They cannot make the stop "based on" that sole factor.
It may become part of "the totality of the circumstances" that "contribute to" reasonable suspicion.
You (and Kavanaugh a few weeks prior) are saying that it can be.
That's a contradiction.
> it's well-established that race cannot be a consideration in the application of law.
You seem to think these statements are equivalent. They are not.
"Kavanaugh a few weeks prior" is perfectly consistent, as explained in the other post I linked.
And no, your "solely due to" vs "contributing factor to" does not satisfy this. The quoted text (from Whren v United States) is extremely clear: race cannot be a consideration.
> Comments should get more thoughtful and substantive, not less, as a topic gets more divisive.
Therefore I am done here, as well.
Footnote on Page 7, written by Kavanaugh mere weeks after the Perdomo decision, says the opposite: "the officers must not make interior immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity... “[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”"
So is race a consideration or is it not? He says here that it's well-established that the Constitution prevents it.
Or did he just throw in that sentence as a complete non-sequitur, unrelated to the immediately preceding sentences?