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Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by eqvinox on Wednesday November 04, 2026 @09:41PM (#50374446)
The point of running a local unbound is indeed to turn on DNSsec validation. After that, it's the domains' fault for not using DNSsec. But at least your own stuff won't be tampered with, because you use DNSsec on your own domains, right? Right?

:-(

Coincidentally, a bunch of free wifi stuff blocks the root key queries unbound does at startup, resulting in nothing working until you get those records in there somehow (e.g. load_cache).

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by denkmoon on Thursday November 05, 2026 @01:30AM (#50375887)
[delayed]
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by cowlevel on Friday November 06, 2026 @02:12AM (#50389157)
Which DNS server? Your client talks to a central cache (of your choice) which talks to the chain of servers for all relevant domains, most of which don't support DoT or DoH.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by yjftsjthsd-h on Thursday November 05, 2026 @01:35AM (#50375909)
I was under the impression that dnssec's entire value was rather controversial? I'm not a crypographer so I had to skim https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ and I still don't understand it, but if

> In fact, it does nothing for any of the “last mile” of DNS lookups: the link between software and DNS servers. It’s a server-to-server protocol.

is true, then I'm ... pretty unsold on its usefulness. Anyone wanna ELI5 whether that's untrue or anything's changed in the last decade?

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by usr1106 on Thursday November 05, 2026 @01:58AM (#50376021)
I can't speak about the strength or weaknesses of the whole concept.

Out of curiosity I enabled DNSSEC checking beginning this year. I mostly noted nothing in my browsing. However, with 2 services I noted obscure problems that worked only partially. Some Jira plugins and Swedish railway SJ. I needed to excempt some of their domains from being checked to use their services. Of course you waste a couple of hours every time it happens because you don't think of DNSEC first when some web-based services behaves weirdly. There might be more requests not served to my browser, but I just never noticed or bothered to debug.

So not fit for general use. And even as an experienced developer it's not easy to understand why an exception would be needed. A bug in systemd? Incorrect data in DNS? A real attack?

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by jeroenhd on Thursday November 05, 2026 @02:19AM (#50376154)
DNSSEC failures need to be louder. If websites that fucked up their DNSSEC would get the same error messages as websites that fucked up other parts of their security, people wouldn't be so eager to turn off security festures as workarounds.

Give SJ the option to turn off DNSSEC and their website will stay broken. Give people a "someone might be tampering with your connection" popup and they would start caring.

There are also other issues with DNSSEC that need working out, but I still believe it does much more good than it does bad. Leaving everything in the background with an easy-to-disable setting makes it next to useless.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by eqvinox on Thursday November 05, 2026 @09:38AM (#50379638)
> DNSSEC failures need to be louder.

Full ACK. As a part of this, DNSsec validation needs to be as close to the client app as possible and reasonable; definitely never off-host. (Caches can do additional validation, but that makes the error reporting complicated.)

corollary: the AD bit should never be used on anything actually on the network. Maybe on localhost, but even there it's questionable in UX results.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by cowlevel on Friday November 06, 2026 @02:09AM (#50389136)
It's about time to question the whole off-host DNS resolver thing entirely. Fine if you want to have a cache, but the cache should return the whole record chain starting from the root in that case, so the client can validate it. Also fine to have an on-host cache that caches validation status.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by jeroenhd on Thursday November 05, 2026 @04:33AM (#50377124)
DNSSEC as designed is pretty useless. It was designed in an era where computers could not be relied upon to do cryptographic validation of something like DNS records, so that duty was delegated to DNS servers like the ones ISPs ran, where records could be cached.

There are also potential downsides (like someone being able to enumerate your subdomains, if you care about such a thing) and it's often switched off by default on operating systems consumers use.

However, it's the only thing that validates DNS records at this moment. That alone makes it worth enabling, in my opinion. For many domain owners, you only need to tick the checkbox in your registrar's domain control pane. If you use a modern DNS server, it's also one config flag and maybe copy/pasting a handful of fields away.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by alwillis on Thursday November 05, 2026 @02:43PM (#50383485)
> DNSSEC as designed is pretty useless.

Another approach that we analysed in more detail is the distribution of the host key fingerprints via a special resource record. This removes any user interaction, potential human error, or presumed configuration of a user’s device because OpenSSH-client can query the DNS and do the comparison. It only requires the administrator to publish a host’s fingerprints as a set of SSHFP records, which can be securely obtained (DNSSEC). If the latter holds, MITM attacks are mitigated, and overall security is improved. [1]

[1]: "Improving SSH’s security with SSHFP DNS records" - https://blog.apnic.net/2022/12/02/improving-sshs-security-wi...

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by jeroenhd on Thursday November 05, 2026 @03:30PM (#50384067)
SSHFPS is what I should be using in my homelab if it weren't for the awful split-DNS setup I have!

I personally prefer the theoretical advantages of SSH certificates, but those don't have CRL support (let alone an ACME alternative) as far as I know, so that's not exactly perfect either.

I want DNSSEC('s goals and ambitions) to succeed, but having a "trusted" ISP server that sets a "trust me bro" bit is the design flaw that kills the original design.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by eqvinox on Thursday November 05, 2026 @06:34PM (#50386123)
There's a patch for openssh to use the ldns library and do its own DNSsec validation. A few distros apply it to their packages, though I'm not sure what the current status is. It never got accepted into openssh sadly.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @12:31PM (#50395463)
I have never been able to get my head around the idea that the DNS should have anything whatsoever to do with my SSH fleet. The DNS exists to solve the problem of introductions between unaffiliated network endpoints. To a first approximation nobody SSH's to a random server. You don't need any third-party PKI to get optimal SSH security!
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by eqvinox on Friday November 06, 2026 @07:26PM (#50400371)
Same reason https://sshfp.github.io/sshfp.html exists, anchoring SSH fingerprints to the Web PKI: it's a convenient distribution method. Which helps, because people suck at distributing fingerprints. DNSsec and the Web PKI take an equivalent role here, I'd say.

Alternate solutions I'm aware of would be SSH certificates and querying LDAP. One of the issues with SSH certificates (AFAIK) is that they become rather cumbersome when administrative domains aren't cleanly separated, which is quite common once you're outside rigid and obvious organizational structures that reflect into sysadmin. LDAP has the same scoping issues, except even worse.

> You don't need any third-party PKI to get optimal SSH security!

This is a very binary view on an issue that is all about grimey, squishy user behavior. Sure, if users copy around SSH fingerprints, they don't need this. And either way they don't need it very often. But have you met users? The Web PKI goes to great lengths to avoid people shooting themselves in the foot (on both server and client side), why not look at some options for SSH?

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @08:31PM (#50400752)
You don't have to distribute fingerprints by hand. SSH already has a built-in PKI that handles this, and it's what most large fleet operators use (it's also the simplest way to connect an SSH fleet to an SSO IdP). SSH certificates, not WebPKI certificates.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by eqvinox on Friday November 06, 2026 @08:59PM (#50400919)
> You don't have to distribute fingerprints by hand. SSH already has a built-in PKI that handles this, and it's what most large fleet operators use (it's also the simplest way to connect an SSH fleet to an SSO IdP). SSH certificates, not WebPKI certificates.

I know. I'm discussing them in my post.

If you're replying on posts without reading them in their entirety, that certainly explains some of the communication issues we were having on another post (re. DANE) a while back. I don't think I'm interested in any further exchange with you.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @09:11PM (#50400985)
I read your whole post, which ended with "if users copy around fingerprints", which is a problem the built-in SSH PKI that large fleet operators already use solves. I don't think I misconstrued you.

You don't have to keep replying, but I'm going to point out that we have gotten no closer to finding a reason that anyone would even entertain the idea of SSHFP, a system that wires the already perfectly good SSH PKI subsystem into the state-controlled DNS PKI. Why would anybody ever do that?

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by sscaryterry on Saturday November 07, 2026 @10:57AM (#50405615)
The op is known to not read and spew propaganda.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by eqvinox on Thursday November 05, 2026 @05:33AM (#50377522)
Note the linked post is from 2015. But also:

> domain-validated certificates remain insecure

...99% of the internet runs on DV certificates; that's what ACME & Let's Encrypt are at the end of the day.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Thursday November 05, 2026 @12:28PM (#50381818)
Just yesterday, there was a talk from Ukraine and Germany about how they use DNSSEC:

<https://www.icann.org/en/engagement-calendar/details/icann-t...>

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @12:29PM (#50395424)
This is literally a presentation about Ukraine using its control over the DNS to manipulate queries from clients! Like, I like and support Ukraine and all, but this is the problem with top-down PKIs: states use them as policy instruments!
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Friday November 06, 2026 @06:43PM (#50400050)
You are literally full of it. There are two presentations, where one only talks about the security benefits of DNSSEC and how Ukraine uses them to great advantage. From what I can tell, the other presentation also talks about that, but also talks about blocking threats at the resolver level. You know, like most public resolvers already (optionally) do. DNSSEC has nothing to do with this. DNSSEC is, instead, a defense against falsified information, should a user choose to use their own resolver instead of a centralized one.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @08:31PM (#50400759)
You just said the same thing I said with different words.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Saturday November 07, 2026 @07:28AM (#50403975)
Google [middlebrow dismissal]
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Thursday November 05, 2026 @12:33PM (#50381883)
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Friday November 06, 2026 @11:21AM (#50394405)
Sometimes that rebuttal is summarily dismissed for being old, so here is a modern rebuttal, from a few weeks ago in fact: <https://circleid.com/posts/common-beliefs-about-dnssec-put-t...>
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @12:24PM (#50395362)
This is the funniest DNSSEC thing I've read, by the way. Apparently the market failure of DNSSEC is because of... me?
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by akerl_ on Friday November 06, 2026 @01:02PM (#50395907)
Somewhere out there, a Linux users group is acting out mock trials to charge you with murder of a crucial security standard.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Friday November 06, 2026 @06:34PM (#50399971)
I don’t know why you would find it funny; You brag about trying your best to do exactly that:

“[…] it's what the security team at one of the few large tech companies that actually have [DNSSEC] enabled told me when I asked why the hell they had it enabled.”

— <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44957512>

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @08:32PM (#50400764)
Oh, I absolutely have it as a goal! It just shouldn't be possible for me to singlehandedly succeed at it.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Saturday November 07, 2026 @07:28AM (#50403972)
I agree. You have even stopped responding to rebuttals entirely.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Saturday November 07, 2026 @11:51AM (#50405982)
And yet here we are! Your own source says I'm the prime mover. You better get smarter about convincing me to like DNSSEC, because if you don't, your project is doomed!
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Saturday November 07, 2026 @02:10PM (#50407116)
Your old post about DNSSEC has been thoroughly answered, many times since it was written. Many points you made are now invalid, because things have changed. But you refuse to respond to modern arguments for DNSSEC. Even here, you only respond flippantly and derisively, ignore all arguments, and only talk about how you are the subject of attention. There are other people who behave this way, but they seem to be getting less and less approval lately.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Saturday November 07, 2026 @03:22PM (#50407703)
Two things.

First, you're the one who brought up this stupid article claiming that I'm singlehandedly responsible for the failure of DNSSEC. Not me. Next time, don't cite it!

Second, you have a funny definition of "thoroughly answered". People have written posts disagreeing with it. Their arguments are not persuasive. Clearly, for the last decade or so, my arguments have been carrying the day. You can't just write a rebuttal and declare the debate over!

DNSSEC proponents are weird about this stuff. Someone else took me to task for not point-by-point including their rebuttal article in my original post, like that's a reasonable demand to make.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Sunday November 08, 2026 @03:10AM (#50411333)
> Their arguments are not persuasive.

Really? Then how would you counter them?

> You can't just write a rebuttal and declare the debate over!

True. But if a rebuttal does not recieve any counterarguments, from you or anyone else, then the rebuttal stands.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Sunday November 08, 2026 @11:58AM (#50414955)
I've written so many words about DNSSEC on HN that it's a running joke. The search bar will avail. I'm obviously not going to take seriously the argument that I don't share my rebuttals to these arguments.

As is so often the case, you and I are now the only two people reading this subthread, so if there's more you want to know from me, feel free to email.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Monday November 09, 2026 @05:01PM (#50432880)
You do often comment in DNSSEC-related threads. But you never give any arguments, let alone counterarguments to rebuttals to your ten-year-old article.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Monday November 09, 2026 @05:49PM (#50433422)
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Wednesday November 11, 2026 @10:33AM (#50454624)
And no arguments can be found.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by eqvinox on Friday November 06, 2026 @08:02PM (#50400585)
Huh. Multiple European TLDs (dk cz se nl sk no ch) with >50% DNSsec signatures on domains. https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#/?top=tlds&tld_tab=3

Honestly, I would've expected everything in that table to be an order of magnitude worse for DNSsec. Good to know!

(It's linked from the article you linked, transitively thanks for that link!)

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by alwillis on Thursday November 05, 2026 @02:27PM (#50383286)
Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME), RFC 8555, recommends certificate issuers use DNSSEC when using DNS to validate control of the DNS zone:

  As noted above, DNS forgery attacks against the ACME server can
  result in the server making incorrect decisions about domain control
  and thus mis-issuing certificates.  Servers SHOULD perform DNS
  queries over TCP, which provides better resistance to some forgery
  attacks than DNS over UDP.
    
    An ACME-based CA will often need to make DNS queries, e.g., to [1]
  validate control of DNS names.  Because the security of such
  validations ultimately depends on the authenticity of DNS data, every
  possible precaution should be taken to secure DNS queries done by the
  CA. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that ACME-based CAs make all DNS
  queries via DNSSEC-validating stub or recursive resolvers.  This
  provides additional protection to domains that choose to make use of
  DNSSEC.
  
  An ACME-based CA must only use a resolver if it trusts the resolver
  and every component of the network route by which it is accessed.
  Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that ACME-based CAs operate their own
  DNSSEC-validating resolvers within their trusted network and use
  these resolvers both for CAA record lookups and all record lookups in
  furtherance of a challenge scheme (A, AAAA, TXT, etc.).
  
  
[1]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555/#section-11.2
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @12:26PM (#50395381)
That's saying less than it appears to. What the RFC is saying is that CAs should be validating DNSSEC where it exists. It was written at a time when CAs didn't uniformly validate DNSSEC at all (because DNSSEC causes outages and pisses off customers). Even I think CAs should validate DNSSEC where it exists! It is not a general recommendation that everyone sign their zones, though.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by alwillis on Thursday November 05, 2026 @02:56PM (#50383645)
> It’s a server-to-server protocol is true, then I'm ... pretty unsold on its usefulness.

You can run a DNSSEC-aware resolver like unbound on your laptop if you wanted to. It comes with a bunch of Linux distros.

Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by cowlevel on Friday November 06, 2026 @02:11AM (#50389148)
Can and should! Unbound is very easy to set up, if you know how to administer Linux systems at all. It also acts as a local cache and I noticed a small improvement to page loading time because of having the cache. Otherwise there is no local cache - every single call to getaddrinfo sends a network request to your configured DNS server.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @12:30PM (#50395440)
People should just say what they mean here. DNSSEC is in fact a server-to-server protocol, and your response is "yes, you should just run your own servers".
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by teddyh on Friday November 06, 2026 @06:49PM (#50400102)
Fact check: A resolver is not restricted to servers, nor is DNSSEC a server-to-server protocol.
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by tptacek on Friday November 06, 2026 @08:46PM (#50400832)
Ah, yes. What even is a "DNS server"? Clearly it's not the thing that shows up in your network configuration under "DNS server"; that, as you observe, is properly labeled "resolver".
Re:So my ISP was hijacking my DNS by Bender on Thursday November 05, 2026 @07:25AM (#50378275)
Adoption at the TLD is high as it is expected of the TLD operators but at the apex or second level is very low. So .org itself is signed but .org second level domains are just below 5% adoption overall. .com second level is around 4.2%. .net second level are a little higher at around 5.2%. So most people's answer would be a solid no.