> To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court’s case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a “relevant factor” when considered along with other salient factors. Id., at 887.
A fuller quote:
> To stop an individual for brief questioning about immigration status, the Government must have reasonable suspicion that the individual is illegally present in the United States ... Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and "considerably short" of the preponderance of the evidence standard ... Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances ... Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court's case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a "relevant factor" when considered along with other salient factors.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavanaugh_stop?wprov=sfti1#Sup...
"Looking Mexican in LA."
Mm... I can smell them Freedom Fries.
But they definitely cannot arrest people based on reasonable suspicion. Anyone speaking on behalf of DHS should know the difference.
And an important part of the decision is that (emphasis his):
> Plaintiffs’ standing theory is especially deficient in this case because immigration officers also use their experience to stop suspected illegal immigrants based on a variety of factors. So even if the Government had a policy of making stops based on the factors prohibited by the District Court, immigration officers might not rely only on those factors if and when they stop plaintiffs in the future.
and to affirm existing understanding of reasonable suspicion:
> Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and “considerably short” of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 274. Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 885, n. 10; Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273. Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884–885 (listing “[a]ny number of factors” that contribute to reasonable suspicion of illegal presence).
(In other words, he clearly lays out the reasons why such a "combination of factors" may create reasonable suspicion, per precedent.)
As for Kavanaugh "realizing" any such thing, I can't fathom why you think so. This is the same guy who has been very visibly protested by activists of a similar stripe from the beginning.
Footnote on Page 7, written by Kavanaugh mere weeks after the Perdomo decision, says the opposite: "the officers must not make interior immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity... “[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”"
So is race a consideration or is it not? He says here that it's well-established that the Constitution prevents it.
Or did he just throw in that sentence as a complete non-sequitur, unrelated to the immediately preceding sentences?
They cannot make the stop "based on" that sole factor.
It may become part of "the totality of the circumstances" that "contribute to" reasonable suspicion.
You (and Kavanaugh a few weeks prior) are saying that it can be.
That's a contradiction.
> it's well-established that race cannot be a consideration in the application of law.
You seem to think these statements are equivalent. They are not.
"Kavanaugh a few weeks prior" is perfectly consistent, as explained in the other post I linked.
And no, your "solely due to" vs "contributing factor to" does not satisfy this. The quoted text (from Whren v United States) is extremely clear: race cannot be a consideration.
> Comments should get more thoughtful and substantive, not less, as a topic gets more divisive.
Therefore I am done here, as well.
Can you give us an example where the two statements are meaningfully different?
You have to stop thinking these institutions are worth protecting when they have been the impediment to any progress this country has made.