> In fact, it does nothing for any of the “last mile” of DNS lookups: the link between software and DNS servers. It’s a server-to-server protocol.
is true, then I'm ... pretty unsold on its usefulness. Anyone wanna ELI5 whether that's untrue or anything's changed in the last decade?
Out of curiosity I enabled DNSSEC checking beginning this year. I mostly noted nothing in my browsing. However, with 2 services I noted obscure problems that worked only partially. Some Jira plugins and Swedish railway SJ. I needed to excempt some of their domains from being checked to use their services. Of course you waste a couple of hours every time it happens because you don't think of DNSEC first when some web-based services behaves weirdly. There might be more requests not served to my browser, but I just never noticed or bothered to debug.
So not fit for general use. And even as an experienced developer it's not easy to understand why an exception would be needed. A bug in systemd? Incorrect data in DNS? A real attack?
Give SJ the option to turn off DNSSEC and their website will stay broken. Give people a "someone might be tampering with your connection" popup and they would start caring.
There are also other issues with DNSSEC that need working out, but I still believe it does much more good than it does bad. Leaving everything in the background with an easy-to-disable setting makes it next to useless.
Full ACK. As a part of this, DNSsec validation needs to be as close to the client app as possible and reasonable; definitely never off-host. (Caches can do additional validation, but that makes the error reporting complicated.)
corollary: the AD bit should never be used on anything actually on the network. Maybe on localhost, but even there it's questionable in UX results.
There are also potential downsides (like someone being able to enumerate your subdomains, if you care about such a thing) and it's often switched off by default on operating systems consumers use.
However, it's the only thing that validates DNS records at this moment. That alone makes it worth enabling, in my opinion. For many domain owners, you only need to tick the checkbox in your registrar's domain control pane. If you use a modern DNS server, it's also one config flag and maybe copy/pasting a handful of fields away.
Another approach that we analysed in more detail is the distribution of the host key fingerprints via a special resource record. This removes any user interaction, potential human error, or presumed configuration of a user’s device because OpenSSH-client can query the DNS and do the comparison. It only requires the administrator to publish a host’s fingerprints as a set of SSHFP records, which can be securely obtained (DNSSEC). If the latter holds, MITM attacks are mitigated, and overall security is improved. [1]
[1]: "Improving SSH’s security with SSHFP DNS records" - https://blog.apnic.net/2022/12/02/improving-sshs-security-wi...
I personally prefer the theoretical advantages of SSH certificates, but those don't have CRL support (let alone an ACME alternative) as far as I know, so that's not exactly perfect either.
I want DNSSEC('s goals and ambitions) to succeed, but having a "trusted" ISP server that sets a "trust me bro" bit is the design flaw that kills the original design.
Alternate solutions I'm aware of would be SSH certificates and querying LDAP. One of the issues with SSH certificates (AFAIK) is that they become rather cumbersome when administrative domains aren't cleanly separated, which is quite common once you're outside rigid and obvious organizational structures that reflect into sysadmin. LDAP has the same scoping issues, except even worse.
> You don't need any third-party PKI to get optimal SSH security!
This is a very binary view on an issue that is all about grimey, squishy user behavior. Sure, if users copy around SSH fingerprints, they don't need this. And either way they don't need it very often. But have you met users? The Web PKI goes to great lengths to avoid people shooting themselves in the foot (on both server and client side), why not look at some options for SSH?
I know. I'm discussing them in my post.
If you're replying on posts without reading them in their entirety, that certainly explains some of the communication issues we were having on another post (re. DANE) a while back. I don't think I'm interested in any further exchange with you.
You don't have to keep replying, but I'm going to point out that we have gotten no closer to finding a reason that anyone would even entertain the idea of SSHFP, a system that wires the already perfectly good SSH PKI subsystem into the state-controlled DNS PKI. Why would anybody ever do that?
> domain-validated certificates remain insecure
...99% of the internet runs on DV certificates; that's what ACME & Let's Encrypt are at the end of the day.
<https://www.icann.org/en/engagement-calendar/details/icann-t...>
General DNSSEC rationale: <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-...>
DNSSEC adoption graph: <https://www.verisign.com/resources/dnssec-tools/dnssec-score...>
“[…] it's what the security team at one of the few large tech companies that actually have [DNSSEC] enabled told me when I asked why the hell they had it enabled.”
First, you're the one who brought up this stupid article claiming that I'm singlehandedly responsible for the failure of DNSSEC. Not me. Next time, don't cite it!
Second, you have a funny definition of "thoroughly answered". People have written posts disagreeing with it. Their arguments are not persuasive. Clearly, for the last decade or so, my arguments have been carrying the day. You can't just write a rebuttal and declare the debate over!
DNSSEC proponents are weird about this stuff. Someone else took me to task for not point-by-point including their rebuttal article in my original post, like that's a reasonable demand to make.
Really? Then how would you counter them?
> You can't just write a rebuttal and declare the debate over!
True. But if a rebuttal does not recieve any counterarguments, from you or anyone else, then the rebuttal stands.
As is so often the case, you and I are now the only two people reading this subthread, so if there's more you want to know from me, feel free to email.
Honestly, I would've expected everything in that table to be an order of magnitude worse for DNSsec. Good to know!
(It's linked from the article you linked, transitively thanks for that link!)
As noted above, DNS forgery attacks against the ACME server can
result in the server making incorrect decisions about domain control
and thus mis-issuing certificates. Servers SHOULD perform DNS
queries over TCP, which provides better resistance to some forgery
attacks than DNS over UDP.
An ACME-based CA will often need to make DNS queries, e.g., to [1]
validate control of DNS names. Because the security of such
validations ultimately depends on the authenticity of DNS data, every
possible precaution should be taken to secure DNS queries done by the
CA. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that ACME-based CAs make all DNS
queries via DNSSEC-validating stub or recursive resolvers. This
provides additional protection to domains that choose to make use of
DNSSEC.
An ACME-based CA must only use a resolver if it trusts the resolver
and every component of the network route by which it is accessed.
Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that ACME-based CAs operate their own
DNSSEC-validating resolvers within their trusted network and use
these resolvers both for CAA record lookups and all record lookups in
furtherance of a challenge scheme (A, AAAA, TXT, etc.).
[1]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555/#section-11.2You can run a DNSSEC-aware resolver like unbound on your laptop if you wanted to. It comes with a bunch of Linux distros.
:-(
Coincidentally, a bunch of free wifi stuff blocks the root key queries unbound does at startup, resulting in nothing working until you get those records in there somehow (e.g. load_cache).