/45329

Any tables created before the defaults put in place are of course still subject to the wide open defaults, because they would risk break existing users apps if they back-ported those.

Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by mcoliver on Saturday November 14, 2026 @05:03PM (#50501430)
The amount of misconfigured supabase out there is astounding. And I'm not just talking about your mom's friend who wants a mahjong social network site. Companies backed by sand hill road VCs to the tunes of 10s of millions of dollars expose keys, don't have rls, set anon envs that are really full admin keys, don't rotate keys, etc.. the list goes on. It's wild.
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by Twirrim on Saturday November 14, 2026 @06:05PM (#50501982)
Supabase taking a leaf out of Firebase's playbook, I see.
Re:Lovable apps expose passport details and more than 200K p... by creatornader on Sunday November 15, 2026 @05:54AM (#50505910)
It's a shame that making things easy to use has typically meant the user gives up control/hosting capabilities and generally gets less security out of the box. You're probably right about Supabase, that they made that tradeoff explicitly, but they have more demand than they keep up with and finally seem to be course correcting toward more secure defaults that apparently will make onboarding their users more difficult (this is a false dilemma IMO). There isn't a real attempt at transparency with the app builders e.g lovable, bolt, v0, replit, base44 because that's not really the point. The vibecoding tools all sell the idea of a concierge service but that only works if the experience is actually "luxury" which in this case means you can trust in a guaranteed basic level of data privacy. People who don't get Postgres and RLS implement it sloppily and you inevitably get cases like this. You can put that on the user but I think platforms have a higher bar here to create experiences or interfaces where the easy path is the most secure one. There are obviously many other parts of these process that can be leaky beyond the database as well so the app architecture needs to make the system cohere together securely and I just don't feel like the existing options are fully up to the task.