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Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me... by drucken on Thursday December 20, 2012 @01:18PM (#4949069)
There are more secure tools than the ones mentioned available, and have been for a while.

For example, Bestcrypt from Jetico (http://www.jetico.com/encryption-bestcrypt-volume-encryption...) supports two-factor authentication with removable disks (including USB sticks) or hardware tokens or over the network. That is, the encryption keys are simply not available on a computer that may be stolen, for example.

In addition, all kinds of memory dumps, including hibernation and even crash dumps are fully encrypted.

I imagine in time, at the minimum the PGP and Truecrypt products will eventually catch up with similar features.

Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me... by SageRaven on Thursday December 20, 2012 @06:49PM (#4950719)
Sure, the key files won't be on the computer, but the decryption key must necessarily be resident in RAM or otherwise accessible by the CPU (in a register, such as with TRESOR mentioned elsewhere) to encrypt/decrypt disk blocks of a running system.
Re:Popular disk encryption systems' keys recoverable from me... by drucken on Friday December 21, 2012 @05:41AM (#4952214)
My point is that there are security products with configurations where the keys are cleared from RAM when the system is not running (including hibernation modes). Therefore, in those configurations they are at most only vulnerable while they are running.

Used in that way, this greatly mitigates the risks mentioned in the article.