Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by casca on Thursday December 20, 2012 @10:59AM
(#4948312)
TL;DR: Elcomsoft releases tool to recover keys from memory from BitLocker, PGP Whole Disk Encryption and TrueCrypt.
This attack is not news, but Elcomsoft makes excellent tools that work so it makes it easier. There is no cracking going on. There is a question around hibernation - Truecrypt can dismount drives before hibernating so might be protected.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by gpcz on Thursday December 20, 2012 @11:13AM
(#4948387)
It also means that organizations that only accept commercial software due to bureaucratic concerns such as requiring a support contract, needing a corporate name on their tools to be considered "respectable," etc now have access to a technique that the research community discovered how to do years ago. Effectively, it's now an "enterprise solution."
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by trebor on Thursday December 20, 2012 @10:54AM
(#4948288)
This is a linkbait title that has nothing to do with cracking. It does, however, have to do with the recovery of your encryption keys from a memory dump. And yes, if your computer is running or put into hibernation your encryption keys will be at risk—guaranteed.
For better security shut your system off. Especially if you have a firewire port (because most computers with them can have a direct memory dump taken without any need to interact with the victim's computer).
Short answer: Yes, it clears the keys upon dismount.
Longer answer: If you have a non-critical volume encrypted, set to dismount on hibernate, it clears the keys. Beware programs that still have files in in memory, though. If you have the system volume encrypted, then nobody can get the keys out of the hibernation file. Truecrypt is forced to leave the keys in memory here, but you just hibernated. The system is shut down. Give it a minute and the RAM will clear.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by sahaskatta on Thursday December 20, 2012 @03:00PM
(#4949605)
Windows 8's shut down now does some sort of kernel hibernation. Shutting down isn't really a full shutdown in the traditional sense anymore apparently. Anyone know whether this means Windows 8 machines with Bitlocker are vulnerable?
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by ColinWright on Thursday December 20, 2012 @01:14PM
(#4949053)
I see the mods have just changed the title to one that is not the title on the article, but which does more accurately reflect the contents. For that I applaud them.
The interesting thing is that over the past few months I've been trained by the mods not to put a more accurate title, but always to go with the literal title as embedded in the article. Whenever I've tried to be helpful it's simply got changed back to the less informative version, so I've stopped bothering.
Does this indicate a change of policy? Should I now go back to providing accurate, informative titles?
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by trotsky on Thursday December 20, 2012 @01:43PM
(#4949200)
A properly configured IOMMU (VT-d in intel parlance) should prevent most physical ram dump attack vectors. The good news is that almost all x86 chips are shipping with one on die these days. The bad news is that support is thin - many vendors don't ship good firmware for it. Software wise support is mixed - your OS needs to manage what drivers have access to what pages. Since it's seen as primarily a virtualization technology, virtualization platforms handle it best - xen is top notch and works well out of the box. Other OS's can mostly be well configured with some patience with the notable exception of darwin (apple hardware also lacks vt-d firmware support).
If you're in a situation where you're truly concerned about your door being busted down you're almost guaranteed to be subject to a ram dump if you're vulnerable, primarily via firewire, unlocked workstations and local exploits but a myriad of less common vectors exist.
If you're concerned about such attacks you could use an external device which lets you enter a password using its own keyboard, meaning the key is stored in volatile memory on the external device - not accessible via a memory dumping tool. And then don't leave the device plugged into the computer when you're not around.
And bruteforce attacks have been around for a while using GPUs for instance Passware's forensic program.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by mikeash on Thursday December 20, 2012 @10:59AM
(#4948313)
Why don't these tools flush the encryption keys when hibernating, and require the user to re-enter their password to resume? That's what Apple's FDE does, anyway.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by drcube on Thursday December 20, 2012 @11:06AM
(#4948350)
I have to re-enter my passphrase on my LUKS encrypted laptop when resuming from hibernation. Does anybody know if LUKS (which uses cryptsetup/dm-crypt) is safer in this regard?
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by yungchin on Thursday December 20, 2012 @11:15AM
(#4948408)
If you stick to a recommended partition layout, the swap partition (which will contain the hibernation image) should be contained in the LUKS partition, so yes, that's safe from this type of attack.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by drcube on Thursday December 20, 2012 @11:19AM
(#4948442)
Yeah, my swap partition is encrypted. The only thing that isn't is a small /boot partition. I figured as much, but I would have figured TrueCrypt and the like would be the same way. Being a relative novice with encryption, I just wanted to clarify. Thanks.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by drucken on Thursday December 20, 2012 @01:18PM
(#4949069)
There are more secure tools than the ones mentioned available, and have been for a while.
For example, Bestcrypt from Jetico (http://www.jetico.com/encryption-bestcrypt-volume-encryption...) supports two-factor authentication with removable disks (including USB sticks) or hardware tokens or over the network. That is, the encryption keys are simply not available on a computer that may be stolen, for example.
In addition, all kinds of memory dumps, including hibernation and even crash dumps are fully encrypted.
I imagine in time, at the minimum the PGP and Truecrypt products will eventually catch up with similar features.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by SageRaven on Thursday December 20, 2012 @06:49PM
(#4950719)
Sure, the key files won't be on the computer, but the decryption key must necessarily be resident in RAM or otherwise accessible by the CPU (in a register, such as with TRESOR mentioned elsewhere) to encrypt/decrypt disk blocks of a running system.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by drucken on Friday December 21, 2012 @05:41AM
(#4952214)
My point is that there are security products with configurations where the keys are cleared from RAM when the system is not running (including hibernation modes). Therefore, in those configurations they are at most only vulnerable while they are running.
Used in that way, this greatly mitigates the risks mentioned in the article.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by sweis on Thursday December 20, 2012 @05:57PM
(#4950568)
Shameless self-promotion here:
PrivateCore (http://www.privatecore.com) defends against memory extraction attacks like this. We treat main memory as a hostile device and encrypt all data before it leaves the CPU.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by revelation on Thursday December 20, 2012 @01:45PM
(#4949207)
This is blogspam and the monospace font is hurting my eyes. Nothing was cracked or broken. This is a long known vulnerability that to effectively exploit requires physical access to the computer in question. This tool doesn't even solve the hard problem, which is getting a memory dump in the first place.
Of course, if you have physical access, theres a multitude of ways to get the keys that are not time critical or depend on the machine running at the time of access.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by lucb1e on Thursday December 20, 2012 @12:05PM
(#4948676)
This vulnerability has been known for years and has been effectively demonstrated many times in the past. The title should rather be something along the lines of "New tool to use memory dumps of running systems to read encrypted harddrives."
I've seen options to store the key in the L1-cache instead of the RAM-memory to make this attack much harder. I'm not sure whether I remember correctly or if it's even possible with common tools though.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by WinnyDaPoo on Thursday December 20, 2012 @01:49PM
(#4949228)
Adding to your point that this is old news: https://citp.princeton.edu/research/memory/ [LEST WE REMEMBER: COLD BOOT ATTACKS ON ENCRYPTION KEYS]. I think this was on HN awhile ago...
The real news is the commercial tool that implements the memory dumping and key extraction.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me...
by foxhill on Thursday December 20, 2012 @12:01PM
(#4948653)
i seem to remember reading about somebody running disk encryption, and storing the keys in the x86 debug registers - i believe this method would be completely immune to this "crack".
as has been said before, recovering keys from memory dumps is nothing new (although this makes it much easier).
This attack is not news, but Elcomsoft makes excellent tools that work so it makes it easier. There is no cracking going on. There is a question around hibernation - Truecrypt can dismount drives before hibernating so might be protected.
For better security shut your system off. Especially if you have a firewire port (because most computers with them can have a direct memory dump taken without any need to interact with the victim's computer).
Don't get too hasty there. The default for Truecrypt at least is to dismount upon hibernation.
And if the system requires that the volume be mounted when resuming the hibernated state, just turning the system on could compromise the system.
Short answer: Yes, it clears the keys upon dismount.
Longer answer: If you have a non-critical volume encrypted, set to dismount on hibernate, it clears the keys. Beware programs that still have files in in memory, though. If you have the system volume encrypted, then nobody can get the keys out of the hibernation file. Truecrypt is forced to leave the keys in memory here, but you just hibernated. The system is shut down. Give it a minute and the RAM will clear.
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4949053
The interesting thing is that over the past few months I've been trained by the mods not to put a more accurate title, but always to go with the literal title as embedded in the article. Whenever I've tried to be helpful it's simply got changed back to the less informative version, so I've stopped bothering.
Does this indicate a change of policy? Should I now go back to providing accurate, informative titles?
If you're in a situation where you're truly concerned about your door being busted down you're almost guaranteed to be subject to a ram dump if you're vulnerable, primarily via firewire, unlocked workstations and local exploits but a myriad of less common vectors exist.
And you can perform the firewire attack using http://www.breaknenter.org/projects/inception/
Additionally memory can also be dumped via PCI e.g. http://www.grandideastudio.com/portfolio/tribble/
If you're concerned about such attacks you could use an external device which lets you enter a password using its own keyboard, meaning the key is stored in volatile memory on the external device - not accessible via a memory dumping tool. And then don't leave the device plugged into the computer when you're not around.
And bruteforce attacks have been around for a while using GPUs for instance Passware's forensic program.
For example, Bestcrypt from Jetico (http://www.jetico.com/encryption-bestcrypt-volume-encryption...) supports two-factor authentication with removable disks (including USB sticks) or hardware tokens or over the network. That is, the encryption keys are simply not available on a computer that may be stolen, for example.
In addition, all kinds of memory dumps, including hibernation and even crash dumps are fully encrypted.
I imagine in time, at the minimum the PGP and Truecrypt products will eventually catch up with similar features.
Used in that way, this greatly mitigates the risks mentioned in the article.
PrivateCore (http://www.privatecore.com) defends against memory extraction attacks like this. We treat main memory as a hostile device and encrypt all data before it leaves the CPU.
We're venture-backed and hiring a memory-management researcher if you're interested: http://www.privatecore.com/careers/memory-management-researc...
Of course, if you have physical access, theres a multitude of ways to get the keys that are not time critical or depend on the machine running at the time of access.
I've seen options to store the key in the L1-cache instead of the RAM-memory to make this attack much harder. I'm not sure whether I remember correctly or if it's even possible with common tools though.
The real news is the commercial tool that implements the memory dumping and key extraction.
Enclosed but not encrypted: (http://www.h-online.com/security/features/Enclosed-but-not-e...)
as has been said before, recovering keys from memory dumps is nothing new (although this makes it much easier).
turns out there was a patch for the linux kernel[1] to do it.
[1] - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR